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The main concern of this dissertation is to determine
the impact of dependency on Zaire's foreign policy. The
study is premised on the notion that any serious inquiry
on the foreign policies of peripheral countries like
Zaire, can be coherent if sufficient attention is paid to
the structure of their political economy. In this context,
the paradigm of dependency which lays bare the economic
structure of peripheral states, is used in order to grasp
the foreign policy of Zaire. The dissertation raises the
question as to the extent to which dependency determines
the course of Zaire's foreign policy. By way of hypothesis,
it is argued that the class alliance existing between the
Zairean ruling class and foreign capital has prevented
Zaire from pursuing an independent militant foreign policy
based on the principles of non-alignment. Through the
application of the historical materialist method, the
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different material forces which shape the historical
evolution of Zaire have been thoroughly analyzed. Since
the study shows that the survival of the Zairean ruling
class depends on the support of foreign forces, it is
quite evident that the relationship between the Zairean
state and foreign capital has a "dominant-dependent"
character. Therefore, the dissertation concludes by
inference or deduction that dependency impacts on Zaire's
foreign policy. Hence, the author calls for a radical
change in Zaire's economic structure and the establishment
of new institutional arrangements in order to get rid of
dependency. In this author's view, the eradication of
dependency is a sine qua non condition toward the pursuit
of an independent foreign policy.
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Most of the analyses dealing with the foreign policies
of African states in general, and Zaire in particular, tend
to pay insufficient attention to the structures of their
political economy. One of the principal reasons for this
neglect lies in the difficulty of linking unequivocally
political decisions to economic factors. Variables such as
economic dependence or simply dependency may seem scienti¬
fically too equivocal and controversial to explain a political
decision of any particular dependent country. Nevertheless,
many serious students of African politics like Timothy Shaw
and Olajide Aluko, believe that dependency may be a useful
analytical tool to understand the dynamics of the foreign
policies of many peripheral African states. Speaking of
methodological issues which often arise in any study dealing
with international relations, Olajide Aluko argues that:
Social science is not like the physical or natural
sciences. Theoretical models involving prediction
have proved even less useful in economics than in
meteorology. And international relations comprises
many more complex variables that are neither quanti¬
fiable or verifiable. So the use of the models and
theoretical analysis in international relations is
less rewarding and less illuminating than in economics.1
iQlajide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 4.
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In the case of a dependent country like Zaire, given
the nature of the state and its colonial inheritance of
dependence which is maintained thanks to some factors such
as international class alliances, the choice of dependency
as a variable may be useful in explaining some of its
important political decisions at the international level.
As Charles Lercher, Jr. and Abdul Said maintain: "The value
of choosing a particular frame of reference for any inquiry
is not that it gets us any closer to the ultimate truth of
the matter; rather it provides a ground on which to stand."2
Given this, one may argue that the nature of the
Zairean state and the structure of its political economy
determine the course of Zaire's foreign policy. Indeed,
integrated into the world economic system during the colonial
period, the Zairean economy has not undergone any fundamental
change since independence on June 30, 1960.
As during the colonial era, Zaire's role in the inter¬
national economic system has remained unchanged. That is,
to supply copper, cobalt, and other mineral and agricultural
products to the developed countries located at the center
of the world economic system, in return for consumer goods
from the developed capitalist countries. Also, just like
in the colonial period, Zaire actually concentrates much
interest on the extraction of copper, cobalt and other
^Charles 0. Lercher, Jr. and Abdul A. Said, eds..
Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective,
3rd edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hai1, 1979),
p. 32.
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mineral products that are badly needed by Western countries
for economic and strategic purposes. The neglect of other
sectors of the Zairean economy, such as agriculture and
transportation is simply the result of the fact that Zaire's
economic structure was designed to be more responsive to
the needs of the developed countries located at the center
of the world economic system than to its own. Needless to
say, Zaire is a peripheral country.
The structural linkage between Zaire and the West has
put the economy of Zaire at the mercy of the Western powers
that provide Zaire with technology, finance and experts,
all of which are needed to insure the production of raw
material and the reproduction of the system. It follows
that the country is extremely vulnerable to external
influences and pressures. Hence, an economic sabotage by
the West may lead to an economic disaster in Zaire. It is
therefore in the Western interest to maintain this neo¬
colonial economic structure. This being the case, an
analysis of the Zairean state must be the starting point of
any study dealing with the nature of the Zairean economy
and the dynamics of its foreign policy. Thus, the first
section of this introductory chapter will focus on the
analysis of the Zairean state while the second section will
examine the concept of dependency and the third section
will deal with the notion of non-alignment. At last, the
fourth section will outline the methodology to be followed
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in the course of this study.
THE ZAIREAN STATE AND ITS INTERNATIONAL NEXUS
The foreign policy of Zaire cannot be clearly understood
without a grasp of the nature of the Zairean state and the
fundamental structure of its political economy. As a matter
of fact, the literature dealing with the notion of the state
in general, and the nature of the Zairean state in particular
is quiet impressive.
Drawing upon the thoughts of Hegel, Marx, Engels and
Lenin, the radical understanding of state puts a strong
emphasis on social classes. Indeed, in the early stages of
capitalism, societies become fragmented as the different
opposing social classes struggle for their respective
interests. The state at this point, emerge to enforce
coercive measures in order to safeguard the interests of
those who control the means of production. It can be
stressed that in a fragmented society, characterized by
class conflicts, the state is never neutral, for it acts to
ensure the domination of the ruling class. Therefore, in
the Marxian terms, the state is the reflection of class
antagonisms. For, it arises when class antagonisms
practically become irreconcilable. Explaining the historical
process of the state, Engels argues that:
The state...is rather a product of society at a
certain stage of development; it is the admission
that this society has become entangled in an
insoluble contradiction with itself, that it is
cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is
powerless to dispel. In order that these antagonisms.
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these classes with conflicting economic interests,
may not annihilate each other and society in sterile
struggle, a power apparently standing above society,
became necessary for the purpose of moderating the
conflict and keeping it within the bounds of "order"
and its is this power, arising out of society, but
placing itself over it, and increasingly alienating
itself from it, is the state.^
In a capitalist society, an economically dominant
class is ipso facto the politically dominant class. Marx
argues that the class which controls the means of production
has control over the political power. Therefore, the state
becomes simply a protector of the ruling class interests.
Speaking further of the state, Engels stresses that:
Because the state arose from the need to hold class
antagonisms in check, but because it arose, at the
same time, in the midst of the conflict of these
classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most
powerful, economically dominant class, which through
the medium of the state, becomes also the politically
dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding
down and exploiting the oppressed class.^
The question of the state is crucial generally in Africa
and particularly in Zaire. The political struggle against
the coercive colonial state reached its logical conclusion
in the 1960s when the processus of decolonization gave birth
to a new type of state (i.e. the neo-colonial state). The
masses that fought colonialism did not expect this outcome.
To the Zairean masses, independence would result in the
political and economic control of the country by the Zairean
people. To be specific, the Zairean masses thought that
^Engels, Frederick quoted by Ronald H. Chilcote,
Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm
(Boulder : Westview Press, 1981), p. 191.
4lbid., p. 192.
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independence would end foreign domination. However, through
neo-colonialism, foreign powers have continued to maintain
their domination in most of the peripheral states. Speaking
of neo-colonial dependent states, Berch Berberoglu argues that
Internally ruled by comprador-capitalist and/or feudal
remnants and externally tied to imperialism, these
states are thoroughly integrated into the world
capitalist system dominated by the bourgeoisie in the
advanced capitalist countries.^
The actual state in Zaire is a neo-colonial one which
serves primarily the interests of externally-based dominant
classes and the interests of those which run it. By using a
Marxist approach, Nzongola's analysis of the state in Zaire
puts a strong emphasis on social classes. In his words,
...it is a neo-colonial state whose ruling class helps
block economic growth and development as well as the
normal functioning of the state apparatus by depriving
the state of those essential means and capabilities
with which it may improve the living conditions of the
popuplation as a whole.6
In his analysis of the Zairean state, Nzongola-Ntalaja
contends that:
The starting point for any Marxist analysis of the
nature and role of the state is not the state's
material structure or apparatus, as Alavi and Saul
begin their discussions, but the class struggle.
For the state is above all a condensation of social
relationships, a relation of power between struggling
classes.7
^Berch Berberoglu, "The Class Nature of the State in
Peripheral Social Formations," Journal of Contemporary
Asia 13:3 (1983), p. 325.
^Nzongola-Ntalaja, Class Struggle and National Liberation
in Africa (Roxbury: Omenana, 1982), p. 44.
• >7lbid p. 39.
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Quoting from the New Nigerian of June 15, 1978, Nzongola
identifies the Zairean ruling class as a kleptocracy which
rules the country "at the pleasure of foreign powers to the
disadvantage of their own people."8 Explaining the gap
existing between the socio-economic conditions of the ruling
class and the other social classes, Nzongola argues that;
The social and economic services left behind by
the colonialist have deteriorated to a point
where most of them exist in name only. Peasant
farmers find it difficult to sell their produce
in urban markets, for lack of an adequate road
network and fair prices. Thousands of rural
migrants to urban centers have to settle for
non-durable dwellings in unhealthy squatter
communities. And a state of semi-permanent
insecurity exists for ordinary people, who are
subject to extortions by members of the armed
forces, the civil service, and the youth branch
of the ruling party. At the same time, politicians
and senior government officials live in expensive
villas and lead a life of luxury and pleasure.^
The nature of the Zairean state is simply a consequence of
its international nexus accompanied by the capitalist
character of the ruling class. This coincides with Nzongola's
belief that:
The economic and moral debacle of Zaire is a function
of the embourgeoisement of the country's leadership
group, its insertion in the import-export economy, its
execution of the neo-colonial tasks of the post colonial
state, and its mis-management of public resources.
Thomas M. Gallaghy, on the other hand, sees the Zairean





expression “state formation" in order to analyze the process
leading to the consolidation of the Zairean state. According
to him, state formation is:
The set of complementary and competing processes that
deal with the creation, consolidation, and extension
of an organization of domination over a population in
a given territory using an administrative apparatus
backed by a coercive capability and various legitimat¬
ing ideas...it is a struggle for dominance with inter¬
nal societal groups and external groups, organizations,
and forces for compliance, resources, and the fulfill¬
ment of ideal and material interests.il
Although some of the characteristics of Gallaghy's
state formation fit into the Zairean society, the concept
is open to questioning when he argues that state formation
is a "struggle for political unification, and external
security."12 For, the coercive character of this type of
state and the social cleavages that it encourages constitute
a tremendous obstacle to an unmasked political unification.
In addition, the dependent character of that state puts its
external security at the mercy of the outside forces.
Thomas Gallaghy argues that:
state formation is both the chief goal and object of
Mobutu's efforts; it is his central and preeminent
policy concern. All other policy concerns revolve
around and are subordinate to this desire to increase
state power. By increasing state power, Mobutu also
reinforces his own position and that of the ruling
class or political aristocracy that supports him.
Mobutu is not solely interested in his own personal
power, he is interested in creating a strong, stable
llThomas M. Gallaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire
in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1981) , p. 81.
12ibid., p. 165.
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state that will outlast him.13
Gallaghy seems to emphasize the organizational structure that
the Zairean ruling class has set up in order to maintain its
domination. However, like many students of Zairean politics
Thomas Gallaghy acknowledges the role that foreign powers
play in strengthening the state in Zaire. He contends that:
Major Western powers have repeatedly helped to keep
Zaire together, have helped Mobutu to come to power
and consolidate that power in important ways (while
others have tried to overthrow him), and along with
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, have
helped to keep him in power.1^
Thomas Gallaghy is, however, one of those scholars who
believe that Western powers are not able to affect either
the structure of the state, or the working procedures of
the Mobutu regime. Indeed, although he acknowledges the
significant role of Western support in the survival of
Mobutu's regime, he however, does not believe that the
Western power can force the regime Mobutu to change its
working procedures. In his words:
The Mobutu regime would not exist today without
external support, past and present, but the ruler
of this patrimonial administrative state and his
political aristocracy have successfully fought
off challenges to their relative autonomy. External
influence is important, but it has its limits.
By stressing, in the above statement, the inevitability of





Thomas Gallaghy indirectly lays bare the dependent character
of the Zairean state. Hence a profound analysis of Zaire's
dependency is in order. Without it, one cannot clearly
evaluate the impact of external forces on the state's
foreign policy. This research is based on the premise that
the best way to establish a link between external forces and
political decisions is through a dynamic study supported by
appropriate data and methods. That is what this dissertation
seeks to do. Given this, one can contend that the ties
linking Zaire and the outside forces have been strengthened,
thanks to the class alliance existing between the Zairean
ruling class and the bourgeoisie capitalist classes abroad.
The Zairean ruling class traces its origin in the petty
bourgeois class which took the leadership during the struggle
against Belgian colonialism. At independence, the differences
among members of the pettybourgeois class became sharp as
far as their ideological orientation was concerned.
Nationalists, under the leadership of Patrice Lumumba,
found themselves in open conflict with the so-called
moderates. Conflicts among Zairean leaders opened the door
to the Cold War between the superpowers. In her remarkable
book. The Congo Cables, Madeleine D. Kalb demonstrates how
the Western powers, under the leadership of the United
States succeeded in putting in power the pro-Western leaders
in Zaire. Referring to the first military takeover in Zaire,
on September 14, 1960, Madeleine Kalb writes:
11
If UN money, however inadvertently supplied,
gave Mobutu his first big boost, it was the
additional money, supplied by the CIA and
the Western embassies in Leopoldville that
kept him in business from then on, according
to reliable sources. Dayal for one, was
convinced that the indecisive Colonel (Mobutu)
would never have taken the plunge if he had
not been assured of major outside assistance.
From that time on, he explained, Mobutu always
has plenty of cash to pay his soldiers, even
when the Congo's treasury was empty. UN liaison
officers attached to Mobutu reported that from
time to time Western military attaches would
visit the Colonel with buldging brief cases
containing thick brown paper packets which they
obligingly deposited on his table. We could not
tell what they contained, Dayal wrote, but could
not help making guesses.
The second military takeover took place on November 24,
1965. With his revolutionary slogans. President Mobutu got
the total support of the masses when he publicly announced
his takeover. In his program speech of December 12, 1965,
President Mobutu declared:
Nothing had value for them (leaders of the first
regime), but power...and for what power and its
exercise could bring them. To stuff their pocket
and live off the Congo and its people, that was
their motto. At every level, many of those who
had a share of public influence became corrupt,
favored the individuals or associations that
gave them bribes and neglected the others. Their
professionalism was no longer motivated by national
or provincial needs, but by their own selfishness.
I have just shown you that we were threatened from
the outside. Some politicians, in order to remain
in, or to takeover did not hesitate to appeal to
foreign countries. They were ready to sell the
Congo and its people on the explicit condition
l^Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables; The Cold War in
Africa From Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmi11 an
Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 96-97.
l^Discours, Allocutions et Messages, ed., (Paris:
J.A., 1975), pp. 20-21.
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that they be helped to stay in power or to seize
it. To satisfy this need, they were about to
sacrifice our independence, our sovereignty, and
our happiness as a free people.!^
This revolutionary language increased the popularity
of President Mobutu after his takeover. But as the years
went by, the Zairean masses realized that their social
conditions were worsening. Whatever the true motives of
the 1965 coup d'etat, one can argue that the ruling class
did not have any clear program dealing with the radical
transformation of the Zairean economic structure. There
were times when the Zairean state took economic decisions
which clashed with the Western interests. However, those
clashes always ended up with a compromise safeguarding the
Western interests.
Whether or not President Mobutu had good intentions in
taking over the power, dependentist scholars may argue that
functioning within a dependent economic structure, his
political power became ipso facto limited. Over the years.
President Mobutu gave up his revolutionary rhetoric and
began adopting obvious conservative stands. His domestic
politics has given rise to open class conflicts and his
foreign policy has become questionable as far as the non-
alignment ideology is concerned. To many observers, the
political stands of Zaire are simply a logical consequence
of the state of dependency which has been increasing at a
high speed over the years. Therefore, a careful theoretical
survey of the concept of dependency is necessary in order to
13
grasp the dynamics of the Zairean politics and its relatedness
with the international arena.
THE CONCEPT OF DEPENDENCY: A THEORETICAL SURVEY
As a paradigm in social sciences, dependency was first
developed by Latin American social scientists who had been
concerned about the aggravation of the fundamental problems
of development in Latin America. Today, the concept is
extended by scholars who analyze not only the problems
facing Latin American countries, but also other Third World
countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
Being identified by most of the scholars as neo-
Marxists, the radical dependent!sts adopt the fundamental
thesis according to which the center is inimical to the
development of peripheral countries and that capitalist
development of the dependent nations is not possible today.
Actually, a great number of scholars belong to the
dependencia school of thought. However, most of them refer
to Theotinio Dos Santos, who has provided the dependencia
school with an acceptable definition of dependency. In his
study of the structure of dependence, Theotinio Dos Santos
suggests the following definition:
By dependence, we mean a situation in which the
economy of certain countries is conditioned by the
development and expansion of another economy to
which the former is subjected. The relation of
interdependence between two or more economies, and
between these and world trade, assumes the form of
dependence when some countries (the dominant ones)
can expand and be self starting, while other countries
(the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection
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of that expansion, which can have either a
positive or negative effect on their immediate
development.
The relations of dependence trace their origin in the
colonial period. The experience shows that the neo-colonial
structure emerging from the relations of dependence have
positive effects on the center and negative effects on the
periphery. Theotinio Dos Santos contends that, "A qualitative
change in the internal structures and external relations of
dependent countries must take place first before the
situation of dependence can be overcome."!^ To Theotinio
Dos Statos, the effects of dependency on the productive
structure are threefoldr^O
1. The productive system that is developing in the
underdeveloped countries is essentially determined
by these international relations; in the first
place, by the need to conserve the agrarian or
mining export structure;
2. The accumulations of capital...is characterized by
profound differences among domestic wage levels, in
the context of a local cheap manpower market,
combined with the utilization of a technology of
intense use of capital. The result, from the view
of relative surplus value, is a high rate of
exploitation of labor power;
3. The productive structure created by dependent
industrialization limits the growth of the internal
market for various reasons. First, because it
subjects the labor force to highly exploitative
relations, limiting its purchasing power. Second,
because in adopting a technology of intense capital
use, it creates very few jobs relatively speaking,
in comparison with population growth, and limits the
creation of new sources of income...Third , the
l^Theotino Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,"
in K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges, eds.. Readings in U.S.




remittance abroad of profits carries away part of the
economic surplus generated within the country which
cannot be utilized, in part because of the above
mentioned limitations on the domestic market, in part
because it does not find new outlets with equally high
rates of exploitation and prefers to move to those
areas where they can be found, in part so as not to
open new industries which would comoete with goods
imported from imperialists centers.20
Having elaborated on the effects of the dependent relations,
Theotinio Dos Santos concludes that:
In order to understand the system of dependent
reproduction and the socio-economic conformations
created by it, we must see it as part of a system
of world economic relations based on monopolistic
control of large scale capital, in control of
certain economic and financial centers over others,
on a monopoly of technology that is highly complex
and that leads to unequal and combined development
at a national and international level.21
Generally speaking, dependency results in a situation
whereby a dependent country cannot manage its internal
affairs without outside assistance. In any case, the actual
dependency of most Third World nations is the consequence of
imperialism. For, imperialism shapes and develops dependency
in the periphery of the world capitalist system. Therefore,
the origin and function of dependency cannot be clearly
understood without reference to the system of imperialism.
As Clifford Edogun argues:
...it is established that the relations of dependence
are rooted in the system of imperialism. This began
in the early conquests when, in the last third of the
19th century, classical capitalism turned into monopoly
capitalism and the finance capital of the advanced




spheres of interest. Today, even after political inde¬
pendence of Third World nations, direct economic depen¬
dence had come to mean that all key positions of the
economies of Third World nations are in the hands of,
or are controlled by foreign monopoly capital. This has
ensured the direct exploitation of the population of the
underdeveloped countries, the systematic appropriation
and repatriation of most of the surplus produced by the
local labor force as well as part of the surplus realized
by the small commodity producers and a certain proportion
of the income of the whole population.22
Although most of the dependent!stas focus their
analyses on the general aspect of dependency and the nega¬
tive consequences emerging from the relations of dependence,
Tamas Szentes puts emphasis on the different forms of
dependency. He contends that:
The peculiar structural features of under¬
developed countries bear witness to the fact
that their present state has been determined
by a historical development in which external
forces have played a prominent part.23
It has been established that a state of dependency has
created a neo-colonal system of production in the dependent
countries. Tamas Szentes identifies four forms of dependence.
1) Direct economic dependence: To Tamas Szentes, direct
economic dependence is "the situation in which the key
positions of the economy, the most important economic
branches, are in the hands of, are controlled by foreign
monopoly capital.“24 Szentes believes that the control
22ciifford Edogun, "Non-Aligned Movement Today: Towards
an Ideological Perspective of World Order," The African
Review 9:1 (1982), p. 75.
23Tamas Szentes, The Political Economy of Underdevelop-
ment (Budapest: Akademiai Kiade, 1976) , p. 100.
24ibid., p. 166.
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of the economy of a dependent country by foreign monopoly
capital is the most marked form of economic dependence. As
many scholars have demonstrated, the structures of the
economy of dependent states are extroverted in the sense
that they are more responsive to the needs of the center.
Therefore, such structures ensure the systematic exploitation
of the population of the underdeveloped country. This form
of dependence exists in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Countries which experience direct economic dependence are,
de facto neo-colonies even though they are, de jure politi¬
cally independent states. In most of those countries,
attempts to nationalize foreign companies have proven to be
unsuccessful for several reasons. One can simply argue
that without any radical changes in the economic structures
of the dependent countries, nationalizations of foreign
companies cannot be really successful. 2) Trade dependence:
to Tamas Szentes,
trade dependence means, on the one hand, a dependence
in trade relations on a few advanced capitalist
countries with which most of the trade is transacted
(let's call it 'relational dependence"), and, on the
other hand, the overall dependence of the entire
economy on the cyclical changes of the capitalist
world market.25
Szentes argues that the relational dependence is simply the
consequence of direct economic dependence. It is on the
one hand, the legacy of colonialism and on the other hand,




a country whose most important economic sectors
are controlled by foreign capital, will trade
largely or exclusively with the metropolitan
country of that capital and will produce what
is needed by the country, and will be a ready
market for goods that the firms of that country
want to sell there.26
As a matter of fact, the neo-colonial system has maintained
the links established during the colonial period. Dependent
countries trade exclusively with the countries that control
their economies. Foreign capital which holds the key positions
in the dependent country's economy make the dependent state
channel foreign trade in the direction it wishes. The
metropolitan countries, on the other hand, use various
means to consolidate the "relational" trade dependence.
The sytem of preference, for example, provides the metropolitan
countries with favorable conditions to export primary
commodities from the dependent states. The "relational"
dependence maintains the status quo in the international
world economic system by determining the economic role of
the peripheral states. Thus, the economic role of the
peripheral states is limited to produce primary commodities
whereas the division of labor prevents them from developing
national industries. The European Economic Community is
one of the international organizations which strengthen the
"relational" trade dependence with several African countries.
Through the credit-financing of exports, the extensions of
26ibid., p. 171
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loans and the monetary relations, the European Economic
Community has succeeded in strengthening the monocultural
production within the economic structure of the neo-colonial
African states. Speaking of the dangers of the "relational"
trade dependence, Szentes argues that the stronger metro¬
politan country can determine (or at least influence) the
conditions of exchange according to her own interest (in
volume, in value terms, in time, etc.), and can use this
form of dependence in order to exert a political pressure
upon the dependent country or to influence the economic
policy of the latter.^7 3) Financial dependence: Tamas
Szentes argues that in countries where the banking system
and the credit system are under foreign control, the ties
of financial dependence are very obvious. Even though most
of the peripheral states have nationalized their banking
system, Szentes agrees that the dependence of the dependent
countries on loans and grants given to them by the leading
capitalist countries and the international organization
controlled by the latter is becoming more and more "the
main form of economic dependence of the underdeveloped
countries and the principal means of neo-colonialism."28
Actually, the external debt that the developing states have
accumulated over the years continues to play a controversial




periphery of the world economic system. According to
Szentes,
this increasing indebtedness of the developing
countries is to a certain extent favorable for
the leading capitalist countries in that it
enables them to force the debtor countries into
a more dependent relationship, a consequence
fully in line with neo-colonialist aims.29
The fact that most of the dependent countries are not able
to stimulate an internal capital accumulation which may be
utilized for repayment shows that in many cases the ruling
classes of the peripheral states use foreign grants for
reasons which may not relate to development goals.
4) Technical dependence: According to Szentes, technical
dependence is
a dependence on intellectual imports, whether in
their materialized form (as the import of technology,
the standardization system, patents and licenses, or
the results of researches in sciences and technology)
or in its live form (as the import of experts,
advisers, teachers, or the sending abroad of students
on foreign scholarships).20
This form of dependence plays a big impact on the cultural
values of the people of the dependent countries who may
adopt the cultural values of thousands of experts living in
their countries. Since the end of formal colonialism,
technical assistance in the peripheral states is mostly
provided by the Western bloc. Claiming to promote the
development of the Third World nations through technical




in putting Western experts in most of the key positions in
different institutions in the dependent states. In the
field of education, banking, industrial production,
communication, transportation, and agriculture, foreign
experts play a very significant role. It is certainly for
that reason that the content of education in the peripheral
states is based on the Western philosophy.
Besides the four kinds of dependence that Tamas Szentes
has elaborated, there exists what Organski calls military
dependency. It may be argued that in the context of this
study, military dependency plays a key role in determining
the course of a dependent country's foreign policy. Organski
contends that:
A military dependency is a nominally independent
nation whose national existence is dependent upon
the presence of foreign troops...The internal
government of a military dependency rests nominally
in the hands of its own nationals, but again the
controlling nation places limits upon the actions
of the national government, not only in foreign
policy, but also in the internal affairs.31
A military dependency varies from one dependent country
to another. Some military dependent countries have foreign
military bases whereas others do not. Organski explains
more by stating that:
In extreme cases, the nation is virtually occupied
by foreign troops and its government heavily
controlled from abroad. In other cases, (for example,
Taiwan), national existence is guaranteed by the
controlling nation, foreign military bases exist,
and the national forces are armed and supplied by the
31a.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1968), p. 247.
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controlling nation, but large numbers of foreign
troops are not present. Presumably they would be in
the case of conflict, but for the moment they are not.
In still other cases, nations may rely heavily upon
foreign military aid and upon the territorial
guarantees of foreign allies, but they retain control
of their own government and military forces.32
The direct consequence of a military dependency lies in the
fact that the government of the dependent country is
apparently in control of the domestic and foreign affairs
of the country, but in reality, the dominant countries
limit its actions at the internal and external level. A
country may be economically dependent on the Western bloc
and militarily dependent on the Eastern bloc. In that
case, military dependence exerts more influence on the
politics of the dependent state (i.e. Ethiopia under Mengistu
and Ghana under Rawlings). The preponderance of the
military dependence in influencing the behavior of a
dependent state lies in the fact that the military assistance
guarantees the survival of the ruling classes in the
dependent states. Therefore, it may be assumed that in order
for dependency to affect the foreign policies of a dependent
country, it must also include the military aspect.
Actually, most of the African countries maintain not
only economic ties, but also military links with the former
metropolitan countries. The ties that bind the former
African colonies to the Western blocs are simply historical.
The socialist revolution taking place in some African
32ibid., p. 248
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countries, such as Congo, Libya, Angola, Mozambique...has
made possible the reduction of the Western influence in the
domestic and international politics of those countries.
Although most of the pro-socialist African countries are
still more or less economically dependent on the Western
bloc, the lack of the military dependency on the Western
bloc prevents them from being subject to a lot of Western
pressure. In addition, there exists obviously no class
alliance between the ruling class in the pro-socialist
African countries and the foreign bourgeois in the Western
bloc. Therefore, in any study dealing with dependency, it
should be argued that class analysis would be more efficient
in the sense that it lays bare actors who promote dependency.
Indeed, dependency is a consequence of historical
factors which can be eradicated by social revolution. By
pointing out the role that dependency can play in shaping
the politics of any dependent country, it is necessary to
stress that politics, that is, the superstructure can also
shape the state of dependency. In other words, dependency
and politics can shape each other reciprocally.
As a matter of fact, the dialectical links existing
between economics (structure) and politics (superstructure)
are very manifest. Indeed, a radical transformation of the
economic structure may be the result of new perceptions,
attitudes, ideas, conceptions and orientations which
necessitate political decisions affecting the economy as a
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whole. The Chinese cultural revolution is one of the
examples which show how the infrastructure can be radically
transformed by the superstructure. However, the inertie of
the superstructure makes the economic structure continue to
play its historical role and pushes the external forces
which control the economy to exert more political influence
in the dependent country. The lack of political will to
transform radically the economic structure continues to
reinforce the neo-colonial economic system in the periphery.
Being more concerned by its selfish interests than the
national interest, the ruling class in the periphery has
established an alliance with the external forces that keep
the economic system from undergoing any radical change.
Therefore, in order to understand clearly the causes and
functions of dependency, one has to deal with the notion of
social classes at the international level. For, besides
all the historical causes that one takes into account when
dealing with the dependency paradigm, there is no doubt
that the class alliances make possible the perpetuation of
the state of dependency.
In an interesting study dealing with the connection
between dependence and the international system. Dale
Johnson, argues that:
The concept of dependence, as it has been elaborated
in recent years, refers to the situation that the
history of colonialism has left and the contemporary
imperialism creates in underdeveloped countries.
25
Dependence is imperialism seen from the perspective
of underdevelopment.33
Speaking of the class character of dependency. Dale Johnson
contends that:
Dependence relations also shape the social structure
of underdevelopment. A principal factor in the
development and perpetuation of underdevelopment
was, and is, the coincidence of interest between
national oligarchies and the economic structure
of underdevelopment.34
To Dale Johnson, the whole international system comprising
the world economic system, the multinational corporations
and imperialism seen as institutionalized system of control,
shapes the structure of dependent states and limits their
freedom of action. National classes and power structures
in dependent countries are also shaped by modern imperialism.
Applying his study to the Latin American countries. Dale
Johnson maintains that:
If indeed national oligarchies still retain
predominant control of the economy and the
principal social and political institutions
within Latin American societies, then the
development alternatives and the political
choices that they can make with this power
are defined and circumscribed...The points
of articulation between the interests of the
dominant classes in Latin America and the
class interests in the imperial center reside
in their position at the apex of structures of
wealth, privilege, and power, in distinct, yet
closely interrelated worlds, neither of which
33Dale Johnson, "Dependence and the International System,"
in James Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson,
Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political
Economy (New York: Anchor Books, 1972 ), p. 71.
34ibid. , p. 73.
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could continue to exist without the other.
Imperialism could not sustain itself as a
dominant force in the world, were it not for
support among client classes in underdeveloped
countries. And oligarchies would fall one by
one to national revolutions if they did not get
international backing.35
The case of Latin America is very similar to the
situation in the African peripheral states. Indeed,
imperialism cannot continue to shape the structure of
dependence in Africa without the collaboration of oligarchic
and client classes holding de jure power in the African
peripheral countries. On the other hand, the survival of
the oligarchic classes in Africa depends on the backing of
international forces which provide them with financial aid
and military assistance. It is for that reason that many
scholars contend that political factors heavily contribute
to increase the state of dependency. For, when class
conflicts in a peripheral state become intense because of
divergence of interests between the ruling class and other
classes, such as peasant and worker classes, the survival
of the ruling class depends on the bourgeois classes in the
center which can provide every necessary assistance in
order to crush revolutionary forces which struggle to bring
about radical changes in the country. Therefore, in order
to prevent nationalist forces from taking over the power so
as to establish an economico-political system which would
respond to the needs of the masses, neo-colonialist forces
3 51bid. , p. 111.
27
do not hesitate to assist economically and militarily the
oligarchic classes which protect their interests.
Because of that reason, one can argue that most of the
economic or military aids to Third World nations are not
necessarily devoted to boost their development. Most of the
time, those aids are designated to assist the ruling classes
that safeguard the interests of the imperialist forces.
Robert Rothstein has certainly understood the dynamics
of class conflicts in the Third World when he writes:
Domestic instability, or the fear thereof,
tempts insecure leaders to use foreign policy
as a supplementary resource in their political
struggles. A rising defense budget, or efforts
to secure high levels of military assistance,
may be a way to keep the army happy and not a
response to an external threat. Foreign aid
may be sought to pay off supporters, not to
raise domestic investment rates. Summit meetings
and speeches at the United Nations may be
designed to alleviate psychic insecurities, not
to deal with substantive problems. And so on.
For leaders who feel constantly threatened, a
foreign policy that reflects an "objective"
interpretation of the national interest, if
any such thing exists, is likely to appear as
something of a luxury; if they do not use foreign
policy to increase their own domestic strength,
they may not be around to use it at all.36
Dependence is, therefore, a paradigm which can be very useful
when it is supported by a class analysis. For that reason,
recent dependentist scholars apply a Marxist analysis in
different studies dealing with the paradigm of dependency.
Despite a series of issues raised as far as dependency and
36Robert L. Rothstein, The Weak in the World of the
Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. Ill.
28
Marxist theories are concerned, radical dependency may be
viewed as a special perspective within a Marxian analysis.
Indeed, one has to distinguish between a bourgeois dependency
approach and a radical dependency approach. The former,
represented by scholars such as Paul Prebish, Raul Fernandez
and Jose Ocampo believe that dependency can lead the peripheral
states to a capitalist development. However, the latter claims
that dependency furthers the underdevelopment of the peripheral
states. Radical dependent!stas such as James Petras, Dale
Johnson, Andre Gunder Frank agree with the theory of value
which is central in the Marxist understanding of history.
Joel C. Edelstein argues that:
The radical dependency perspective does not deny
analysis of the labor process. It does point out
that production for external markets has been a
basic element in the formation of underdevelopment.
Production for external markets had been vitally
important in establishing the interest of dominant
classes in Latin American as well as in the specific
correlation of class forces.
Speaking of the relationship between Marxism and
dependency, Joel Edelstein makes the following comments:
While the radical dependency perspective only
brings out elements in the context of dependent
capitalist development which differ from that
of the development of the now advanced capitalist
countries, some sectarian critics have raised
this perspective to the level of a general theory.
In doing so, they attempt to make dependency into
a competitor with Marxist theory and methodology.
In my opinion, the concepts used by left
37joel C. Edelstein, "Dependency: A Special Theory
Within Marxian Analysis," in Ronald H. Chilcote, Dependency
and Marxism: Toward a Resolution of the Debate (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1981 ), p. 106.
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dependentiStas do not sufficiently specify a
set of relationships to constitute a theory.
But if these concepts were to add up to a theory,
it is a special, rather than a general theory.
As a special theory, it seeks an understanding of
social formations which have been created essentially
through their integration into an expanding world
world capitalist system. It is not an alternative
to Marxist analysis. It can be a perspective which
makes a Marxist analysis of these social formations
possible by exploring the totality of Latin
American dependent capitalist development.38
Therefore, this study does not see any incompatibility
between radical dependency and the Marxist theory. This
study will simply apply the dependentist perspective within
the general Marxist framework. In that context, class analysis
with regard to the mode of production will constitute the key
reference to the understanding of Zaire's foreign policy.
As explained earlier, the state of dependency makes a
country rely on the outside. An extreme dependency prevents
a peripheral country from being self-reliant. It has been
demonstrated that economic and especially military dependencies
put the dependent countries at the mercy of the dominant
countries which limit the freedom of their political actions.
However, most of the peripheral countries in general and
Zaire in particular claim to be non-aligned as far as their
foreign policies are concerned. Zaire is a full member of
the non-alignment movement and its government claims to
detain the full power to determine the course of Zaire's
foreign policy. Before attempting to establish a link
between Zaire's dependency and its foreign policy, it would
38ibid., p. 107
be best to be begin with an overview of the concept of non-
alignment in international politics .
NON-ALIGNMENT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Being one of the most controversial concepts in
international politics, non-alignment has been dismissed by
some scholars as meaningless. However, a large number of
scientists believe that the non-alignment movement has had
a significant impact on international affairs and that the
concept can be meaningful depending on the context in which
it is applied.
Actually, most of the Third World leaders claim to be
involved in the non-alignment movement. To many radical
scholars, non-alignment is still alive in the 1980s despite
the discredit and distortion of the concept by bourgeois
scientists. In an interesting book on the non-alignment,
Peter Willetts argues that:
Many writers trace the origins of the non-
alignment back as far as the late 1940s. While
it is almost impossible to trace the evolution
of ideas with any precision, it is too facile to
accept the judgment of the non-aligned politicians,
some of whom seek to add legitimacy by giving the
ideas a long history...It was not until the late
1950s that Yugoslavia, Egypt and India began to work
together and develop a common approach. Their contri¬
bution to non-alignment does not go any further back.39
To Peter Willetts, the Asian-African conference which
was held in the Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955 should
39peter Willetts, The Non-A1igned Movement: The Origin
of a Third World A^iance (New York: Nichols Publishing
Co., 1978), pp. Z-3.
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not be viewed as the origin of the non-aligned movement.
Speaking of the exact origin of the non-alignment movement,
Willetts contends that:
Non-alignment was not widely recognized as a
coherent set of ideas, that was the basic
justification for the foreign policy of
particular states, until those states came
together and articulated their common interests
and similarity of outlook in the 1961 Belgrade
Conference. This summit originated from the
increasingly close cooperation between Tito,
Nasser and Nehru since 1956. Thus, if there
is any point at which non-alignment was
conceived, it was in the 1956 Suez-Hungary
crisis, the greatest confrontation between
two radical nationalism and the major powers
to occur in the first twenty years of the post
war era.^0
According to Peter Willetts, the Suez-Hungary crisis brought
Yugoslavia, Egypt and India together for the following
reasons: Yugoslavia was threatened by the Russian invasion
of Hungary, whereas Egypt was invaded by Israel, Great
Britain, and France after the nationalization of the Suez
Canal, and at last, India was supporting Egypt for reasons
of sympathy and also for strategic interest in the Suez Canal.
Peter Willetts maintains that "non-alignment was not born
until 1961 as a coherent group of ideas propounded by a
group of relatively like-minded states.In any case, if
one refers to non-alignment as a movement, one should consider
the Bandung Conference as its forerunner. Indeed, the




gathering Third World countries that were mostly under
colonial domination. Speaking of the Bandung Conference,
Clifford Edogun argues that:
It set the tone of the subsequent objectives
of the non-aligned movement. Operating within
a world dominated by two superpowers, the
Bandung Conference sough to highlight the
issue of political independence, the elimination
of the last vestiges of European colonialism,
the development of national economies and the
establishment of liberation movement.^2
To put it clearly, the non-aligned movement traces its
origin in the Bandung Conference held in 1955. However,
one may also agree with Peter Willetts who argues that if
non-alignment is viewed as a set of coherent ideas, then it
is more appropriate to trace its origins to the Belgrade
summit conference which adopted the resolutions of the
Cairo prepartory meeting in June 1961. At the Cairo
prepartory meeting, the foreign ministers drew up the
criteria to be used in order to issue invitations to the
first summit held in Belgrade. Those criteria of non-
alignment were the following:
(1) An independent policy based on the co¬
existence of states with different political
and social systems and non-alignment or a trend
in favor of such a policy; (2) Consistent support
to movements for national independence; (3) Non¬
membership of a multilateral military alliance
concluded in the context of Great Powers
conflicts; (4) In the case of bilateral
military agreement with a great power, or
membership of a regional defense pact, the
agreement or pact should not be one deliberately
concluded in the context of great power conflicts;
and (5) In case of lease of military bases to a
42Edogun, "Non-Aligned Movement Today," p. 69.
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foreign power, the concessions should not have
been made in the context of great power conflicts.
The five criteria mentioned above are used by scholars to
define the concept of non-alignment. Comparing non-alignment
with traditional neutrality, Peter Willetts argues that:
Neutrality was a passive, isolationist policy
of non-involvement and generally was practiced
by stable established states, that had a clear
sense of identity...Neutrality involved
abstention from all conflicts, whereas non-
alignment only involves abstention from the
Cold War. Non-alignment has not implied
neutrality in the anti-colonial struggle, nor
in conflicts between the developing and the
developed nations. Indeed, the claim has often
been made that non-alignment may involve active
participation in Cold War disputes provided that
each issue is decided on its merits, rather than
by regular support of the bloc leader. The
distinction between non-alignment and neutralism
may be summed up by differences between an
activist and an isolationist approach.
There have also been series of debates as to whether non-
alignment may be seen as an ideology or not. On that issue,
Willetts contends that:
An ideology may be defined as the programmatic
assertion of political values, which are held
to be of universal validity for their proclaimed
domain. On this basis, non-alignment is an
ideology. It is different from other ideologies
in that an ideology is usually concerned with
the role of individuals in societies, whereas
non-alignment is concerned with the role of
states in the international system. The ideology
arises from the need for identification for new
states entering a complex and demanding system;
as a counter ideology to the pressures from the
"free world" and the "socialist system," and in
many cases as a result of specific situations of
^^willetts. The Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 18-19.
1 bi d ., p . 29 .
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stress, that some of the states were facing.
Particularly in relations to economic needs the
ideology serves the purpose of interest articulation.
Just as with ideologies concerning man and society,
the origins of non-alignment lie in identification,
stress and interest.
In 1970, the non-aligned held a summit in Zambia. The
Lusaka Conference defined a series of aims of non-alignement.
The Lusaka Conference issued a resolution stating that:
...the following continue to be the basic aims
of non-alignment. The pursuit of world peace
and peaceful co-existence by strengthening the
role of non-aligned countries within the United
Nations so that it will be a more effective
obstacle against all forms of aggressive action
and the threat or use of force against the
freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of any country. The fight against
colonialism and racialism which are a negation
of human equality and dignity; The settlement of
disputes by peaceful means; The ending of the arms
race followed by universal disarmament; Opposition
to great power military alliances and pacts;
Opposition to the establishment of foreign military
bases and foreign troops on foreign soil of other
nations in the context of great power conflicts and
colonial and racist suppression; The universality of
and the strengthening of the efficacy of the United
Nations; And the struggle for economic independence
and mutual cooperation on a basis of equality and
mutual benefits.^®
Since the 1970 Lusaka Conference, the non-aligned
movement has become somewhat institutionalized. A sense of
solidarity has emerged within the movement and meetings are
held on a regular basis. Therefore, every three years, the
non-aligned countries hold a summit conference in a specific
^^Declaration of the Lusaka Conference quoted by
Peter Willetts, Ibid., p. 31.
46ibid.
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city. Up to now, the non-aligned countries have held seven
summits, respectively in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (September 1-6,
1961), Cairo, Egypt (October 5-10, 1964), Lusaka, Zambia
(September 8-10, 1970), Algiers, Algeria (September 5-9, 1973),
Colombo, Sri Lanka (August 16-19, 1976), Havana, Cuba
(September 3-9, 1979), New Delhi, India (March 7-12, 1983).
Africa has witnessed the rise of the non-alignment
through the speeches and writings of great leaders such as
Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita and Kenneth Kaunda.
Speaking of non-alignment in Africa and Asia, Margaret
Legum writes:
...but non-alignment in Africa and Asia has
never meant neutralism or the desire to be
left alone or isolated. It is the assertion
of the right of a nation to freedom of
decision in international affairs, and the
right to make choices on the basis of issue's
merits, regardless of the interest of the
Cold War alliances.
Margaret Legum goes further by stating that non-alignment
in Africa can be seen also as an expression of demands by
African people to the rest of the world. She argues that:
The first demand is the demand for recognition
and dignity as a people with a unique and
worthwhile contribution to make. The drive for
respect and self-interest is common to all
people; it is only more apparent in Africa
where it has been denied for so long...The
second is the demand to take an active part in
ending throughout the continent the system
which is construed to be responsible for the
sufferings of Africans in the past - the twin
'^^Margaret Legum, "African and Non-Alignment, " in
J.W. Burton, ed., Non-Alignement (London: The Trinity
Press, 1966), pp. 56-57.
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system of alien rule or colonialism and racial
discrimination.48
Margaret Legum concludes that non-alignment is Africa's
best approach to policy making in international affairs. As
an approach to deal with internal issues, Legum maintains
that the objectives of non-alignment in Africa is threefold:
(1) The first is to establish the principle
and the practice that the sovereignty of
small states is as important as the interests
of large ones...It is understandable that the
small and relatively week states of Africa
should be constantly aware of their economic
and military weakness in the face of the big
powers, and constantly seeking political means
of ensuring that this will not be exploited.
They have rightly concluded that their efforts
would be in vain if they allow themselves to
become minor partners in either of the strong
international alliances.
(2) The second major objective is to abolish
colonialism and alien rule throughout the
continent.
(3) The third objective in which all of Africa
has a common interest is economic development,
and specifically rapid development through the
application of capital from the developed world
to the resources of Africa. More than this, such
aid must come without political conditions,
otherwise it nullifies Africa's other major
objectives.49
Referring to Margaret Legum, one can argue that non-
alignment is an expression of commitment to decolonization,
self-determination, self-interest, sovereignty and economic
development. Non-alignment may signify a tendency toward
independence and a response to the formation of two
antagonistic blocs. By putting emphasis on economic
48ibid., pp. 58-59
49 I bid., p. 61.
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development, the non-aligned have become inseparable from
the so-called Group of 77 in the North-South economic
negotiations.
As a movement, non-alignmnent may be easy to define.
It can be viewed as an organization composed of non-aligned
countries. The common bond of nation-members is to implement
"a foreign policy independent of the superpowers or associated
blocs, then polarized by the Cold War."50
As a concept, Richard Jackson argues that non-alignment
is difficult to define. He believes that the difficulty to
define non-alignment as a philosophy or set of values lies
in the diversity of the membership within the non-alignment
movement. Despite the complexity surrounding the concept
of non-alignment, Richard Jackson quoted two definitions that
most members of the non-alignment movement find valid. The
first definition came from Gamal Abdel Nasser, who stated in
1961 that:
Non-alignment means that we ought to decide
what we believe in and not according to
what might satisfy any particular country.
It means that our policy is not attached to
the policy of any other country or the big
powers.51
The second definition came from the Deputy Prime
Minister of Vanuatu, Mr. J.S. Regenvanu. At the admission
of Vanuatu as the 101^^ non-aligned member, Mr. Regenvanu
50Richard L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, The UN and the
Superpowers (New York: Praeger, 1983 ), p . 4.
5lGamal Abdel Nasser quoted in Ibid., p. 7.
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made the following statement in March 1983, "For us being a
non-aligned country means being able to say what you believe
without fearing that it could result in undesirable relations
with one or the other bloc."52
As one can notice, non-alignment refers to independence
and freedom of decisions. Generally, any international
political decision of a non-aligned country must be taken
with regard to its national interest. A political decision
of a non-aligned country cannot and should not be taken in
order to satisfy foreign interests. A country which
implements a foreign policy based on foreign interests
should not be seen as non-aligned.
As a matter of fact, independence, colonialism, economic
development, exploitation, political freedom and racism
constituted the main issues which pushed leaders such as
Nehru, Tito and Nasser to develop what is actually called
the ideology of non-alignment. The ideology or philosophy
of non-alignment is still valid in the 1980s because Third
World countries are still being exploited politically and
economically during this neo-colonial period. Speaking of
the ideology of non-alignment, Clifford Edogun writes:
I shall refer to non-alignmemt as a "protest
demand" ideology with attention on the
cluster of Third World attitudes towards
their continued dwindling economic and techno¬
logical position vis-a-vis the advanced capitalist
world. The "protest demand" ideology must thus be
understood as consistent expressions and perception
52j.s. Regenvanu quoted in Ibid.
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of sovereignty over resources, better terms of
trade, greater financial aid, etc.^^
To Clifford Edogun, non-alignment as an ideology is an
instrument of struggle against the economic exploitation of
the Third World. He argues that bourgeois scholars have
sought to discredit and distort the ideology of non-alignment
because of the radical stands of leaders such as Castro of
Cuba, Toure of Guinea, Ho Chi Minh of Indochina, Ben Bella
of Algeria.
To Edogun, the ideology of non-alignment is simply a
protest against the dominant-dependent relations existing
between the ex-colonies and the advanced capitalist countries.
He maintains that:
It was revealed that as Third World peoples
were drawn into new economic and commercial
relations with the advanced capitalist
economy, indigenous economic structures were
forced to serve new external ends. Their
incorporations into the world economy meant
the extraction of both their human and physical
resources. Subsistence, rural economies were
converted into vast reservoir of labor to be
utilized according to the fortunes of the
capitalist economies. These realities became
the nerve of the non-aligned ideological
thought processes that bourgeois scholars
ignored throughout the decade of the 1950s
and the 1960s. It was left to the decade of
the 1970s for the non-aligned movement to revive,
reassert and institutionalize its method of
approach to international economic issues.54
As one can understand, non-alignment is a philosophy
which deals with political as well as economic issues.
53Edogun, "Non-Aligned Movement Today," p. 68
541 bid., p. 73.
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Most of the scholars who have conducted studies on non-
alignment are reluctant to define it. However, generally
speaking, non-alignment refers to a politics which is not
based on foreign interests. A policy of non-alignment
takes into account the national interest of the non-aligned
country. Non-alignment, says Kwame Nkrumah, means “freedom
to judge issues on the merits, and to substitute peaceful
settlement of disputes for violence and war.“55
At the core of non-alignment is the freedom to make
decisions. External pressure aiming at influencing political
decisions contribute to weaken the philosophy of non-alignment.
It may be argued that a non-aligned country is the one
which is determined to preserve its sovereignty and to
struggle against neo-colonialism and economic exploitation.
Zaire is one of the African countries claiming to be
non-aligned. Its foreign policy was explained by President
Mobutu in a speech delivered in December 1972. President
Mobutu described the foreign policy of Zaire in the following
terms: "According to the doctrine laid down by the M.P.R.,
we are neither rightist, leftist, nor even centrist. We
have opted to follow a path which is ours exclusively:
genuine nationalism.“56
55Kwame Nkrumah, "The Determinants of the Foreign
Policies of African States," in Olajide Aluko, ed.. The
Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and
Stroghton, 197^), p. 15.
56Mobutu Sese Seko, “The Foreign Policy of Zaire," in
Umba di Lutete, Address of the State Commissioner of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation (Washington, D.C.:
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However, being a dependent country situated at the
periphery of the world capitalist system, Zaire is undoubtly
placed in the Western orbit. As many other dependent states,
Zairean leaders claim to be non-aligned and pretend to have
freedom to judge issues and make international decisions on
a basis of merit and interests of Zairean people.
A few scholars have written articles on the foreign
policy of Zaire. However, there has never been a dynamic
study explaining the trends of Zaire's foreign policy on
the basis of the dependency paradigm. Michael Schatzberg
tried to describe superficially the multiple dependencies
of Zaire without relating them to Zaire's political stands
at the international level.He analyzed three forms of
dependency: commercial, technological and political.
Schatzberg argues that:
the diversification of dependency has provided
some occasions to play one set of external
interests off against others. Mobutu is far
too shrewd a politician to think that Western
capital speaks with a single voice. The door is
open - not to one, but to all - provided that
foreign investors are willing to associate
Zaireans with their business endeavors.
Despite the fact that Schatzberg did not deepen his analysis
of the Zairean economy, his brief articles ends up with the
Center for Strategic Studies, October 9, 1978), p. 9.
S^See Michael Schatzberg, "Zaire," in Timothy Shaw and
Olajide Aluko, The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy
(Towbridge: Redwood Burn Limited, 1984), pp. 283-318.
59lbid., p. 311.
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conclusion according to which Zaire's multiple dependencies
and the internal dynamics of social class formation will
continue to condition the external relations of Zaire.
However, as explained earlier, Schatzberg did not provide a
profound analysis of the Zairean economic structure in
order to come to relate unequivocally dependency to foreign
policy and demonstrate, on the basis of appropriate data,
how Zaire's dependency will continue to shape Zaire's
foreign policy.
Thomas Kanza, on the other hand, examines Zaire's
foreign policy by focusing on the ideology of Authenticity.
He argues that "the basis of foreign policy of Zaire is the
general policy outlined by the first Congolese government led
by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba."^9 Thomas Kanza seems to
pay much attention to the rhetorical aspect of Zaire's
foreign policy and to the personality of President Mobutu.
Needless to say that Kanza's short article is not in touch
with the reality, for a true analysis of foreign policy
should be based on actions rather than rhetoric or discourse.
Jeannick Odier, at last, describes the success of
President Mobutu in his foreign policy.®^ He explains the
role that Mobutu played in solving some inter-African
59Thomas Kanza, "Zaire's Foreign Policy," in Olajide
Aluko, The Foreign Policies of African States (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 238.
60See Jeannick Odier, "La politique etrangere de Mobutu,"
Revue Francaise d'Etudes Politiques Africaines 120 (Decembre
1975), pp. 25-41.
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conflicts. He praises Mobutu for launching the ideology of
Authenticity and for struggling against colonialism and
racism. Written in 1975, Jeannick Odier's article does not
reflect the actual economic and political realities of
Zaire. He contends that:
After succeeding in reestablishing economic
order and prosperity in Zaire, General Mobutu
has also succeeded, thanks to an active
diplomacy to make Zaire the leader of the
African continent. His desire to practice an
active politics has allowed him to be
surrounded by allies as powerful as different
in their politico-economic systems.61
Being too descriptive, Jeannick Odier's article does
not provide a valualbe analysis which can help to understand
the foreign policy of Zaire.
The main objective of this study is to find out whether
there exists a tremendous connection between dependency and
the foreign policy of Zaire. Such a connection can be
established only after a deep analysis of Zaire's economic
structure. If one comes to establish a link between Zaire's
dependency and its political decision, the question will be
to weigh the impact of that dependency on Zaire's foreign
policy.
611 bid., p. 41.
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
To many students of African politics, the weakness of
the African economy does not necessarily shape the foreign
policy of Africa. In a study on the foreign policy of
Algeria, Robert Mortimer argues that:
Economic power is not a subsidiary factor in
the diplomacy of the African states. On the
contrary, it is a central but yet essentially
negative variable. African states themselves
lack economic power. In other words, they
must function in a world system dominated by
the economic power of others. Global economic
structures, elaborated during the colonial
era, greatly affect the options open to African
states. In the context of an established
international division of labor, there are
enormous constraints on African choices.
Foreign policy is shaped by but is also
potentialy an instrument to shape, the external
economic environment.
One can argue with Robert Mortimer that foreign policy
may be an instrument to challenge the external economic
environment. A country like Algeria has been able to
implement a militant foreign policy and has succeeded in
protecting unequivocally the interests of the Algerian
people. Mortimer maintains that:
Not only Algeria mounted one of the most activist
foreign policies among African states, but it has
explicitly linked its domestic developmental model
with its external policy concerns. The Algerians,
under the leaders as diverse as Ben Bella,
Boumediene, and Benjedid, have consistently
treated foreign policy as a critical component of
their economic development strategy.63
62Robert A. Mortimer, "Global Economy and African Foreign
Policy: The Algerian Model," African Studies Review 27:1
(March 1984), p. 1.
63ibid.
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As a matter of fact, Algeria is one of the few African
countries that challenge the world economic system through
its foreign policy. However, there are many other scholars,
students of African politics who agree with Mortimer and
still believe that some African countries are unable to
implement a militant foreign policy because of their
dependence on the external economic forces. Timothy Shaw
is one of the African scholars who believe that because of
the dynamics of class relations, many African states are
unable to challenge the external powers. In a study on the
foreign policy of Zambia, he argues that, "...policies and
problems of Zambia cannot be explained without reference to
its inheritance and acceptance of dependence."®^ Explaining
the reasons why an African country like Zambia cannot
challenge the international system Timothy Shaw contends
that:
Because the ruling class in a state such as
Zambia maintains a comfortable relationship
with external capital, entrepreneurs and
markets, it is disinterested in confronting
the structure of dependence. Indeed, it is
only likely to change its foreign associations
whenever internal opposition from groups
outside its relationship with foreign interests
becomes critical. The ruling class maintains
political order to perpetuate its linkage
with external associates. It has resisted any
change in either the internal distribution of
goods or in its foreign relations.®®
®4Timothy M. Shaw, "Dependence and Underdevelopment:
The Development and Foreign Policies of Zambia," Papers in
International Studies, Africa Series, No. 28 (Athens:
Center for International Studies, 1976), p. 1.
®®Ibid., p. 3.
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The views expressed by Mortimer and Shaw should be of
significant interest. Both views depict the connection
between economic factors and foreign policies. A study of
Zaire's foreign policy can help African students have a
more or less broad view on the relationship existing between
economy and international politics. The findings of this
study can be applied to most of the neo-colonial African
states that maintain a dependent economic structure that is
responsive to the needs of the external world. Indeed, the
emergence of a local bourgeoisie sustained by external
forces has contributed to prevent any radical change in the
economic structure of the African neo-colonial states.
Therefore, one may suspect that what is true for Zaire can
also be true for any other neo-colonial state whose ruling
class maintains a close relationship with the monopoly
capital .
Whether or not African foreign policy has been influenced
by economic factors, it should be interesting to focus on
the relationship between dependency and Zaire's foreign policy.
It is well known that some African countries like Algeria
try to implement a militant foreign policy and other countries
do not. The main questions that this study is going to
deal with are the following: (1) What kind of foreign policy
does Zaire implement? (2) Does dependency determine the
course of Zaire's foreign policy? (3) To what degree does
dependency contribute to shape the external behavior of the
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Zairean state? (5) Since non-alignment implies freedom of
decision in international affairs, does Zaire behave freely
and independently within the international system? (6) Has
the Zairean ruling class been able to challenge politically
the Western powers despite Zaire's state of dependency?
In order to find adequate answers to the above questions,
serious analysis and investigations need to be done.
However, the main hypothesis of this study is that the
class alliance existing between the Zairean ruling class
and the foreign capital has prevented Zaire from implementing
a militant foreign policy based on the principles of non-
alignment. This, however, does not suggest that all Zairean
decisions are based on foreign interests. For, in many
circumstances, Zaire has taken stands challenging the
Western powers. Also, the experience shows that several
times Zaire has reversed its decisions in order to satisfy
foreign interests. Another hypothesis is that the multiple
dependencies prevent Zaire from implementing a militant
foreign policy. One can contend that even though dependency
does not influence Zaire's foreign policy at 100%, it
certainly plays a major role in the decision-making process
of Zaire.
METHODOLOGY
The historical materialist method will be used in the
context of this study. By using the historical materialist
method, the question will be to explain Zaire's dependency
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and its impact on foreign policies thanks to an analysis of
social classes. The historical materialist method puts
emphasis on the material forces which shape the historical
evolution of a society. To George Lukas,
Historical materialism is no doubt a scientific
method by which to comprehend the events of the
past and to grasp their true nature...It also
permits us to view the present historically and
hence scientifically so that we can penetrate
beneath the surface and perceive the profounder
historical forces which in reality control events.
This study does not intend to make a description of the
historical evolution of Zaire since the pre-colonial period.
It will rather focus on the "immediate history" of Zaire. To
To reach an adequate result, the following procedures will
be observed.
The first step will deal with an analysis of the mode
of production in Zaire. After establishing that the economic
structure of Zaire is neo-colonial, the research will
identify the major forces which intervene in the process of
production in Zaire. Once one determines the class which
controls the means of production, the question will be to
establish the link between the Zairean ruling class which
controls the state and the class which owns the means of
production. It is well known that the alliance existing
between the Zairean ruling class and the owners of the
means of production in Zaire is based on economic factors.
However, that alliance has an impact on political decisions.
^^George Luckas, History of Class Consciousness: Studies
in Marxist Dialectics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971), p.224.
49
As a neo-colonial state, the means of production in Zaire
are controlled by the foreign capital. And the ruling
class in Zaire continues to control the power thanks to
foreign assistance. The Zairean ruling class has been
maintained in power as a result of its allegiance to foreign
interests. In return, the foreign powers continue to
control the economy of Zaire, thanks to the full participation
and collaboration of the Zairean ruling class which has no
alternatives unless it jeopardizes its survival.
The second step will be concerned with the interests
existing between the neo-colonial state in Zaire and the
international monopoly capital. At this point, the study
will focus on the principal themes guiding Zaire's foreign
policy. Indeed, in order to get support from the Zairean
masses the President of Zaire has not hesitated to be very
active among the more progressive African leaders and
militant non-aligned countries of the Third World. President
Mobutu has launched the themes such as Nationalism,
Authenticity, Zairianisation, in which he explained that
the economy of Zaire must belong to Zairean people and not
to foreigners. He also explained in terms to be understood
by the masses during one of his speeches that Authenticity
means that "Zairean people have to do things they want to
do and not things that other people want them to do."67
67a statement made by President Mobutu during one of
his public speeches. The state controlled radio and TV put
on the air this excerpt before every newscast.
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In international politics, themes and expressions such
as "neither rightist, leftist, nor centrist," constitute
some of the principles that Zaire claims to observe.
Therefore, one has to find out whether Zaire has succeeded
in carrying out its principles.
As a matter of fact, on the rhetorical level, some of
the Zairean themes conflict with the Western interests.
However, on the practical level, Zaire allies itself with
Western interests while at the same time proclaiming its
non-alignment. The principal cause of this situation is
simply the allegiance of the Zairean ruling class to the
Western interests.
In order to establish a link between dependency and
foreign policy, information and data to be collected must
have some criteria in order to be analyzed. The study will
be subdivided into three categories.
The first category to be analyzed will include the
actions relating to any Zairean military involvement in a
situation where there are obvious direct or indirect
participation of the Western and Eastern blocs. The Angola
war and the Chadian armed conflicts may be included in this
category. Each situation will be analyzed in such a way
that one comes to determine the motives of the involvement
with regards to the principles laid down by the manifesto
of the party.
The second category will include the political stands
of Zaire in major armed conflicts involving directly or
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indirectly the Western and the Eastern blocs: conflicts
such as the POLISARIO, the Horn of Africa, South Africa,
Israelo-Arab conflict. The question is not to find out
whether Zaire took the Western or Eastern stand, but to
determine whether Zaire has made a judgment on the basis of
merits and interests of the Zairean people.
The third category will analyze the voting record of
Zaire in international fora. This effort will attempt to
identify "key" votes which contradict the principles of
Zaire. Therefore, a survey of the voting record of Zaire
at the United Nations and OAU will help to identify the
votes which conflict with the Zairean principles and
interests.
It is necessary to point out that actions such as
diplomatic recognition of any country or occasional statements
made by Zairean officials and many other minor actions will
not be included in the categories of facts to be analyzed.
After a careful examination of the three categories
mentioned above, an overall stand of Zaire on the international
scene will be assessed. If one determines that Zaire's
foreign policy is a reflection of the Western interests,
the task will be to demonstrate whether or not the Zairean
interests coincide with the Western interests. Since at
the level of rhetoric the Zairean principles conflict with
the Western interests, the formulation of a foreign policy
based on the Western interests can only be the result of the
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class alliance between the Zairean ruling class and
international monopoly capital. As the survival of the
Zairean ruling class depends on the support of foreign
forces, the relationship between the Zairean ruling class
and the foreign capital has a "dominant-dependent" character.
One can therefore conclude by inference that dependency
impacts on Zaire's foreign policy.
To determine that Zaire acted, in any particular
situation, on the basis of dependency is not easy. That
can be determined only by deduction or inference. Any of
Zaire's behavior cannot be explained with regard to the
concept of dependency. However, a serious analysis of such
a behavior with regard to Zaire's interest and principles
may help explain whether Zaire acted on behalf of the
Zairean people's interests or foreign interests. If one
demonstrates that any particular decision is in contradiction
with the Zairean principles and, at the same time, coincides
with the Western interests, one can conclude by inference
that dependency contributed to shape such a behavior. For
instance, it is written in the official documents of the
Zairean single political party. Popular Movement of the
Revolution (MPR) that Zaire would condemn all nations that
strengthen the racist regime of South Africa through
economic and military cooperation. However, on the practical
level, Zaire never publicly condemned the Western powers that
cooperate with South Africa. On the contrary Zaire refused
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to support the ejection of South Africa from the United
Nations. Further, Zaire that claims to support the right
for self-determination and independence has been unwilling
to support the right of the people of the Western Sahara
for self-determination despite the United Nations resolutions.
The prospect of seeing a pro-socialist government in the
Western Sahara has led the Western countries to support
Morocco in its conflict with the POLISARIO. As Morocco
contributed in the rescue operation of Zaire in the Shaba
wars, one can easily notice that Zaire's judgment in the
Western Sahara issue is not based on merit but other
considerations. In any case, any international action to
be analyzed wil be related to Zaire's domestic situation
and to the level of the "dominant-dependent" relationship
between Zaire's ruling class and the international monopoly
capital. For, when contradictions between the Zairean
rulings class and the Western powers arise, one can notice
a change in Zaire's behavior. For instance, the militant
speech of the Zairean President at the United Nations in
1973 was delivered during the period dominated by the rise
of Authenticity and the launching of Zairianization measures
in Zaire. Such domestic policies gave rise to an open
conflict of interests between Zaire and the Western powers.
This research will deal with the quantitative task to
collect data which can determine the level of Zaire's
dependency. All data relating to Zaire's economy
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(investments, foreign economic participation, GNP, GDP...)»
technological and military assistances will be analyzed in
order to evaluate the degree of Zaire's dependency. Once
one determines Zaire's level of dependency, one can be able
to make an assessment on Zaire's vulnerability and
subjection to external forces.
Many secret documents and books can help to reach an
adequate conclusion. The Zairean political exiles who
testify against the Zairean government provide a lot of
data useful in the study of Zaire. The former Prime Minister
of Zaire, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, for example, testified at the
United States Congress two years ago. In his testimony he
declared that the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Zaire and Angola was imposed to President Mobutu by
Washington. Otherwise, Zaire would not have obtained
additional financial assistance from the United States.
This is an example, among others, of Zaire's international
action dictated by foreign powers as well as by the necessity
to survive on the part of the Zairean ruling class.
Documents such as the manifesto of the Zairean political
party, MPR, the Zairean constitution, Mobutu's speeches and
many other official documents laying down the principles of
Zaire's foreign policy will be analyzed in order to understand
the basic contradiction which may arise in the course of
Zaire's foreign policy decisions. At last, scientific
books dealing with the politics in Zaire will help to
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determine the linkage between the Zairean state and the
Western powers.
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
This introductory chapter has clearly defined and
explained the subject of this dissertation. The first
section has reviewed the current literature on the notion
of the state in general, and a discussion of the Zairean
state's connection with the external worl<l in particular.
The second section has focused on the concept of dependency
while the third section has examined the true meaning of
non-alignment in international politics. The fourth section
of this introductory chapter has dealt with the methodological
approach of the dissertation.
Zaire's dependency will be the focus of the second
chapter. The first section of the second chapter will
survey the Zairean economic structure; the second section
will examine Zaire's economic dependence while the third,
fourth and fifth sections will deal respectively with
Zaire's financial, technological, and military dependencies.
The analysis of Zaire's foreign policy will be the
focus of the third chapter of this dissertation. The first
section of this third chapter will deal with the bureaucratic
machinery through which international political decisions
are made while the second section will examine the official
guideline of Zaire's foreign policy as defined by the single
political party MPR. The third section will deal exclusively
56
with the practical aspect of Zaire's foreign policy in
order to determine the gap which exists between rhetoric
and actions. In the context of the discussion on Zaire's
action in the international arena, the study will focus on
Zaire's relations with, respectively, other African states,
the Western bloc, the Eastern bloc, and the Middle East
countries. Further, Zaire's presence at the United Nations
and the Organization of African Unity will be deeply examined
in order to assess unequivocally the overall stand of Zaire
in international affairs.
At last, the fourth chapter will conclude the
dissertation. A general assessment on Zaire's foreign
policy will be made in this conclusive chapter and, of
course, prescriptions and recommendations will be formulated.
CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF ZAIRE'S DEPENDENCY
Like most of the countries located at the periphery of
the world capitalist system, Zaire is a dependent country.
However, an understanding of Zaire's dependency can be
viewed as a necessary step toward an evaluation of Zaire's
vulnerability in the international arena. Since Zaire's
dependency traces its origin in the colonial period, this
chapter intends to analyze Zaire's dependency in an historical
perspective. To be specific, by looking at the historical
evolution of the Zairean economy since the colonial period,
one will be able to identify the various dimensions of
Zaire's dependency and their causes.
Many scholars have written on Zaire's economy. As a
matter of fact, the historical events which dominated the
colonial period of Zaire have been the subject of a large
literature. Books and articles dealing with the Zairean
colonial period are so numerous that a recount of those
colonial events, at this juncture, would be unnecessary.
However, a brief description of the various dimensions of
Zaire's history would help to understand the origin of
Zaire's dependency.
Earlier in its history, Zaire was the victim of a
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series of factors leading to its full integration into
the world capitalist system. The process began with the
territorial pretensions of Leopold II, King of Belgium, who
conquered Zaire, then Congo, and considered it as his
private property. The official proclamation of the
Independent State of the Congo (EIC) in 1885 was accompanied
by the Western recognition of Leopold II's sovereignty over
Congo. Having gotten the Western support and the approval
of some traditional chiefs. King Leopold II began to take a
series of measures aimed at creating an economic and
political organization capable of financing itself and of
producing surplus. Leopold II's regime of outright robbery
put a strong emphasis on the extraction of wealth for
transfer to Belgium. When Leopold II decided to abandon
his territorial pretensions by transfering the Congo to
Belgium, industrial capital was already flowing into Congo.
The administrative reforms that followed Belgium's takeover
of the Congo largely contributed to speed up the process
linking Zaire to the Belgian economy and the world. Indeed,
the imposition of a legal system by the colonial administra¬
tion and the establishment of the "Force Publique" (colonial
army) resulted in the submission of the local population to
the colonial authority. The presence of a coercive colonial
administration coupled by European capitalists contributed
to transform the Zairean economy by making it responsive to
the needs of Belgium and other Western countries. Because
59
of their participation in the colonization process, Belgian
financial interests became, ipso facto, an integral part of
the colonial enterprise.
European companies received special colonial concessions
with the exclusive rights to remove the population and even
to force masses to work in the mining or agricultural field.
The introduction of the tax system made a lot of villagers
abandon their subsistence economic system and find a job in
order to pay taxes. This process led, little by little, to
the formation of a class structure in the Zairian colonial
society. The continued infusion of colonialists and
capitalists resulted in the transformation of the Zairean
society in urban and rural areas with different categories
of social groups. Speaking of the economic activities in
the colonial period of Zaire, Michael Schatzbery argues that:
European interests and personnel controlled
nearly all economic activity and foreigners
eventually monopolized industry, agriculture,
mining, and commerce. Even retail commerce
gradually came under the colonial thumb...
Colonial economic policy explicitly favoured
large mining and agro-industrial concerns and
the state did everything to nurture them.l
The principal effect of the colonial penetration was
the destruction of the traditional mode of production and
the emergence of the economic structure responsive to the
needs of the Belgian economy. Belgian financial interests
^Michael G. Schatzberg, "Zaire," in Timothy M. Shaw and
Olajide Aluko, eds.. The Political Economy of African Foreign
Pol icy (Trowbridge: Gower House, 1984), p. 287.
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that controlled the means of production were ipso facto
financial allies of the colonial state. After many years
of operation, companies in the mining and agricultural
sectors drastically transformed the Zairean society.
Indeed, the emergence of social classes with divergent
interests was simply the consequence of the development of
the capitalist system in Zaire before independence.
In the class structure of the Zairean colonial sociey,
Belgian capitalists, who owned the means of production, and
the colonial administrators, who controlled the state, were
on top of the pyramid. They were not concerned about the
development of Zaire. Indeed, despite the fact that within
half a century of colonialism, mineral societies in Zaire
extracted five and a half million tons of copper and more
than 260,000 kilos of gold, Belgian colonialists were
unwilling to provide Zaire with well educated people capable
of running the country.2 Indeed, the fact shows that within
half a century of colonialism, Belgian colonialists educated
only ten Zaireans to the status of graduate from university.
Besides the European capitalists, one could notice the
development of the class of "evolues". Composed of the
subordinate Zairean employees of the Belgian colonial
administration and private enterprises, the "evolues" were,
for a long time, concerned with their material and cultural
advancement within the colonial system. As Edward Kannyo
2Robert Cornevin, Histoire du Congo (Leopoldville)
(Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1963 ), p. 200.
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argues, the "evolues" began to challenge the colonial order
only after they realized that they could not achieve full
material progress within the colonial system.3 in this
context, they took the leadership role in the struggle for
independence.
Other social categories included the working class and
the 1umpenproletariat. Indeed, the working class, coming
predominantly from villages, was treated by colonial masters
without any human dignity. Despite their hard work in the
colonial companies, workers could not take advantage of the
large profit accumulated in the process of extraction of wealth.
Urban workers, especially, and the 1umpenproletariat, or
the unemployed, played a significant role in the struggle
for decolonization. Their readiness to take action was
proven during the historical revolt of January 4, 1959.
Indeed, on that date, Congolese masses resorted to violence
following the cancellation of an ABAKO's rally by the first
mayor of Kinshasa, Mr. Tordeur (a Belgian). Being one of
the most popular political movements before independence,
ABAKO disposed of thousands followers. The cancellation of
the rally upset the crowd that was eager to hear ABAKO's
leaders speak about "immediate independence," which was
their favorite slogan. With anger, masses marched into
white areas destroying everything. Describing the January 4
^Edward Kannyo, "Post Colonial Politics in Zaire, 1960-
70," in Guy Gran, ed., Zaire; The Political Economy of
Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 55.
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revolt, Alan Merriam quotes Ruth Slade who argued that:
The Abako supporters... grew excited and
talked wildly of independence; Mr. Kasa-Vubu,
who was also present, failed to calm them. The
police arrived and resorted to the use of
firearms; anger spread throughout the native
city, and the cry of independence was taken up;
the pent-up fury of many months was unleashed;
Europeans were attacked and churches, schools,
hospitals, and social centers destroyed. The
Europeans gave way to panic, the army was called
in, and the repression was violent...As a result,
unsuspecting Europeans became involved in the
riots, when they could have avoided the affected
neighborhoods.^
Many scholars have analyzed the colonial class structure
of Zaire. Classifications and criteria vary from one scholar
to another. However, most of the studies on the colonial
period of Zaire pay a lot of attention to Paul Demunter,
Comeliau, Lacroix, and Nzongola's social classifications.
Synthesizing the works of Demunter, Nzongola and Schatzberg,
David Gould identifies in his article on the role of the
military in Zairean politics, six distinct classes in the
colonial period of Zaire (1885-1959). He classifies them
as follows:
1. Bourgeoisie. This class had two strata. The
class of entrepreneurs which owned the critical
means of production, e.g., mines and factories,
was European and European-based... The "middle"
bourgeoisie lived in the colony as settlers
(colons), owning and managing large land concessions.
2. Classical Petty Bourgeoisie. This class included
the bulk of businessmen involved in services, foreigners
(Europeans, Asians, Arabs, West Africans, etc.) and was
characterized by vulnerability to and dependence on
the upper bourgeoisie's policies and strategies.
^Ruth Slade quoted by Alan Merriam, Congo: Background
of Conflict (U.S.A.: Northwestern University Press,
1961) , p. 85.
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3. New Petty Bourgeoisie. This class consisted of
white-collar employees, clerks and teachers. Its
members relied entirely on the colonial-capitalist
system for salaries and wages. Certain Zairians
(known as evolues) were permitted to join Europeans
at the bottom level of the new petty bourgeoisie's
ranks. These included the top Zairians in the army,
including Joseph-Desire Mobutu, who were promoted
in the late 1950s to the rank of sergeant.
4. Peasantry. This class was numerically speaking
the largest. Forced by colonialism to pay taxes and
duties, they were obliged to abandon the "barter"
economy and operate within the confines of the
capitalist economic system.
5. Proletariat. Europeans were the "aristocratic"
workers (in some respects, therefore categori zabl e
within the "new petty bourgeoisie"), while under
the prevailing racist ideology, African workers
are kept apart and scorned.
6. Lumpen-proletariat. The final class consisted of
the unemployed population subsisting in urban ghettos,
hoping for integration into the production process.5
As the above class structure of the Zairean colonial
society indicates, the economy of Zaire was not controlled
by Zairean people. Foreigners who owned the means of
production controlled, ipso facto, the Zairean economy. By
transfering regularly raw materials from Zaire to Belgium
and other Western countries, the economic structure of
Zaire became responsive to the needs of the Belgian economy
and the rest of the capitalist world.
Given the situation created by colonialism, the struggle
for independence was to mean the exclusive control of Zaire
by Zairean people. However, differences among "evolues"
who took the leadership role in the struggle for independence.
^David J. Gould, "Patrons and Clients: The Role of the
Military in Zairian Politics," in Isaac James Mowoe, ed..
The Performance of Soldiers as Governors; African Politics
and the African Military (Washington, D.C.; Uni versity
Press America, 1980), pp. 469-470.
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has a serious Impact on the post colonial Zairean state.
In this context, Edward Kannyo makes the following comments:
Until the last two years of Belgian colonial
rule, the energies of the "evolues" had been
diverted into the organization of ethnic or
cultural organizations rather than political
parties. It is therefore not surprising that,
when greater freedom to organize politically
was granted in 1957 during the first municipal
elections, ethnic animosity and conflict were
the result. By early 1960, ethnic warfare had
broken out in Kasai and a few other places.
The struggle for control of the post colonial
Zairean State among the former evolue stratum
soon erupted into armed confrontation,
secessions, and assassinations.®
When the struggle for independence reached a decisive
stage in Zaire, some reactionary "evolues" did not hesitate
to request foreign support in order to take control of the
Zairean post colonial state. The Mouvement National
Congolais (MNC) headed by Patrice Emery Lumumba, was
undoubtly the only political party to have a radical program
aiming at transforming the economic structure of the Zairean
society. In addition, the MNC was the only political party
organized on a national basis rather than ethnic. Given
his radical stands, Lumumba was not expected to get any
Western backing. In the struggle for the control of the
post colonial Zairean state, Lumumba exclusively relied on
the Zairean masses while other Zairean leaders were seeking
foreign support. Speaking of the external intervention in
the struggle for control of the post colonial Zairean state,
Edward Kannyo argues that:
SKannyo, "Post Colonial Politics in Zaire," p. 56.
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The forms and degree of external intervention
were determined by the manner in which foreign
interests perceived the relationships between
their economic and political stakes and the
political character of the contending Zairean
groups and factions...Belgian colonial rule
had brought the Zairean political system into
the international capitalist system as a
supplier of vital strategic raw materials. One
of the fundamental questions that the imminence
of Zairean political independence raised for the
foreign economic and political interests was the
country's continued status as a member of this
system. Would the country opt out? Would foreign
investment be safe? These questions were of great
concern to the major capitalist powers - the
United States, Britain, France, West Germay -
and especially Belgium, which had extensive
economic interests.^
Concerned about their economic interests in Zaire,
imperialists and their Zairean clients succeeded in murdering
Lumumba who was elected by the parliament as prime minister.
Lumumba's death and the elimination of the populist
insurrections annihilated the challenge to foreign interests
and facilitated the maintenance of Zaire in the status of
supplier of raw materials to the developed capitalist
countries. Secessions, political strifes, conflicts and
rivalry which continued to take place after independence,
ended up with a military coup d'etat on November 24, 1965.
The advent of President Mobutu to power gave a new hope
to the Zairean masses who were tired of the selfishness of
the first regime's leaders. Indeed, it was obvious that a
large number of the "evolues" had been concerned about
moving into the former European positions in the state
7lbid.
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administration. The "evolues" became the immediate
beneficiaries of the political and socioeconomic opportunities
left by Europeans while the masses saw no change in their
situation. Therefore, the November 24 coup d'etat was
welcomed by the masses who expected a radical change in
their socioeconomic conditions.
President Mobutu's rise to power was subject to a lot
of speculations among students of African politics. Indeed,
the former President of Zaire, Joseph Kasa-Vubu had the
Western support, especially during the tense period marked
by his open conflict with Patrice Lumumba. Mobutu's relative
control over the Congolese national army coupled with his
external contacts helped him play a major role during the
political crisis period. His influence in politics sufaced
for the first time in September 1960 when he "neutralized"
Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba and established the "College of
Commisioners" which had to control the power up to February
1961. Composed of moderate university students, the College
of Commissioners was clearly siding with Kasa-Vubu in his
conflict with Lumumba. It was reported that Kasa-Vubu was
meeting with the College of Commissioners on a regular
basis. By September 15, when Lumumba was confined to his
residence and encircled by the UN guards to prevent his
arrest, there were Congolese troops, on the other hand,
standing by Lumumba's residence in order to prevent him
from escaping. Therefore, it was evident that the government
controlled by Mobutu, the College of Commissioners, and
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indirectly by Kasa-Vubu had already made plans relating to
Lumumba's removal. By late 1961, some of the members of
the College of Commissioners succeeded in establishing an
informal political caucus known as the Binza group. By
mid-1962, the Binza group became politically very influential
thanks to the control that its members had over key organs
of power. Some of the principal members of the Binza group
were the following: Mobutu Joseph Desire, Army Commander;
Nendaka Victor, Security Police Chief; Bomboko Justin Marie,
Foreign Minister; Ndele Albert, National Bank President;
and Damien Kandolo, Interior Ministry Permanent Secretary.
Most of the members of the Binza group were former members of
the College of Commissioners. Some of them played a key
role in the fall of Patrice Lumumba.
The murder of Lumumba left the central government in
the hands of moderate leaders. However, later on, the Western
countries were worried about the lack of a strong leadership
to eliminate secessions and political strifes in the Congo.
To foreign strategists, the perpetual subjection of Zaire
to Western economic control required a relative political
stability. A couple of months before Mobutu's coup d'etat,
relations between President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister
Tshombe who was also moderate, were tense. That led
Kasa-Vubu to announce on October 13, 1965 that Evarist
Kimba would form a new government and that Tshombe's
transitional duties were over. On November 14, 1965,
Tshombe's followers succeeded in blocking the investiture
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of Kimba in the parliament. Western interests were watching
closely the Tshombe - Kasa-Vuba contest. Grawford Young
and Thomas Turner have analyzed the personalities of
Kasa-Vubu and Tshombe. They argue that:
While both protagonists had favored a federal
structure in 1959-60, and each had distrusted
the aggressive, unitarist nationalism of
Lumumba, their personalities were incompatible.
KasaVubu was distant, mysterious, legalistic,
lacking in charisma, and disposed to allow
conflicts to seek their own resolution - and
in important aspects politically naive. Tshombe
was skilled in the art of constructing alliances
of convenience, uninhibited by ideological
conviction, open to diverse influences, charming
personally, and captivating to crowds. Though
KasaVubu had relied heavily on Western, especially
American, support in 1960, he was never a client
of external interests...Tshombe who entered
politics with modest family wealth, squirreled
away large sums abroad...He always maintained
close and profitable ties to foreign financial
milieux, especially those of Belgium.8
The American government saw in Mobutu, an alternative to
Kasa-Vubu's lack of strong leadership. Because of the
unavailability of the CIA secret documents, it is difficult
to make a clear connection between the U.S. government and
the November 24 coup d'etat. However, Grawford Young and
Thomas Turner explain that:
Weissman, the most assiduous and thorough
student of the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) role in Zaire, concludes that
the agency was "involved" in the coup, but
without specifying in exactly what way or to
what degree. CIA Kinshasa station chief
Lawrence Devlin, who had developed an
intimate relationship with Mobutu in 1959
^Grawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and
Decline of the Zairean State (Madison: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 49-50.
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when both were in Brussels, had played a
crucial covert role in Zairian affairs
through the Binza group in 1960-62, and had
returned for a second tour of duty in Zaire
not long before the coup - a fact which many
observers saw as circumstantial evidence of
American complicity in the coup. Though
Tshombe had his supporters among American
diplomats (particularly Ambassador McMurtre
Godley), his leadership was crippled by an
inability to gain sufficient African
legitimacy. To Washington the KasaVubu group
seemed embarked on dangerous opening to the
left. The Mobutu alternative thus appeared
to promise both stability and reliabi1ity.^
In order to legitimize his authority and attract
popular support. President Mobutu began to criticize the
former civilian regime which he accused of being unable to
give to the country the economic independence needed. He
accused former leaders of being the agents of foreign
powers. Mobutu's rhetoric was anti-colonial , anti-imperialist
and nationalist. He even proclaimed Lumumba a national
hero. Mobutu's speeches were focusing on his ideological
assertions which have been termed nationalism, authencity,
nationalisme zairois authentique, Mobutism, Zairianization.
All this contributed to increase Mobutu's popularity.
However, despite the nationalist rhetoric of President
Mobutu, Zaire's structural linkage to the world capitalist
system could be seen as a significant factor affecting
domestic as well as international politics in Zaire.
Besides, the development of the state capitalism in Zaire
indicated that the capitalist orientation of the Zairean
• >91 b i d p. 53
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ruling class was an important factor which made impossible
the radical transformation of the Zairean economic structure.
Therefore, the nationalist rhetoric of President Mobutu
could not mask permanently the fact that the Zairean ruling
class had some common interests with foreign capital.
The actual social cleavages existing between the
Zairean bourgeoisie and other classes such as the workers,
the peasants, and the 1umpenproletariat have resulted in
open class conflicts. The threat against the Zairean state
has led the ruling class to increase Zaire's state of
dependency by seeking material assistance from foreign
backers in order to crush popular revolts. In any case, in
order to understand the dynamic of class conflicts in Zaire,
it is best to begin with an analysis of Zaire's class
structure. Indeed, the post-colonial class structure of
Zaire has also been the subject of serious scientific studies.
Comeliau and Lacroix have used different criteria to analyze
the class structure of Zaire after independence. Both
scholars have made use of the concept of group instead of
class. Unlike Comeliau, Lacroix has based his classification
on the relations between social groups and means of produc¬
tion. According to Michael Schatzberg, of the analysts who
have applied the Marxist notion of social class to Zairean
politics and society, Nzongola-Ntajala is among the keenest.
lOMichael Schatzberg, Political and Class in Africa:
Bureaucracy, Business and Beer in Lisala (New York:
Africana Publishing Company, 1980) , p"! 19.
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Indeed, Nzongola identified five social classes in his
article entitled "The Bourgeoisie and Revolution in the
Congo". Michael Schatzberg explains in detail Nzongolo's
classification in the following terms:
...the national bourgeoisie includes politicians
bureaucrats, cadres, independent entrepreneurs,
and wealthy traders. The second class, the petty
bourgeoisie, corresponds roughly to Comeliau's
under bourgeoisie and is composed of clerks,
teachers, nurses, soldiers, and policemen. The
working class encompasses rural and urban salaried
workers, and village farmers are in the peasantry.
Finally, the fifth class includes the lumpen-
proletaritat, or the unemployed...In basing his
social classes on the social groups put forth by
Comeliau, Nzongola notes that these groups can be
considered class-in-themselves, which have
recognizable structures. They may, if conditions
merit, become class-for-themselves through
political organization and the development of
class consciousness. Nzongola elects to use the
word class because of its value in the analysis
of social change and political conflict.^
In a more profound study dealing with the urban
administration in Kananga, Nzongola identifies the same
class structure. It should be pointed out that Nzongola
has not based his classification on the relation between
individuals and the means of production. Instead, he has
focused on objective elements, such as residential neighbor¬
hood and means of transportation, to determine his social
classes classification. Such objective elements are helpful
in identifying the bourgeoisie in Zaire because of its
taste for luxurious lifestyle. In addition, the objective
elements of the bourgeoisie is simply the outcome of
11Ibid.
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its class position. However, one should not fail to mention
that the Zairean bourgeoisie is dependent on foreign capital
which controls the means of prodution of Zaire.
In any case, empirical indicators are being considered
by different scholars as important objective elements to
classify social groups in Zaire. The luxurious lifestyle
of members of the Zairean bourgeoisie is so obvious that
one can easily identify them. The Zairean ruling class is
actually responsible for the continued Zaire's state of
dependency. Michael Schatzberg identifies it as politico-
commercial bourgeoisie class. Indeed, most of the Zairean
high ranking officials combine politics with business.
Most of them, if not all, are involved in business activities.
Zairean businessmen who are not involved in politics are
closely associated with the interests of politicians. In its
struggle for an economic base, the Zairean ruling class did
not hesitate to launch what was called "Zairianization
measures". It was argued that through the "Zairianization"
process, Zairean people will take over the ownership of
small and medium sized foreign enterprises. However, Zairean
officials or their relatives were the principal beneficiaries
of the so-called Zairianization. The Tables 1 and 2 show
the effects of Zairianization in Lubumbashi and Bumba.
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TABLE 1
EFFECTS OF ZAIRIANIZATION IN LUBUMBASHI




Pol i t i c i a n s 69 35.4
Busines smen 67 34.4
Civil servants 9 4.6
Other 50 25.6
Source: David J. Gould, "Underdevelopment Administration
and Disorganization Theory: Systematic Corruption
in the Public Bureaucracy of Mobutu's Zaire,"
Paper Presented at the Conference on Political
Clientelism, t^atronage and Development (feellagi o,
Italy, August 1978), p. STI
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TABLE 2
EFFECTS OF ZAIRIANIZATION IN BUMBA
Type of Business Acquired Acquereur
General Commerce, rice mill, sawmill,
gas station
General Commerce
General Commerce and food store
General Commerce and coffee factory
General Commerce and radio repair
General Commerce
General Commerce and agricultural trade
Garage and butcher shop
General Commerce
General Commerce
















Source: Ph.D. dissertation, Michael G. Schatzberg,
'^Bureaucracy, Business, Beer: The Political
Dynamics of Class Formation in Lisala, Zaire,"
University of Wisconsin, 1977, p. 359.
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The above tables (1 and 2) show how the Zairean
bourgeoisie struggle to build an economic base in order to
get rid of its dependence on the international monopoly
capital. However, the technological and financial aspects
of Zaire's dependence - which will be discussed later in
this chapter have made the Zairean bourgeoisie's struggle
unsuccessful. Michael Schatzberg explains the origin of
the politico-commercial bouregeoisie class in Zaire and its
source of wealth. He argues that:
...since control of the means of production was
not possible, the Zairean politico-commercial
bourgeoisie has been dependent on control of the
state. The hurried departure of the Belgians in
1960 left an enormous political and administrative
vacuum. As there was but an insignificant economic
petty bourgeoisie to compete with them, the levers
of state command were taken over by the erstwhile
clerks and subalterns of the colonial state with
only their salaries inhand. Unable to accumulate
any appreciable capital under colonialism, they
soon learned how to rectify that situation by
making use of the state apparatus to create their
own riches. Indeed, throughout the history of
independent Zaire, access to political and
administrative office has been a source of wealth.
State power, administrative position, and public
funds have been used repeatedly to acquire private
prerequisites. The usual legal measures, as well as
some extraordinary creative illegal ones, have been
employed. Once accumulated, the fruits of this
bureaucratic capitalism could be used to obtain
economic enterprises of varying sorts such as
plantations, bars, and commercial establishments.
Access to the coffers of the state has thus been a
considerable and irreplacable trump in the economic
consolidation of Zaire's politico-commerical
bourgeoisie^^
Zairean people expected from President Mobutu's takeover
a qualitative transformation of their social conditions.
l^schatzberg, "Zaire," pp. 288-289.
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Unfortunately, the Mobutu regime has maintained the economic
structure which has been integrated into the world capitalist
system in which different economic forces are in interaction.
People have come to realize that there exists a divergence
of interests between the ruling class and the masses while
convergent interests link the ruling class to the bourgeois
capitalists abroad. This situation has given rise to open
conflicts of which the immediate consequence is a political
instability.
Having lost the popular base it has in the 1960s, the
Mobutu regime has no choice but to consolidate its alliance
with foreign powers in order to keep other social classes in
check. Robert Rothstein is certainly right when he argues
that internal instability pushes leaders to use foreign
policy as a supplementary resource in their political
struggles.
Because of the presence of a permanent political crisis
caused by social conflicts, the Zairean state has developed
the dependency of Zaire to the extent that the country is
presently in a situation of total neo-colonialism. Indeed,
the "de jure" power is in the hands of the Zairean elite
while the "de facto" power is in the hands of the protectors
of the state.
Zaire's dependency is multidimensional. It can be
discussed at six levels: economic, trade, technological,
financial, military and political. A careful examination
77
of these forms of dependencies would be a necessary step
leading to the understanding of Zaire's foreign policy,
ECONOMIC DEPENCENCE
As indicated earlier, the economy of Zaire is extroverted.
The end of colonization has not brought any significant
change in the economic structure of Zaire. The ties linking
Zaire's economy to the world capitalist system have remained
intact. Just like in the colonial period, the economy of
Zaire is not controlled by Zairean people; it is rather
under the control of foreigners. Further, as before
independence, Zaire, actually, pays much more attention to
the extraction of copper whereas the other sectors of
economy remain neglected. Overall, Zaire's participation in
its economy is high. However, foreign companies exert a
significant control at the levels of production and
redistribution thanks to the permanent presence of
their technical personnel. Table 3 shows the percentage of
the Zairean state participation in some of the enterprises
established in different fields.
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TABLE 3
STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMY OF ZAIRE, 1970
Share of the state
in the value


















Share of the state in the capital of the





















en commun du Zaire, Air
Zaire, Compagnie Maritime
du Zaire 82
Banking, insurance Societe National d'Assurance,
Banque du Peuple 36
Trade Economat du Peuple, Societe
Generale d'A1imentation
N.B. The above figures represent only the total capital of
enterprises in which the Zairean state has a participation.
Source: J.P. H Peemans, "The Social and Economic Development
of Zaire Since Independence: An Historical Outline,"
African Affairs 74:295 (April 1975), p. 176.
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As one notices, the state participation does not cover
the total capital of the sectors above mentioned, for
multinational corporations finance major projects in the
different sectors of the Zairean economy. In any case, as
shown in Table 3, in several instances the percentage of
Zaire's participation is very high. However, the truth is
that despite that high participation, Zaire does not have
the control over the production and marketing of its
products. The case of the Zairean state enterprise
GECAMINES, discussed later in this section, will demonstrate
that the Zairean state does not exert exclusive control
over its own enterprises.
The penetration of the Western economic forces is
obvious when one looks at the Zairean economic sectors.
Although data on multinational corporations are very
difficult to collect, one can identify some of the most
powerful corporations operating in Zaire.
Mining sector: SODIMIZA, owned by eight Japanese
firms and recently sold to the Zairean government but
operating under Japanese technical control. The installa¬
tion cost of SODIMIZA was worth $90 million. SODIMIZA
operates in the copper sector; SOCIETE Miniere de Teke-
Fungurume owned by the international consortium of American,
British, French, and Japanese: the Zairean government held
twenty percent interest at the creation of SMFT while the
international consortium kept eighty percent. The initial
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investment cost of SMFT was $300 million. SIBEKA, a
belgian firm controls twenty percent of MIBA which extracts
diamends.
Agricultural sector: Continental Grains owned by
Americans, opened a flour mill in Matadi with $85 million
as start-up costs. Krupp group participated in the
establishment of a palm oil and soap enterprise in Gemena
(Equateur). The Zairean state contributed with twenty
percent share while the Moleka group put up sixty-five
percent and the Krupp group provided fifteen percent.
Transport sector: General Motors, Leyland, Renault
and Fiat have created plants which assemble vehicles
while Goodyear and Rubberico have built a tire factory
worth $16 million.
Energy sector: Western financial and material
interventions have strongly participated in the Inga-Darn
project and the Inga-Shaba power line. The American
contractors Morrison-Knudsen and Fishback and Moore have
invested $260 million in the Inga-Shaba project. Alusuisse
(Aluminum Suisse) accepted to build a smelter. The cost
was evaluated to $1 billion. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corporation which are American corporations have made
plans to build an aluminum smelter.
Other sectors: the Maluku steel mill was financed by
the Zairean government with the participation of the
Italian firms Finsinder, Societa Italiana Impianta and
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the German firm DEMAG. Further, multinational corporations
have invested in cementery, breweries, textiles, tobacco.
For instance, the Wester German industrial group Klocker
Humbold-Deutz AG. has been building a cement factory in
Lukola, near Kinshasa with the initial capital of three
million zaires. The Zairean government intends to hold
fifty-one percent of the shares in the capital. In the
financial sector, SOFIDE (the finance and development
company) was established under the auspice of the World
Bank. Its initial capital was 2m. zaires. SOFIDE
provides newly established enterprises with technical and
financial assistance. The presence of foreign economic
forces is therefore obvious in all sectors of the Zairean
economy. This study sees Zaire's economic dependence as
a situation in which the most important branches of the
economy are under the control of foreigners.
Indeed, being largely controlled by Western economic
forces operating through the multinational corporations
and foreign economic experts, the Zairean economy responds
almost totally to the needs of the Western economy. The
lack of interest in the agricultural sector has led
different economic forces to concentrate their effort on
the mining sector. Table 4 shows how agricultural
products decreased from the period before independence to
1977. Indeed, there seems to be some progress between







Corn (tons) 120,000 50,000 130,000
Rice 100,000 20,000 127,000
Cassava 1,500,000 900,000 700,000
Cotton-grai n 143 ,000 15,000 10,000 (a)
Palm oil exports 165,000 85,000 11,995
Returns in Zaire
currency (b) 25,018 ,000 17,000,000 -72,700,000
Population(1957) 13,120,000 17,570,000 26,310,000
(a) cotton fiber
(b) financial bulletin of the International Monetary
Fund, May 1980
Source: Open Letter to President Mobutu (Washington, D.C.:
Center for Development Policy, 1983 ) , p. 18.
concerned. However, when one compares those official
statistics with the growth of the population, the situation
does not look great. Indeed, whereas in 1965 a Zairean
produced 3kg. of corn, 1kg. of rice, nearly 50kg. of cassava,
more or less 1kg. of cotton, and exported 5kg. of palm oil,
in 1977 the same Zairean produced 5kg, of corn, 5kg. of
rice, 27kg. of cassava, 0.4kg. of cotton and exported less
than 1kg. of palm oil. As far as returns in Zaire currency
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are concerned, Table 4 clearly shows the extent to which
Zaire has become insolvent. Therefore, it can be argued
that Zaire no longer produces enough food to feed its
population. Almost self-reliant in the colonial period
as far as food is concerned, Zaire actually relies on
the external world to feed its population (see section on
trade dependency).
Despite the fact that Zaire has been strongly concerned
about copper production which provides the government
with foreign currencies, operations in the mining sector
are beyond the control of the Zairean state. Indeed, for
years, the Zairean government has been unable to control
the operations of the mining companies, for even the
nationalization measures have proven unsuccessful. Since
the colonial period, copper has been the dominant commodity
in the mining sector. It has been argued by many observers
that copper constitutes the heart of the Zairean economy.
Because of the importance of the mining sector in the
Zairean economy, it would be necessary to examine the
process of mineral production in order to measure the
degree of Zaire's economic dependency.
Zaire is rich in copper, zinc, cobalt, silver, uranium
and cadmium. Important diamond mines are situated in
Kasai. Zaire is the world's largest cobalt producer,
accounting for sixty percent of the world population and
the seventh largest producer of copper. More than eighty
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percent of export revenue come from the mining sector.
Zaire is also the largest producer of industrial diamonds.
Without any doubt, the mining sector constitutes the key
of the Zairean economy. Unfortunately, despite its
importance, the mining sector has become the instrument
strengthening Zaire's dependency. Dominated by GECAMINES,
a so-called national company which depends on foreign
countries as far as its operations and financing are
concerned, the mining sector of Zaire has contributed to
increase the level of Zaire's dependency. When President
Mobutu took over [the power] in 1965, he attracted the
support of the masses because of his nationalist rhetoric.
He promised an economic independence for Zaire. President
Mobutu understood that the mining sector's resources would
provide a source of revenue for the new regime. So, he
began a fight against foreign hegemonic control over
Zaire's mining sector. Relations between the central
government and the mining companies became strained as
new tax measures were imposed by the government. Also,
despite the government's request, the "Union Miniere du
Haut-Katanga" refused to relocate its head office in
Zaire. Tensions between the government and "Union Miniere
du Haut-Katanga" (UMHK) ended up with the promulgation of
the Bakajika law. Under this law, territorial concessions
granted to UMHK and other foreign companies during the
colonial period were abolished without compensation. The
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dissolution of the UMHK resulted in the creation of
"Societe Generale Congolaise de Minerais (GECOMIN),
later to be renamed "Generales des Carrieres et Mines
(GECAMINES). Many scholars have argued that the
nationalization of UMHK has not revolutionized the
relations of production. That nationalization has been
ineffective in the sense that it limited itself in the
change of the names instead of the relations of production.
As a matter of fact, as far as profits were concerned
GECAMINES' annual revenues were decreasing almost every
year while UMHK kept on receiving high profits thanks to
the agreement relating to its compensation. According to
Grawford Young and Thomas Turner, "UMHK annual reports
show that its profits from Zaire were not affected by the
nationalization; UMHK earned 8 billion francs from 1960
to 1966 , and 8.5 billion from 1967 to 1973 .Most of
UMHK's profits were derived from the Societe Generale de
Minerals' revenues, as specified in the formal agreement
on the compensation for UMHK. As Table 5 indicates,
payments to the Societe Generale des Minerais are very
considerable to the extent that sometimes they exceed
GECAMINES profits.
Many scholars have argued that the nationalization
of GECAMINES was superficial, for it never gave the
Zairean state the power to control the production of




TAXATION AND PROFITS OF GECAMINES















1967 17.6 0.9 5.2 69.8 80
1968 12.9 8.9 69 92.1 54
1969 23.9 11.5 48 129.7 61
1970 14.5 17.5 122 132.9 50
1971 17.4 14.4 81 86.5 31
1972 8.9 14.4 162 88.2 31
1973 81.9 21.3 76 168.3 49
1974 15.4 - - 225.8 41
1975 * 113.6 22
Source: Grawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and
Decline of the Zairian State (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 294.
copper. To Nzongola Ntalaja "rather than weakening the
links of economic dependence vis-a-vis the imperailist
centres of the world imperialist system, the nationali¬
zation of the copper industry strengthened them."!^
To put it clearly, the nationalization of the UMHK
l^Nzongol a-Ntal aja, "The Authenticity of Neocolonialism:
Ideology and Class Struggle in Zaire," Berkeley Journal of
Sociology 22 (1977-78), p. 122.
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has been ineffective because the operations of the
mineral company GECAMINES largely depend on technicians
and technology provided by the Western countries. (See
section on the technological dependence). Zaire's
dependence upon mineral wealth makes it difficult for the
Zairean government to stop the production of copper in
order to restructure profoundly the mineral sector and
enhance its bargaining power vis-a-vis the Western bloc.
At the end of 1966, President Mobutu tried to halt all
copper exports, but the decline in the state's revenues
accompanied by inflation pushed the Zairean government to
reverse its decision. Therefore, despite the so-called
nationalization of UMHK, the actual GECAMINES depends on
the Western countries as far as financing, production and
marketing are concerned. Indeed, in 1981, the World Bank
granted a loan of more than 250 million dollars to Zaire
in order to expand Gecamines' activities. Also, in order
to control the marketing of Zaire's mineral products, the
Zairean government decided to create SOZACOM (Societe
Zairoise de Commercialisation des Minerais). However,
the sabotage of the Zairean mineral products marketed by
SOZACOM made Zaire renegotiate its contracts with the
Belgian company "Societe Generale des Minerais".
Zaire totally depends on the Western market which
consumes its mineral products. At this point, the
experience has shown that Zaire cannot sell its mineral
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products without the assistance of Western companies.
Thus, despite the creation of SOZACOM which is in charge
of marketing Zaire's mineral products, the "Societe
Generale des Minerais" (a Belgian firm) continues to sell
Zaire's copper. The 1969 agreement reached by Zaire and
SGM has remained effective up to now. Under that agreement,
SGM would provide technical assistance to Gecamines for
twenty-five years, and later on, SGM's share would be
reduced gradually from six percent to one percent. Also,
SGM received the guarantee to continue to refine Zaire's
copper in Belgium. Speaking of the agreement between the
Zairean government and SGM, Schatzberg contends that:
Unsurprisingly, the financial arrangements between
Gecomine and SGM evolved in favour of the latter.
Between 1968 and 1972, the renumerations due SGM
for its marketing and management know-how accounted
for a large percentage of the total profits of the
Zairean parastatal. The low was 48 percent of total
profits in 1968; the high 162 percent in 1972. In
April 1974, yet another agreement was concluded and
the 6 percent compensation figure was replaced by a
flat sum of $100 million.
As one can notice, the nationalization of UMHK has
never changed the relations of production established
during the colonial period. For, the extraction of
copper, its refining and marketing are under the control
of foreign forces. The only change which accompanies the
nationalization of UMHK was the Africanization of cadres.
According to Schatzberg:
In January 1957, Gecamines employed 251 Zairean
l^Schatzberg, "Zaire," p. 291
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white collar workers of a total of 2,166
or 11.5 percent; by the end of 1967 Zaireans
held 1,309 white collar positions of a total
of 2,252, or 58 percent... As late of 1976, the
regime imposed revolutionary steering committee
of Gecamines was composed of the company's
thirteen top executives of whom three were
Zairean, one Swedish, one French, and eight
Belgian.
As far as the nationalization of UMHK is concerned,
one can argue that the Zairean state took the ownership
of the company, however, the control remained abroad.
Zaire's dependence upon the copper sector led the
Zairean government to conclude agreements with some
multinational corporations in order to increase the
production of copper. Indeed, SODIMIZA, a Japanese firm
set up in 1969, had been allowed to develop two sites
caved out of the old Union Miniere perimeter. Zaire held
fifteen percent interest with the remaining eighty-five
percent held by a consortium of eight Japanese firms.
The Musoshi mine which was opened up in 1972 and the
Kasenda mine which started operating in 1977 were both
under the control of SODIMIZA. According to Colin Legum,
"Over the years, SODIMIZA had mined c. 14m.t. of copper
ore, which it turned into 330,000t. of concentrates, all
shipped to Japan."17 in May 1983, the eight Japanese
firms which had shares in SODIMIZA decided to pull out of
16ibid.
l^Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record; Annual
Survey and Documents 1983-1984 (New York: Africana
Publishing Company, 1985), p. B403.
91
their joint ventures with the Zairean government probably
because of the weakness of the copper prices, combined
with high production costs caused by inflation. Under a
new agreement concluded between the Zairean government
and the eight Japanese firms, Zaire's government would,
purchase the Japanese firms' shares of the
stock for thirty million dollars and to
exonerate them of all responsibility for
all but twenty million dollars of SODIMIZA's
total $207 million debts. In return, the
Japanese shareholders agreed to lend SODIMIZA
twenty million dollars to ensure its continued
operations and, given the fact that the mines
had been run almost entirely by Japanese
technicians, to train new managers during a
transition period. The loan is for fifteen
years, with five years grace, at an annual
interest of 8.4 percent.
As one can notice, the disengagement of the Japanese
firms has not eliminated the exclusive control of SODIMIZA
by the Japanese firms. Indeed, up to now SODIMIZA operates
under the control of Japanese technicians and also,
CODEMIZA, a Japanese firm set up to market SODIMIZA's
output, will continue to purchase copper produced by
SODIMIZA. Therefore, the process is much similar to the
production of copper by Gecamines.
The Zairean government had another venture with
American, British, French, and Japanese interests. This
venture resulted in the creation of the Societe Miniere de
Tenke-Fungurume (SMFT) in the early 1970s. At the creation
of SMTF, Zaire held twenty percent interest while the
ISibid
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international consortium of American, British, French,
and Japanese companies held eighty percent interest.
Exploration rights were granted to an area of 30,700
kilometers. However, financial difficulties caused by
increased costs and the closing of the railroad to Lobito
led to the suspension of SMTP activities. Actually, it
has been reported that the Zairean government approved in
September 1984, a project being considered by the SMTP
and which may lead to the production of 15,000t of blister
copper a year.19 in any case, the creation of SMTP cannot
be seen as a move toward an eventual increase in Zaire's
economic power, for the control of SMTP is in the hands
of foreigners.
The Zairean company, SOZACOM has also bee unable to
control the marketing of the Zairean gold and diamond.
Indeed, Zaire's decision to dispense with the services of
De Beers' Central Selling Organization (CSO) was
unsuccessful. Indeed, the five-year agreement concluded
with the International Diamond Corporation of London and
the Antwerp based dealers of Caddi and Blasol in April
1981 was renounced in April 1983. For, in 1983, Zaire
reached another agreement with De Beers' CSO; under this
agreement, De Beers has to contribute three million
dollars to the rehabilitation of the Miba diamond fields
while the Belgian firm SIBEKA (in which De Beers holds a
19lbid.
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19 percent share) has to advance another three million
dollars. Actually, SIBEKA controls twenty percent of
MIBA, and the Zairean government holds the remaining
eighty percent. However, just like in the copper sector,
the production, management, refining and marketing of
diamond and gold are under the control of foreign forces.
Legum argued that,
...even before resuming its traditional role
as marketing agent for the MIBA diamonds, the
CSO had already regained a foothold in Zaire
by securing the non-exclusive right to purchase
artisanal diamonds mined by individual prospectors.20
As demonstrated earlier, Zaire still does not control
its mining sector. Therefore, it has to depend on the
West in order to assure the production of mineral products
which constitute eighty percent of the total revenue of
the state.
The process of exploitation that was examined in the
mining sector is also at play in other sectors of the
economy. Although the mining sector constitutes the basis
of the Zairean economy, a look at the agricultural sector
may be necessary to clearly understand the impact of external
economic forces on Zaire's economy. Indeed, the agricultural
sector has been neglected for many years. As shown in




AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT: EXPORTS AND INDUSTRIAL CROPS
1959 1964 1968 1972
Palm Oil (lOOOT) 244 177 206 168
Palm Kernels (lOOOT) 61 47 48 37
Cotton (fibres, lOOOT) 63 15 12 21
Timber (lOOOm^) 228 180 137 80
Cocoa (lOOOT) 4 5 5 6
Rubber (lOOOT) 40 35 41 40
Coffee (lOOOT) 62 38 55 79
Tea (lOOOT) 4 4 5 8
Bananas (lOOOT) 31 - 3 -
Source: J. P. Peemans, "The Social and Economic
Development of Zaire Since Independence:
A Historical Outline," African Affairs 74:295
(April 1975), p. 178,
The introduction of the capitalist mode of production in
the agricultural sector resulted in the emergence of two
subsectors: (1) the subsistence subsector which practices
shifting agriculture along traditional lines, and (2) the
so-called modern subsector which applies imported
agricultural techniques in varying degrees.
Foreign capital, through the multinational corporations
has been present in the agricultural sector since the
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colonial period. Just like in the mining sector, the
multinational in the agricultural sector has contributed
to distort the Zairean pre-colonial economic structure.
Kabala Kabunda contends that:
The impact which the multinational has had on
the structures of social formation in Zaire
has been profound and has contributed greatly
to the emergence of new social classes, to the
proletarization of the peasants, to marginali¬
zation, to the reduction of other pre-capitalist
production modes and to the installation of the
structures of an underdeveloped capitalism.^l
This is no doubt that the multinational firms
operating in the agricultural sector have also played a
major role in shaping the externally-oriented and
underdeveloped economic structure of Zaire. One of the
giant conglomerates involved in the Zairean agriculture
is Unilever. An Anglo-Dutch consortium, Unilever obtained
750,000 hectares from the colonial government in 1911 and
set up the Huileries du Congo Beige (HCB) in the country.
The HCB began planting palm groves and in 1919 the company
owned seven large palm oil extraction factories. HCB
expanded its activities by setting up plantations of
heaveas, cacao trees and coffee. In this process, many
Zaireans saw their land expropriated and their labor abused.
Schatzberg argues that:
21m.K.K. Kabala Kabunda, “Multinational Corporations and
the Installation of Externally-Oriented Economic Structures
in Contemporary Africa: The Example of the Uni 1ever-Zaire
Group," in Carl Widstrand, ed., Multinational Firms in Africa
(New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975 ), p. 317.
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Taxes forced Zaireans to seek wage labour on
the HCB concessions and local chiefs designated
a certain number of their able-bodies men to
sign contracts with HCB for specified periods.
In return for this services, the chiefs received
a percentage of the workers' salaries.22
In addition to plantations, Unilever set up in the
industrial sector, MARSAVCO (Margarine, Soaps and Comestics)
and in the commercial sector, SEDEC (Company for Commercial
Ventures). In this context, besides its export trade,
Unilever was producing and marketing goods for local
consumption. HCB became PLC (Plantation Lever-Congo)
after independence and later on PLZ (Plantations Lever au
Zaire). PLZ was nationalized during the Zairianization
period and was returned to their original owner in 1977.
As any other multinational firm, PLZ operates powerfully
in Zaire. In its activities, PLZ seems to operate without
any government restrictions. As Schatzberg writes:
PLZ has received a virtually unrestricted hand
in setting the wages of its employees and in
determining prices paid to independent farmers
for their products. Wages are below the Zairean
minimum and the company's purchases of agri¬
cultural products are occasionally two to four
times below the world market price. In return,
the state, or rather the politico-commercial
bourgeoisie, has received the benefits of
foreign exchange earnings which contribute to
its luxurious lifestyle. PLZ is an archtypal
end ave. 23
MARSAVCO, on the other hand, was established within
the framework of import-substitution. Benefiting from a
22schatzberg, "Zaire," p. 292.
23ibid., p. 293.
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local supply of cheap palm oil, MARSAVCO has the monopoly
for the production of saop and margarine in Zaire. The
link between MARSAVCO's operations and the Zairean politico-
Commercial class's activities is very obvious. Indeed,
the distribution of MARSAVCO products is ensured by
various third party wholesalers, formerly foreigners, but
today Zaireans, members of the politico-commercial class
(as examples see Table 2). In return, the Zairean state
has provided MARSAVCO with a lot of advantages such as
exemption of import duties for raw materials imported.
Kabunda argues that MARSAVCO has accelerated the course
of Zaire's underdevelopment by developing technological
dependency and creating insufficient linkage effects.
In the commercial sector, SEDEC deals with activities
relating to imports of cars, motors, agricultural equipment
to the distribution of local products. The role that
SEDEC plays can be summarized with regards to Kabala
Kabunda's comments termed as follows:
...the level attained by this multinational
(SEDEC) throughout the country on the level
of the process of goods distribution, the
privileged position in colonial-type trade,
and the extortion of the purchasing power
of the people. This extortion flows directly
from the appropriation of the principal means
of production by large-scale capital.
In short, the penetration of the capitalist mode of
production in the agricultural sector has also contributed
24Kabunda, "Multinational Corporations," p. 317.
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to shape the Zairean economic structure and enhance the
lifestyle of the ruling class members while producing
questionable effects on the masses.
It would be unnecessary to overview the internal
dynamics of other Zairean economic sectors such as
transport and communications, for their impact on the
economy of Zaire is very insignificant. Indeed the
one commodity economy aspect of the Zairean economy has
made copper the main key for its growth. For that reason,
the fall in copper prices has always had a tremendous
impact on the Zairean economy. Zaire pays much more
attention to the production of copper than agricultural
products. For instance, in 1976, copper and cobalt made
more than fifty percent of export income against thirty-
nine percent in 1959, while agricultural exports declined
from thirty-nine percent in 1959 to twenty percent in
1976.25 To put it clearly, when one speaks of Zaire's
economy, one speaks of copper and cobalt. Because of the
strong emphasis of the Zairean government on the production
of copper, cobalt and other mineral products, the
contribution of the mining sector to the GDP is the
highest in the Zairean economy. Table 7 gives a picture
of the Zairean GDP by industrial origin.




GDP BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN
(constant 1970 prices)
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Agriculture 182.6 183.5 158.8 163.1 165.6
Mining 113.6 126.3 211.2 220.0 226.4
Manufacturing 75.9 84.0 77.5 81.9 85.8
Construction 31.3 39.3 45.0 51.5 46.0
Electricity ,
Gas and Water 9.3 10.1 8.7 9.5 9.6
Transport and
Communications 81.0 88.0 75.9 83.6 73.5
Trade and
Finance 147.6 156.4 106.4 116.6 121.7
Public
Adnui ni st rat ion
and Defense 98.3 120.8
Other Branches 120.1 131.5 282.6 305.3 306.3
GDP at factor
cost 859.7 939.9 966.1 1031.5 1034.9
Net indirect
taxes • - - - •
GDP at market




1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Agriculture 172.0 175.6 172.6 184.4 174.3
Mining 243.4 250.1 242.1 214.0 184.3
Manufacturing 93.4 101.1 92.1 84.8 85.3
Construction 51.9 58.5 58.1 48.7 46.9
Electricity,
Gas and Water 10.4 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.3
Transport and
Communications 85.7 91.5 82.3 71.1 67.5
Trade and
Finance 129.3 142.2 131.1 133.1 128.5
Public
Administrati on
and Defense . .
Other Branches 333.7 347.3 316.5 310.5 328.7
GDP at factor
cost 1119.8 1175.7 1105.0 1057.6 1026.8
Net indirect
taxes - - 0.7 - -
GDP at market









Zaire continues to maintain a neo-colonial economic
structure geared towards the export of raw materials.
Its economic dependence on foreign forces which control
the fluctuation of prices in the world market is obvious.
However, the need of Zaire's mineral resources by the
Western powers has resulted in the maintenance of a state
capable of protecting the economic structure set up during
the colonial period. Presently, Zairean society continues
to be marked by the flow of massive foreign loans. This
has resulted in a foreign debt of more than five billion
dollars. (See section on financial dependence). Speaking
of projects financed by foreign loans in Zaire, the New
African Yearbook states:
Costly projects such as la voix du Zaire
(a highly sophisticated radio and color
TV service) or the World Trade Centre
are merely for prestige, while Maluku
Steelmill, the Inga dam, and the Inga-Shaba
power line will not repay their investment
cost in the foreseable future. The project
reflects the need of multinational companies
to find an outlet for their products, and
they also increase Zaire's dependence on
sophisticated foreign technology while
creating very few new jobs. Such projects
also offer high-ranking officials exceptional
opportunities for rake-offs.26
Actually, American, French, German, and Italian
investments flow in Zaire. This can be seen as a




diversification of dependency does not
alter the basic extroverted nature of
Zaire's economy, but it at least provides
Mobutu a chance to play one set of interests
off against another - something he has done
with consumate skill.27
In conclusion, it can be argued without any doubt
that despite its nominal independence, Zaire does not
have any effective control over its economy. Indeed, the
placement of foreign experts in key positions in different
institutions such as the National Bank of Zaire, the
Finance Department, Custom Services; (see section of
technological dependence) the control over production,
refining, and marketing of the mineral products by
foreigners, the invasion of the economy by multinational
corporations which transfer the profits abroad while
creating insignificant jobs; and the allegiance of the
ruling class to foreign economic forces which provide
exceptional opportunities to improve its economic conditions
are some of the facts which demonstrate the real character
of Zaire's economic dependence. An analysis of Zaire's
trade dependence is important if one seeks to evaluate
the level of structural linkage between the Zairean
economy and the external world. This will be the main
concern of the following section.
27schatzberg, "Zaire," p. 295
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TRADE DEPENDENCE
Zaire's trade dependence is the consequence of the
extroverted economic structure set up during the colonial
period. The actual neo-colonial economic forces which link
Zaire's economy to the developed capitalist countries have
largely contributed to shape Zaire's trade dependence.
Indeed, communist countries in Europe and Asia have never
been important trading partners of Zaire. The government of
Zaire directs its exports to developed capitalist countries
which constitute the main source of Zaire's imports.
Despite the diversification of trading partners, the former
metropole Belgium has remained the largest single supplier
of imports and also the largest market for Zairean exports.
The fact that Belgian companies control the production,
refining, and marketing of Zaire's copper shows the
extent to which Belgium is tied to Zaire's economy.
Tables 8, 9 and 10 give a realistic picture of Zaire's
activities concerning imports and exports. However, it
should be pointed out that the positive balances shown in
Table 10 do not eradicate Zaire's state of dependency.
For Tables 11 and 12 show that Zaire heavily relies on the
Western block countries as far as trade is concerned. One
of the consequences of Zaire's trade dependence lies in the
fact that Zaire is subject to fluctuations of prices
imposed by Western forces. Zaire's reliance on the export







Exports 1976 1977 1978
Mineral products 654,728 617,077 716,865
Copper 326,511 324,29-1 322,656
Cobalt 98,622 93,045 180,703
Zi nc 40,553 27,814 14,168
Diamonds 47,429 55,173 103,181
Cassiterite 16,701 23,117 23,677
Crude petroleum 92,119 66,700 38,000
Agri cul tural
product s 164,614 259,539 198,235
Coffee 103,066 165,538 138,190
Palm oil and
kernels 14,956 19,754 9,772
Industrial products 7,849 4,166 5,500
Others 10,709 31,618 10,000
TOTAL 837,900 912,400 930,600
Source: Zaire: A Country Profile (Washington, D.C.: Agency




(in '000 zaires )
Imports c.i .f 1976 1977 1978
Consumer goods 107,725 98,813 115,620
Food, drink,
tobacco 57,665 52,731 68,341
Textiles, clothing 16,212 14,785 12,258
Energy 60,822 104,234 87,467
Primary manufacturers
& semi-finished
products 140,696 129,369 128,263
Capital goods 75,745 60,424 79,998
Others (including
errors and omissions 161,590 130,848 156,042
TOTAL 546,577 522,688 567,390
Source: Zaire: A Country Profile (Washington, D.C: Agency




1974 1975 1976 1977
Exports 647.5 413.4 747.3 846.9
Imports 525.5 452.4 546.6 522.7
Balance +122.0 -39.0 +200.7 +324.2




PRINCIPAL PARTNERS OF ZAIRE FOR IMPORTED PRODUCTS
(in mill ions of zaires )
Countries 1978 1979 1980
Belgiurn/Luxemburg 150.8 323.3 721.3
France 97.0 253.2 349.4
West Germany 76.1 233.9 435.1
Italy 46.0 72.4 199.9
Japan 20.1 45.6 127.7
Netherlands 15.0 45.3 76.3
South Africa 40.0 n/a n/a
Spain 16.1 n/a n/a
Switzerland 12.3 n/a n/a
United Kingdom 33.4 82.3 180.0
U.S.A and Canada 69.4 195.3 434.5
Zambia 11.6 n/a n/a
Zimbabwe 29.6 n/a n/a
Source: Africa South of the Sahara 1983-1984 (London:
p. 916.Europa Publications Limited . 1983).
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TABLE 12
PRINCIPAL PARTNERS IN ZAIRE FOR EXPORTED GOODS
(in min ions zaires)
Countries 1978 1979 1980
Belgium/Luxemburg 643. 6 1,546.0 3,415.8
F ranee 124. 5 286.4 488.0
West Germany 105. 3 184.1 321.4
Italy 112. 0 206.2 428.7
Japan 70. 2 199.6 375.7
Netherlands 22. 6 32.7 64.6
South Africa 22. 1 n/a n/a
Switzerland 74. 4 n/a n/a
United Kingdom 160. 5 242.5 341.6
U.S.A. and Canada 195. 6 494.5 1 ,009.7
Zambia 0. 3 n/a n/a
Source: Africa South of the Sahara 1983-1984 (London:
Europa Publications Limited, 1983), p. 916.
more than seventy percent of hard currency makes the
Zairean state dependent upon the price of these commodities
on the world market. By relying exclusively on the
Western market, Zaire is forced, on many occasions, to
sell its products at insignificant prices. For instance,
the official price of cobalt was $25 a pound in 1978, but
in February 1981, Zaire decided to sell its cobalt for
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$20 a pound despite strong protests from Zambia which
also produces copper and cobalt; by the end of 1981, follow
ing the Reagan admininstration's pressure on the IMF so
that supplementary loans be granted to Zaire, the Zairean
government agreed to provide the United States with more
than five million pounds of cobalt for $15 per pound.28
It may be argued that negotiations between Zaire and its
trading partners do not necessarily take into account the
interest of the Zairean people. As Michael Schatzberg
contends :
It matters little to the politico-commercial
bourgeoisie that effective control is in
foreign hands as long as payments and
benefits to itself are forthcoming. Within
this general state of dependency, however,
the bourgeoisie can, and does, seek a larger
share of the economic pie and this may well
be the ultimate meaning of the repeated
negotiations of copper conventions between
Zaire and Belgian interests.29
Zaire's trade dependence has continued to increase
thanks to the development of import-substitution activities
in the country. Indeed, for many years, it has been
thought that Zaire could reduce the volume of consumer
goods imports by developing an economy sustained by import-
substitutions. However, the reality shows that import-
substitution has, on the contrary, accelerated the
28colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: Annual
Survey and pocuments~l981-1982 (New York: Africana
Publishing Company, 1981), p. 388.
29schatzberg, "Zaire," pp. 291-292.
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dependence of Zaire. For instance, Zaire's beer industry
cannot operate without the import of hops and malt from
the West; from 1970 to 1978 Zaire spent $146 million for
the import of hops and malt.30 Further, the making of
bread in Zaire depends on the Continental Grain Company,
a United States based multinational corporations which
supplies the Zairean government in wheat.. In short, all
industries operating in Zaire depend on imports of raw
materials or spare parts from abroad.
Some imported products are the consequence of the
luxury life of the politico-commercial bourgeoisie class,
for the members of the Zairean ruling class prefer foreign
goods to local ones. As Schatzberg observed:
The World Bank has recently calculated that in
1973 Zaire spent $200 million on 'non-essential'
imports. These expenditures totalled $220
million in 1974; $140 million in 1975; and $135
million in 1976. The list of these 'non-essential'
imports makes interesting reading. Included in
this category are: tinned fish and meats, shell
fish, cheese, breakfast cereals, fruit, jams,
jellies, chocolates, alcoholic beverages, tobacco
products, toys, sporting goods, lindeum, carpets,
cut flowers, lace tapestries, pottery, chin
gold and silverware, household appliances,
watches, photo equipment, radios, records,
automobiles, jewelry, lamps, musical instruments,
and central heating and plumbing equipment.31
The conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis
on Zaire's trade dependence is that the historical ties




has largely contributed to shape Zaire's dependence.
Actually, Zaire has no control over the prices of imported
and exported products, and also, the Zairean industries
cannot operate without the maintenance of the trade
patterns established during the colonial period and
reinforced during this neo-colonial period. There is no
doubt to argue that trade between Zaire and its Western
allies is in the advantage of the latter. Trade dependence
is closely linked to technological dependence. An analysis
of Zaire's technological dependence in the next section
will be helpful in determining the level of Zaire's
dependency.
TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE
Besides the trade dependence of Zaire, there is what
experts call technological dependence. As a matter of
fact, Zaire technological dependence is the consequence
of the maintenance of an economic structure set up by
colonialism. In order to function, the Zairean economy
needs the infusion of technological know-how and technically
skilled personnel from the developed countries, especially
the Western world. Zaire's dependence on "Western"
technology has contributed to increase the overall
dependency of Zaire on the Western bloc. It has been
said earlier that all important projects such as the
Inga-Shaba power line, are financed by the Western countries
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and usually, the funding is accompanied by a flow of
technicians. In the case of the Inga-Shaba power line,
Schatzberg writes that:
American construction crews are largely
responsible for building the power line
with imported equipment. Should any part
of this mammoth understanding need repair,
new parts will have to come from abroad -
most likely accompanied by the expatriate
technicians needed to install them.32
The above statement is also relevant when it comes
to most of the Zairean industries. Indeed, from the mining
sector to the agricultural sector, Zairean companies
operate with heavy equipment imported from the West.
Western technicians are in charge of operating those
heavy imported machines. The most intriguing aspect of
this dependence lies in the fact that Western technicians
seem to be unwilling to transfer their technical knowledge
to Zairean people. Most scholars argue that Zaireans are
not trained to takeover the technological functions of
the Western technicians. Quoting Eckhard Siggel, Schatzberg
contends that:
A recent study based on interviews in sixty-
three mining and manufacturing enterprises
demonstrates that formal training programmes
are rare in Zaire's industries. Less than 20
percent of the firms interviewed have provided
formal training and instruction on a continuing
basis and Zaire depends upon foreign personnel





One may argue that there has been little effort made
to help Zaireans takeover the technical functions of
foreigners. The few Zaireans with a degree in engineering
encounter a lot of hostility from foreign technicians who
seem unwilling to give up their positions. Zaire's
technological dependence has actually deepened as a result
of the presence of multinational corporations in all
Zaireans economic sectors. As a result the Zairean state
is subject to the power of the multinational corporations.
The conflict between the Zairean state and UMHK is a
concrete example exposing the weaknesses of the Zairean
state. Indeed, after the nationalization of UMHK, the
state enterprise GECAMINES could not function without the
indispensable UMHK's technicians. The effort of the
Zairean state to invite other corporate partners was
unsuccessful as UMHK threatened to take legal actions
against whoever intended to buy the expropriated copper.
The reluctance or refusal of some foreign firms to become
partners of the Zairean state led the Zairean government
to make a deal with the Societe Generale des Minerais
which is an member of the Societe General that was an
integral part of the UMHK. The Belgian Societe Generale
des Minerais was given the responsibility to manage
services and installations, and to market copper.
Therefore, the establishment of GECAMINES as a state
enterprise was simply a symbolical act, for UMHK's influence
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has still been felt through the Societe Generale des
Minerals. Speaking of the Zaire-UMHK conflict, Grawford
Young and Thomas Turner state that:
The settlement was to prove very profitable for
UMHK. SOGEMIN received a management contract for
the recruitment of expatriate personnel, the
management of the installations, and marketing of
the copper. In return, SOGEMIN was to receive 6.5
percent of the sales revenue of Gecamines. Only 1
percent was required to reimburse SOGEMIN itself,
so the remainder, in effect, was compensation for
UMHK. In addition, Zaire abandoned its claims to
shares in Union Miniere in Belgium, which was al§o
the major beneficiary of the "pipeline" copper.34
As shown in Table 13, the power of UMHK was so obvious
that the Zairean government could not get rid of its
indirect presence.
TABLE 13





Need of state for foreign
exchange and revenue

















American support for regime
Source: Grawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and
Decl ine of the Zairean State (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 292.
34Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairean
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The technological dependence of Zaire will remain
unsolved as long as the Zairean government does not re¬
structure the educational system. Indeed, the actual
educational system which is a reflection of the Belgian
system does not respond to Zaire's needs. At the secondary
and university levels, emphasis is put on traditional and
classical education to the extent that graduates from both
levels lack adequate skills to perform technical functions.
Even though there exist a few technical schools in Zaire,
deterioration of material conditions in those schools or,
in some cases, their frequent closures for poltical reasons
(i.e., IBTP) make it difficult for Zaire to eradicate its
technological dependence.
At this point, one can contend that Western
technological presence has also contributed to increase
Zaire's dependence, for any withdrawal of the Western
technicians will result in the collapse of Zaire's economy.
The Zairean ruling class is less concerned about this
dependence as long as its selfish interests are concerned.
Having analyzed Zaires' trade and technological dependence,
a look at Zaire's financial dependence will help understand
the level of vulnerability of the Zairean state.
FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE
Zaire's financial dependence is one of the consequences
of the ongoing economic crisis in Zaire for more than a
State, p. 293.
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decade. The perpetual deficit in the budget has pushed
the Zairean government to borrow money permanently in
order to run the country. Actually, Zaire has reached a
level where its economy cannot function without heavy flows
of external loans. The excessive dependence of Zaire on
foreign loans has become a factor which jeopardizes its
sovereignty. Indeed, the unwillingness of the Zairean
government to stimulate an internal accumulation of capital
has led the country to beg regularly Western creditors
for financial loans. Zaire has become a case of scientific
study, for economic experts have been wondering why the
massive flow of foreign loans has not transformed the
quality of life of the Zairean masses. Some radical
scholars argue that the protection of the Zairean ruling
class is one of the main factors that the Western bloc
takes into account when granting loans to Zaire. Indeed,
in many occasions, some Western governments have not
hesitated to put pressure on private banks and the IMF so
that supplementary credits be granted to Zaire. It is in
this context that one can understand the connection of the
Paris Club, composed of seven Western governments, with
the IMF and the World Bank. (The role of the Paris Club
and other Zairean creditors namely the IMF, the World
Bank and the private commercial banks are to be discussed
later in this section).
From 1960 to 1975, the external debt of Zaire rose
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up to more than $2,017 billion (excluding grants by
private agencies and CMEA countries).35 it increased up
to more than $5,000 billion by the end of 1981. The facts
show that the rise of the GNP in Zaire has been caused by
the excessive flow of external debt. Indeed, according
to the Book of World Rankings, in 1976, external debt
represented 63.8 percent of the GNP in Zaire.36 By the end
of 1980, external debt, as a percentage of the GNP, may
be estimated at seventy-five percent. However, the rise
of the GNP is not an indicator of economic growth, for
Zaire still remains in the sector of low income countries.
Indeed, despite its mineral resources, its wealthy land,
and the increasing flow of foreign loans, Zaire is,
according to the OECDE Report, sixty percent absolute
poor in terms of economic growth.37 Tables 14 and 15
show the evolution of Zaire's external public debt and
the debt service obligations.
The economic difficulties of Zaire are, in many
respects, the result of many factors such as mismanagement
of governmental expenses. David Gould argues that:
One of the clear indices of resource manipulation
in Zaire has been the high level of unbalanced
governmental expenses. Since 1970, the Zairean
government has pursued a policy of chronic
35oeCDE Report, November 1980, p. 216.
366eorge T. Kurian, The Book of World Rankings (New
York: Facts on File, 1979), p. 107.
37oecDE Report, November 1978, p. 182.
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TABLE 14
ZAIRE’S EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT, 1972-1977
(millions of U.S. dollars)
1972 1973 1974
Total outstanding.
including undisbursed 714.9 1,750.8 2,876.9
Private creditors 468.4 1,209.9 1,818.0
Suppliers 225.6 442.0 564.5
Private financial
institutions 237.8 762.7 1,247.6
Multi1ateral
institutions 85.5 101.3 136.6
IBRD 2.5 1.5 0.5
IDA 54.0 63.5 73.5
Bilateral official
lenders 161.1 439.5 722.3
Total oustanding.
disbursed only 544.2 862.3 1,294.6
Private creditors 389.9 677.8 983.0
Suppliers 188.0 246.5 325.8
Private financial
institutions 197.0 426.1 651.3
Multilateral
institutions 30.4 50.0 60.4
IBRD 2.5 1.5 0.5
IDA 8.4 16.3 26.3
Bilateral official
lenders 123.8 134.5 251.3
1975 1976 1977
Total outstanding,









institutions 1,268.6 1,349.0 1,376.0
Multi1ateral
institutions 284.7 349.8 367.6
IBRD 100.0 100.0 100.0




lenders 827.4 955.8 1,121.4
Total outstanding.
disbursed only 1,655.1 2 ,168.8 2,639.3




institutions 819.5 1 ,031.6 1,146.0
Multi1ateral
institutions 79.1 116.8 179.8
IBRD 11.8 32.4 56.4
IDA 37.8 54.6 87.0
Bilateral official
lenders 403.7 589.1 801.2
Source: Guy Gran, "Zaire 1978: The Ethical and
Intel1ectual Bankruptcy of the World System,"
Africa Today
p. 18.
25:4 (October- December 1978),
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TABLE 15
DEBT SERVICE OBLIGATIONS, 1978-1983
(millions of U.S. dollars)
1978 1979 1980
Debt Service 477.1 471.9 482.9
Private creditors 392.7 366.9 367.5
Multilateral
institutions 15.8 23.6 22.0
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Bilateral lenders 68.6 81.4 93.4
Amortization 325.7 342.9 347.0
Interest 151.4 147.0 135.9
1981 1982 1983




institutions 23.3 23.3 22.9
Bilateral lenders 98.7 103.0 105.0
Amortization 304.3 291.7 260.1
Interest 117.6 100.7 81.3
Source: Grawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and
Dec1ine of the Zairean State (Madison : University
of Wisconsi n Press, 1985 ) , p. 387.
budgetary dificiency due to the increasing level
of expenditures as against diminishing returns.38
Table 16 shows the structure of the Zairean governmental
38David Gould, Bureaucratic Corruption and Under¬
development in the Third World fcountries: The tase of
Zaire (New York: Perganon Press, 1980), p, 106.
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governmental expenses from 1970 to 1974 (in millions of
zai re ). 39
TABLE 16








1970 315.3 264.6 62.4 -13.0
1971 288.8 279.4 68.8 -60.0
1972 298.8 284.1 72.2 -84.0
1973 376.7 345.1 104.5 -138.0
1974 588.6 545.5 199.8 -212.5
1975 477.2 510.4 121.4 -228.2
Source: David Gould , Bureaucratic Corruption and Under-
development in the Third World Countries : The
Case of Zaire (New York:
P-
Pergamon PressTT^O),
In addition to the above figures, Zaire's deficit has kept
on increasing as follows: -618. in 1976 and -446.3 in 1977
The mismanagement of financial resources has been
very detrimental; to Zaire's economy. It has largely
contributed to make Zaire unable to pay its external
debt. Speaking of the external debt of Zaire, the Worl d
39ibid.
^0"International Financial Statistics," IMF 26:10
(October-December 1980), pp. 406-431.
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Bank Report states that:
The accumulation of vast arrears shows that
external debt of Zaire has already proven to
be unmanageable. The reasons for this lie in
the massive deterioration of Zaire's terms of
trade, the expansionary policies followed up
to 1974, the manner in which expenditures were
financed and the pattern of investment,^!
Zairean economic difficulties have attracted the
attention of different international organizations such
as the IMF. The appointment of foreign advisors from
IMF, France and Belgium in the government machinery (Finance
Ministry, National Bank of Zaire, Taxes and Customs) has
accelerated the degree of Zaire's dependence. (See
discussion on IMF later in this section). Thanks to
foreign advisors, public expenditures dropped from $224
in 1975 to $1889 in 1979 and there was an improvement in
the market for exported national products because of the
increase of average sale prices.^2 Also, the successive
stabilization plans by IMF resulted in the reduction of
balance of payment deficit to $324 million in 1979 against
$373 million in 1978 and $480 million in 1977.43
Besides mismanagement problems, experts argue that
the Zairean government gets foreign loans without a
precise policy for development. As the World Bank Report
4!world Bank Report, "Zaire Current Economic Situation
and Constraints, (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 35.
42"Economic, Financial and Technical Series," Africa




An important factor which has had and will
continue to have adverse effects on the
ability of Zaire to meet its debt service
obligation is the allocation of the funds
borrowed abroad with insufficient regard to
economic priorities in a situation where
expanded production constitutes the ultimate
since for the repayment of external loans,
too little was allocated to the productive
sectors.
In any case, the economic structure of Zaire which
is dependent on the world capitalist economy has been one
of the causes of Zaire's financial situation. It appears,
at the moment, that the Zairean capitalist economic
structure, located at the periphery of the world capitalist
system, cannot function without the infusion of financial
resources and technology from the advanced capitalist
countries. In addition, the Zairean ruling class seems
to encourage the massive flow of foreign financial
assistance, for it gives the members of the politico-
commercial bourgeoisie class some important opportunities
to grow richer. As Schatzberg contends:
The Zairean elite wished to maintain the flow
of funds from the international system to
finance its grandiose development schemes such
as the Inga-Shaba and to maintain its sumptuous
lifestyle. The more funds which appeared from
varying sources, the more could be 'appropriated.'
or 'lost,' or 'mislaid'.^5
^^World Bank Report, p. 38.
^Sschatzberg, "Zaire," p. 300
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Zaire's creditors can be subdivised Into four
different categories. A look at each category Is necessary
In order to evaluate the political consequence of Zaire's
1ndebtedness.
The International Monetary Fund. The IMF is one of
the international agencies most heavily involved in
Zaire. When President Mobutu rose to power he struggled
unsuccessfully to avoid the IMF's tutelage in Zaire.
Indeed, quoting David Alexander, Grawford Young and Thomas
Turner write that:
Mobutu was anxious to obtain a reprieve on the
debt without passing through the IMF, to which
he had a strong antipathy; its conditions were
likely to be too stringent, and he had privately
pledged in 1967 that he would never again commit
himself to following the fund's prescription.^®
However, the private banks through the Citibank's Vice
President, Irving Friedman convinced Mobutu that IMF's
involvement in loans negotiations was indispensable.
IMF's strong involvement in Zaire's financial affairs
began in fall 1975 when its team was invited by the
Zairean government to discuss the possibility of drawing
a first tranche standby credit. To Grawford Young and
Thomas Turner,
The IMF was flabbergasted to discover that
no one in Zaire knew exactly what the debt
was; borrowing has been undertaken through
46Qavid Alexander quoted by Young and Turner, The
Rise and Decline of the Zairean State, p. 379.
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various channels, by diverse government bodies
and parastatals, and the Bank of Zaire had no
comprehensive data.^'
In March 1976, Zaire withdrew a first tranche standby
credit worth $47 million after agreeing to devalue its
currency and to limit the wage increases and government
expenditure. In March and April 1977, Zaire received a
second tranche standby credit worth $52.5 million
accompanied by a $32.8 million loan. However, the rise
of deficit in the budget led IMF to become reluctant to
give new credit to Zaire. Further, Zaire was not meeting
arrears.
In June 1978, the IMF got involved in attempts to
reschedule the Zaire debt. Sponsored by Belgium, the
meeting took place in Brussels. Participants included
among others Zaire, Belgium, West Germany, Canada, the
United States, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, Holland and
Britain as well as the World Bank, IMF and the European
Commission. Under pressure from the IMF and its Western
creditors, Zaire agreed
to impose a strict new import licensing system
and to place its public finances under the
supervision of outside experts as a first step
toward reordering its shattered economy. A
nominee of the IMF is to be appointed "principal
director" of the Zaire Central Bank for a
renewable one-year term from the middle of August.
47ibid., p. 379.
^^Africa Research Bulletin 15:5 (June 30, 1978), p. 4705.
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By the end of 1978, Zaire was under a strict tutelage of
IMF, for important positions were given to foreign experts.
Erwin Blumenthal was designated by IMF to assume the
direction of the Bank of Zaire. He was also in charge of
recruiting foreign experts to manage Zaire's key financial
services. So, a Belgian team took over the control of the
customs service while a Turk expert was given the
responsibility to manage the finance ministry. Such
control of key positions in different financial services
can only be seen in a neo-colonial country.
In August 1979, Zaire agreed to a twenty-five percent
devaluation of its currency (the fifth in less than a year).
Blumenthal realized how difficult it was to manage the
Zairean economy because of the rise of corruption encouraged
by the ruling class. He resigned by the end of 1979.
By the end of 1980, the total amount of financial
loans received by the Zairean government from IMF was
more than $1,000 million. In July 1981, the IMF granted
supplementary credits to Zaire, but in return, Zaire had
to devalue its currency one more time. From 1975 to
1981, Zaire devalued more than six times its currency at
the request of the IMF. Under IMF's pressure Zaire had
to elaborate five stabilization plans (the first in March
1976, the second in November 1977, the third in August
1979, the fourth in July 1971, and the fifth in December
1983). In each case Zaire received substantial standby
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credit from the IMF. As a matter of fact, the 1977
stabilization plan was related to what Zairean authorities
called the Mobutu Plan (see discussion on the Paris Club).
However, the unsuccessful results of the first two stabili
zation plans led the IMF and the World Bank to recruit
experts in order to manage the Zairean financial services.
To put it clearly, the German IMF bureaucrat seconded
to the National Bank of Zaire had tense working relations
with the Zairean ruling class because of his strictness.
Indeed, he took harsh measures cutting off credit and
exchange facilities to key members of the ruling class
including President Mobutu's closest friends and relatives
His restrictions relating to withdrawals of foreign
currencies from the National Bank angered the Zairean
elite. Blumenthal resigned before writing a report
indicating how mismanagement and corruption in Zaire have
reached a point of "non-return". In.his report, Erwin
Blumenthal states that:
Alarmingly clear that the corruptive system in
Zaire with all its wicked and ugly manifestations,
its mismanagement and fraud wil destroy all
endeavors of international institutions, of
friendly governments, and of the commercial banks
towards recovery and rehabilitation of Zaire's
economy. Sure, there will be new promises by
Mobutu, by members of his government, rescheduling
and rescheduling again of a growing external public
debt, but no (repeat: no) prospect for Zaire's
creditors to get their money back in any foreseeable
future.
^^Thomas Gallaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire
in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1984), p. 200.
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Some economists, such as Andre Huybrechts, have come to
believe that the appointment of foreign experts cannot
solve the economic problems of Zaire.50 jn any case, the
Zairean government tries to maintain good relations with
the IMF, for this latter provides Zaire with important
financial credits. As a consequence, the IMF plays a big
role in shaping politics in Zaire. As an example, in
1976 the IMF imposed the Zairean government to denationalize
certain parts of its economy. There is, therefore, no
doubt to contend that the IMF plays economic as well as
political roles in Zaire. The reliance of Zaire on
standby credits from the IMF is a factor making Zaire
lean politically toward the Western countries which
control the IMF.
The Paris Club. Composed of Belgium, Canada, France,
West Germany, Italy, Japan, Holland, Sweden, Great Britain,
and the United States, the Paris Club is actually the
protector of the Zairean state thanks to its economic
power. It is known that without the flow of foreign
loans, the Zairean government would not be able to run
the country because of its perpetual budget deficit and
its insufficient GNP. Since the West needs the actual
Zairean state which safeguards its interests, the Paris
Club grants loans to ensure the survival of the Zairean
SOAndre Huybrechts, Africa South of the Sahara 1983-
1984 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1983), p. 110.
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state. Up to the end of 1982, Zaire received a total of
$3,000 million from the Paris Club.^l The incapacity of
the Zairean government to pay its debts leads the Paris
Club to reschedule almost every year the payment of
Zaire's external debt. To be specific, the Paris Club
rescheduled Zaire's external debt five times: in 1976, 1977,
1979, 1981, and 1983. The Paris Club works closely with
the IMF and the World Bank in order to reach a settlement
on Zaire's external debt. It was during the 1977 Paris
Club meeting that Zaire was requested to provide an
integrated program for development in order to obtain
additional credit. President Mobutu responded by launching
the so-called Mobutu Plan. In Mobutu's words.
Given that I am the guarantor of the well-being of
the Zairean people, I propose to you a recovery plan,
which I call, without demagoguery, the Mobutu Plan,
because, not only have I conceived it, but further,
I intend to personally apply it and see to its success.52
The Mobutu Plan aimed at eliminating corruption, improving
the transportation infrastructure, making interest payments
on time, boosting the economy, etc. Speaking of the Mobutu
Plan, Grawford Young and Thomas Turner argue that:
At this point there literally was no Mobutu
Plan, in the sense of a document setting
forth Mobutu's conception. What eventually
emerged from the Ministry of Planning was a
call for $1 billion in new foreign aid.
51''Economic, Financial and Technical Series," Af ri can
National Bulletin 19 (August 14, 1982), p. 6520.
52Mobutu quoted in Young and Turner, The Rise and
Decline of the Zairean State, p. 383.
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bolstered by a vague collation of pious
aspirations such as better transport, higher
agricultural production, decentralized decision
-making, and improved administrati on.53
In any case, the Mobutu Plan never produced positive
results. Also, despite the neo-colonial functions imposed
to Zaire by the Western creditors through the Paris Club,
Zaire is still unable to meet its arrears. In any case,
as long as the Zairean regime will continue to safeguard
the Western interests, the Paris Club will still work on
rescheduling Zaire's external debt payments.
The World Bank. The World Bank has financed several
projects in Zaire. Most of these projects do not lead to
positive results at the level of implementation. To many
scholars, the World Bank projects which are elaborated
by foreign experts rely heavily on data supplied by the
Zairean ruling class. In his analysis on the role of the
World Bank in Zaire, Guy Gran agrees that researches
conducted by the World Bank are based simply on discussions
between experts and the Zairean elite.54 in most of the
cases, foreign exports completely ignore the socio¬
political realities of the country which constitute the
basis of the projects financed by the World Bank. In any
case, by the end of 1982, Zaire owed more than $475 million
53ibid.
54Guy Gran, "Development Versus the World System:
International Aid Activities in Zaire," in Guy Gran, ed.,
Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (New
York: Praeger, l979), p. 801.
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to the World Bank.^^ Without any doubt, the funding of
projects through SOFIDE (Societe Financiere de Development)
contributes to increase the wealth of the ruling class
members rather than transforming the masses quality of
life. To Andre Huybrechts, the funding of projects gives
the advantage to the ruling class whose members own some
companies receiving funds from SOFIDE.56 Those members
are, according to Andre Huybrechts, the only channel of
communication existing between the international
organizations granting the funds and the Zairean state
receiving the funds. As one can notice, a great part of
the ruling classes' wealth comes from this kind of mechanism.
In any case, the World Bank has tacitly supported Mobutu's
economic policy since 1965. As Guy Gran argues.
Despite the sincere humanistic intentions of
some of the international officials involved,
the bank has thus legitimized, by its intellectual
and material support, a development path that, by
the bank's own data, consigns most Zairians to
deprivation of elementary human rights for
indefinite future, if not permanently.57
Every year, the World Bank financed projects which are
mostly elaborated by foreign experts. In 1974, the World
Bank financed a $435 million project to raise copper
production by Gecamines from 470,000 to 590,000 tons and
55Africa Research Bulletin, p. 6520
56Huybrechts, Africa South of the Sahara, p. 907.
57Gran, "Development Versus the World System," p. 302
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cobalt from 16,000 to 20,000 tons per year. Referring
to this project, Guy Gran contends that:
...obstensibly Gecamines will earn further
profits from the export of minerals, money
that the government could then spend on
social services and other people-related
development. Nothing in the project design
requires this, however, and it is not
happening to any appreciable degree. Those
officials who wanted more foreign exchange
for their personal pleasure and political
aggrandizement fared well.58
In 1975, the World Bank financed a highway project and in
1976 got involved in a water supply project. In sum, one
can have a complete picture of the World Bank projects











FY'69 Highways, technical 6.0
FY'70
assistance
Development finance 5.0 n. a. -
FY • 71 River transport 7.0 - -
FY'72 DFC II 10.0 n. a. -
10/71 Higher education 6.5 5.3 -
2/72 Highways II 19.0 10.3 17.1








12/73 DEC III 10.0 n. a.
12/74 Gecamines 100.0 215.0 120.0
1/75 Highways III 26.0 12.8 1.5
5/75 River transport II 26.0 26.0 -
1/76 Education II 21.0 27.5 -
3/76 Water supply 21.5 31.0 17.7
9/76 Cotton 8.0 3.5 3.1
3/77 Livestock II 8.0 2.8 5.3
4/77 DEC IV 10.0 n. a. -
3/78 Oil palm 9.0 23.0 15.4
TOTAL 301.5 363.7
n .a. = not available
Source : Guy Gran, ed.. Zaire: The Political Economy of
Underdevelopment (New York : Praeger, 1579),
p." idt;
Most of the projects of the World Bank contribute to
maximize the profit of the Zairean ruling class and the
multinational corporations, for they do not result in
improving the social conditions of the Zairean masses.
The Zairean parastatal state “Office of Roads" which
carries out the highways projects has never been able to
maintain the roads. Besides the lack of trained personnel,
the Office of Roads is as corrupt as any other Zairean
parastatal company. To Guy Gran,
Roads do not, however, exist in this sort of
social vacuum. Without building a positive
and participatory social contract between
people and a regional government, there is
little possibility of maintaining roads. The
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Mobutu government failed to do this. Its road
development activities have been largely
elitist, part of a spoils system in operation.59
Besides the highway projects, all other World Bank projects
(water supply, river transport, education, etc.) are
carried out by a corrupt Zairean machinery to the extent
that they do not lead to positive results. It may be
argued that because of the financial opportunities that
the Zairean politico-commercial class receive from the
World Bank projects, the Zairean government has developed
a state of dependency on World Bank projects and fundings.
At this point, the World Bank has largely contributed to
the increase of the Zairean external public debt.
Private Commercial Banks. More than 120 private
commercial banks grant financial loans to Zaire. By the
end of 1982, the external debt of Zaire to those banks
amounted to $402 million.5® Without the assurance of the
Western governments, those private commercial banks would
suspend granting loans to Zaire because of the incapacity
of the Zairean government to pay its arrears. From 1970 to
1973, the international banking system as creditors of
Zaire grew as shown in Table 18.
59lbid., p. 305.
50Africa ResearchBulletin, p. 6520
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TABLE 18
THE GROWTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM
AS CREDITORS OF ZAIRE, 1970-3
(in millions of zaires)
December June
1970 1973
Fonds Bel go-Zai roi s 64 -
USAID 42 62
BIRD/IDA 3 28
Societe Generale de Banque - 38
First National City Bank - 25
Morgan Crenfell and Tokai - 25
Morgan Guaranty Trust - 15
Other banks 2 18
Other public institutions - 10
TOTAL FINANCIAL DEBT Ill 221
Source: Rapport Banque du Zaire, 1972-3, p. 193.
Actually, the Western banks are upset because of
Zaire's incapacity to meet its arrears. On October 1,
1982, for the second time, the Zairean government could
not pay the $31 million due for payment. According to
Africa Research Bulletin:
...the threat of Kinshasa being declared in
default of its debts was raised at a meeting
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in London at the end of September (1982). In
terms of this scenario, the banks would write
off the debts, but Zaire would find itself
blacklisted by the international banking
community. A very reliable banking source said
that one United States bank had already written
off its part of Zaire's foreign debts.
Actually, the Western banks are no longer eager to loan
money to the Zairean government. For instance, the inter¬
national banking consortium composed of Lazard, Kuehn Loeb
and S.G. Warburg has not accepted to renew its contract.
One may conclude by arguing that Zaire's economy has
been unable to stimulate an internal capital accumulation.
For that reason, foreign loans have been viewed by the
ruling class as an alternative to the lack of internal
capital accumulation. Actually, the suspension of foreign
loans can be detrimental to the Zairean ruling class
which struggles to crush revolutionary pressure emerging
from the masses. In order to avoid a revolutionary
takeover in Zaire, the Western powers have no choice but
to provide the Zairean state with necessary funds to
ensure its survival. Therefore, Zaire is financially a
dependent country. Zaire's dependence does not limit
itself in the economic sphere, for militarily and
politically, Zaire is also dependent. An analysis of
Zaire's military and political dependence will be the
concern of the next section.




Zaire's national security strongly relies on foreign
assistance. The Shaba Wars I and II have demonstratred
to what extent Zaire's security is vulnerable. The
tremendous consequence of a military dependence lies in
the fact that the survival of the state depends on external
forces. Actually, the Zairean army is equipped and
trained exclusively by Belgium, France, West Germany,
Italy, and the United States.^2 Since the resumption of
diplomatic relations with Zaire in 1982, Israel has been
playing an important role as far as the equipment and the
training of the Zairean army are concerned. In order to
give the impression of being independent, the President
of Zaire concluded some military agreements with China
and North Korea in the 1970s. However, according to
Kaplan, North Korea withdrew its instructors from Zaire
in spring 1977.^3 Concerning China, its military role is
not significant as the Western countries which are ready
«
to intervene when the state's survival is in danger.
Despite its membership in the non-alignment movement,
Zaire has not hesitated to reach military agreements with
the Western bloc at the level of military technical
assistance, equipment, training and even establishment of
62Kaplan, Zaire: A Country Study, pp. 250-254.
63ibid., p. 102.
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foreign military bases. The most curious fact is that
the Zairean government has not been willing to disclose
its military agreements as regards to the resolutions of
the non-alignment movement. This lack of disclosure
shows the suspicious character of those agreements.
There are actually a lot of foreign military advisors in
Zaire. The exact number is unknown. However, according
to the Congolese National Liberation Front, 1,240 Belgian
soldiers are stationed in Kamina, Kinshasa, and Kitona;
750 West German soldiers are respectively in Kongolo,
Kalemie and Manono; 2,000 French soldiers are based in
Mbanza-Ngungu, Kinshasa, Kolwezi, Kananga, Likasi, and
Lubumbashi.^4
Foreign forces do not limit their actions in training
the Zairean army. For, experience has shown that they may
assist the state in one way or another. The two Shaba
wars are a concrete example of foreign military intervention
in Zaire. While some scholars argue that Shaba wars were
a manifestation of a popular uprising against a corrupt
regime, others claim that Zaire was invaded by mercenaries
equipped and trained by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The
Shaba wars, needless to say, attracted the East-West
tension in Central Africa. Many analysts contend that the
internal socio-economic crises were among other factors
S^flNC, The Question of Zaire/Congo (San Francisco:
John Brown Book Club, 1982), p. TH
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which caused the break up of the two wars. A brief
recapitualtion of the Shaba events is necessary to
demonstrate the level of Zaire's military dependency on
the West.
The Shaba War I started on March 10, 1977 when
thousands of soldiers crossed from Angola into Shaba and
captured successively Dilolo, Kasenga, Kapanga, Kasaji,
and Mutshatsha. While the Zairean army broke and fled,
the insurgents threatened to capture Kolwezi. The Zairean
governemnt claimed that Cuban soldiers were among the
invaders. Although Zaire's claim has never been proved,
the Western bloc intervened in one way or another.
Morocco sent 1,500 troops, France provided aircraft to
carry arms, Belgium sent arms and the USA provided other
supplies while Egypt sent pilots later.65 Thanks to the
Western intervention, Zaire retook control of its
territories on May 26 when the last insurgent left Kaponga
in route back to Angola. Following Shaba War I, President
Mobutu took a series of measures intended to eliminate the
masses discontent concerning the socio-economic crisis in
Zaire. President Mobutu announced that there would be
elections every five years for members of parliament.
The idea of President Mobutu behind such a decision was
to show that people could participate in the political
65Ralph Uwechue, Africa Today (London: Africa
Journal Limited, 1981), p. 1405.
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process. During that period, criticism of the Mobutu
regime increased following rumors according to which, the
West German company OTRAG (Orbital Transport and Rakaten
A.G.) had set up a firing range for testing of experimental
rockets. It was reported that its first firing would take
place in May 1977. The contract betwen Zaire and OTRAG
surprised nationals as well as foreigners because of its
colonial character. Indeed, according to the contract,
the West German company would occupy a territory of 100,000
square kilometers in the north of Shaba. Further, the
contract gave the West German company exhorbitant rights,
such as "removals of population, unrestricted use of the
territory, judicial immunity, and tax exoneration for
company members."66 jo the New African Yearbook, that
contract "resembled concessions given to the Colonial
Charter Companies."67 Many observers argued that the
presence of OTRAG was a cover for a Western military base
facilitating a permanent watch of the region and an
eventual Western military intervention. The OTRAG contract
symbolized the dependence of Zaire vis-a-vis the West.
For, it provided the Zairean state with millions of
dollars and foreign military presence securing the survival
of the state. After keeping a long silence on rumors and




foreign reports. President Mobutu confirmed at last that
he had concluded agreement with 0TRA6. However, he
insisted that the project was for peaceful purposes.
African leaders as well as other leaders around the world
began to question the so-called non-aligned stand of
President Mobutu. Needless to argue that President
Mobutu's explanations did not satisfy the world opinion.
However, two years later, that is, in May 1979, Zaire did
cancel its contract with OTRAG. The cancellation of the
OTRAG contract took place just a year after the end of
the Shaba War II.
Indeed, the Shaba War II began on May 11, 1978 when
the FLNC (Front for the National Liberation of the Congo)
launched its second invasion of Shaba. About 4,000
soldiers attacked Kolwezi and Mutshatsha.They took
control of Kolwezi on May 15. Like in the Shaba War I,
the Western governments launched a rescue operation. On
May 19, 400 French paratroopers of the Foreign Legions'
Parachute Regiment dropped at Kolwezi and fought the
FLNC soldiers.®^ Belgian, British and American aircrafts
were helping to transport supplies. The Shaba War II
ended on June 3, when the recapture of Mutshatsha was
reported.
In any case, the two Shaba wars increased Zaire's
68uwechue, Africa Today, p. 1407.
69ibid.
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dependency, for it became clear that the survival of the
regime depended on the West. According to the New African
Yearbook;
The regime's inability to deal with the FLNC's
offensives enhanced Zaire's security problems.
This was the central issue at the conference
in Paris on June 5, 1978, attended by the U.S.,
Britain, West Germany and France.
This above statement makes it clear that the Western
countries badly need to keep Zaire in the orbit and, for
that reason, the internal security of Zaire, is a matter
of concern for the West. As long as the Zairean state
continues to protect the Western interest, the military
protection of the regime is guaranteed. Analyzing the
impact of the Shaba wars on Zaire's foreign policy, Galen
Hull contends that:
Whatever question remained as to Zaire's
orientation in foreign policy was dispelled
by the Mobutu regime's behavior during two
successive "invasions" of its southern border
in 1977 and 1978 that came to be referred to
as Shaba I and Shaba II. The effect of these
events was to throw into even sharper relief
the regime's dependence upon Western powers
and their third world allies.
Zaire's dependency at the military, technological,
economic, financial and trade levels lead to what analysts
call political dependence. As a matter of fact, political
70New African Yearbook, p. 395.
^iGalen Hull, "Zaire in the World System: In Search of
Sovereignty," in Guy Gran, ed., The Political Economy of
Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger, 1979 ), p. 2Z1.
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dependence is the cause and the consequence of the multiple
dependencies analyzed earlier. Indeed, the radicalization
of the Zairean economic structure is a matter of political
will on the part of the Zairean state. However, given the
capitalistic character of the Zairean ruling class, the
Zairean state will continue to safeguard Western interests.
The early discussion on the historical origin of the
Zairean ruling class clearly indicates that the taste for
embourgeoisement has been one of the most important
concerns of its members. In order to ensure its continued
enrichment, the politico-commercial bourgeoisie class has
realized that the control of the state is a prerequisite.
As the survival of the Zairean state ensures the security
of Western interests, the Western block supports the
politico-commercial bourgeoisie class that controls the
Zairean state. It is, therefore, obvious that the Western
governments and the Zairean ruling class need each other.
The fact that the Western bloc needs the actual Zairean
state makes the President of Zaire display, in some
occasions, a notable autonomy. This pushes some scholars
such as Nzongola-Ntalaja to argue that: "Zaire is not a
puppet regime...reciprocity and the interpenetration of
interests are the keys that explain the regime's pro-
American actions.“72 However, even if Mobutu displays
72Nzongola quoted by Schatzberg, "Zaire," p. 308.
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some autonomy, one can also argue that its autonomy has a
lot of limits. Given the fact that Mobutu knows that his
survival depends on his allegiance to the West, he is more
likely to comply with the Western conditions. For that
reason, contrary to Nzongola's belief, Zair is a real
puppet regime. Schatzberg believes that the political
autonomy of President Mobutu is affected by the fact that
the "room for maneuver is indeed limited."^3
There have been a lot of political decisions taken
by President Mobutu under foreign pressure. There is no
doubt to argue that in many circumstances President Mobutu
plays the game of the West. However, in other circumstances,
the diversification of Zaire's dependence accompanies,
sometimes, by differences among the Western governments
helps President Mobutu a great deal. To Schatzberg:
Mobutu's political autonomy in the international
arena is further enhanced by skillful exploita¬
tion of divisions within the Western camp across
a wide range of issues. In the economic sphere
he has sought to diversify his dependence by
playing one set of foreign interests off against
another, and a similar dynamic is at work in the
political domain. Mobutu and those who represent
him in international councils are shrewd enough
to know that the West rarely speaks with a
unified voice and that fissures within the
Western alliance may provide significant room
for maneuver.74
President Mobutu's quasi political autonomy within
the sphere of dependency has helped enhance his image.
73schatzberg, "Zaire," p. 307 .
74ibid.
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However, despite the contention that President Mobutu is
not totally a puppet president, the political autonomy
that he displays, in some occasions, is far from leading
the country towards a total independence. At this
juncture, it appears that class interests are the key
factors determining the Zairean pro-Western stands.
Indeed, the relation between the Zairean ruling class
operating within the framework of dependency, and the
foreign bourgeoisie is the most important element which
should be taken into account when dealing with an analysis
of Zaire's foreign policy. In the next chapters, the
discussion will focus on the making of Zaire's foreign
policy with special regards to the strengths and weaknesses
of the Zairean state within the international system.
CHAPTER III
THE MAKING OF ZAIRE'S FOREIGN POLICY
In a study dealing with bureaucratic politics and
foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria, Christopher
Clapham contends that: "What matters in the foreign policy
decision-making of African countries is the personalities
of individual leaders rather than the character of
bureaucratic institutions."^ Olajide Aluko, on the other
hand, disagrees with Christopher Clapham and buys
Christopher Hill's point of view according to which "there
is hardly any modern state in which the bureaucrats play
no part in either formulating or implementing foreign
policy decisions."2 Needless to say that Christopher
Clapham and Olajide Aluko's contentions may be applied in
the context of decision-making process in Zaire. Indeed,
besides laying down in the party official documents the
principles that are supposed to guide Zaire's foreign
policy, Zairean bureaucrats practically play no significant
^Christopher Clapham quoted by Olajide Aluko,
"Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
in Nigeria," in Timothy Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds.,
Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and




role 1n the decision-making process. For, major inter¬
national decisions are made public through President
Mobutu's speeches or ordinance-laws. In most of the
cases, Zairean bureaucrats play the role of explaining to
the population the motives of any particular international
decision. Therefore, referring to Christopher Clapham's
contention, one may argue that the personality of President
Mobutu coupled with his ideological orientation matters
in the foreign policy decision-making of Zaire. However,
as far as the rhetoric and the implementation of Zaire's
foreign policy is concerned, one can buy Olajide Aluko's
contention in order to explain that Zairean bureaucrats
participate in one way or another in the making of Zaire's
foreign policy, especially at the implementation level.
Needless to contend that Zairean bureaucrats' role is
bound to support, endorse and carry out President Mobutu's
decisions.
In order to substantiate the allegation according to
which Mobutu's personality and his ideological orientation
matter in the process of decision-making in Zaire, it is
best to examine the different organs that are supposed to
be involved in the making of Zaire's foreign policy and
analyze on both rhetoric and practical levels their true
role.
Zaire's bureaucratic politics is highly centralized
and President Mobutu personally takes decisions regarding
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Zaire's foreign policy. However, it must be pointed out
that he works closely with several high ranking bureaucrats
who play an important role in the formulation and implementa¬
tion of such decisions. As a matter of fact, many political
writings on Zaire's foreign policy confirm this fact. For
instance, Jeannick Odier points out that some officials
like Nguza Karl-I-Bond (former Foreign Minister), Inonga
Lokongo L'Ome (former Vice Foreign Minister) and Lengema
(roving ambassador) contributed a lot to some success
that President Mobutu had in conducting his foreign policy.3
Likewise, Irving Kaplan contends that the office of the
President is staffed by highly educated men who study ques¬
tions and proposals emerging from the various departments
and suggests how they should be answered.^ Therefore, it
is important to examine the bureaucratic institutions
through which international political decisions are made.
Organs which play a role in the decision-making
process of Zaire's foreign policy are part of the political
structure set up by the Mobutu regime. This is why a
look at the political organs which deal in one way on
another with Zaire's foreign policy will be the main
concern of the first section of this chapter.
3jeannick Odier, "La Politique Etrangere de Mobutu,"
Revue Francaise d'Etudes Politiques Africaines 120
(December 1975), p. 26.
^Irving Kaplan, Zaire: A Country Study (Washington,
D.C.: The American University, 1979), p. 85
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BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
The formal organs dealing with Zaire's foreign policy
are set up by the constitution or laws which determine
ipso facto their competence. Law No. 78-010 of February 10,
1978 which revises the constitution of June 14, 1967,
states that, "in the Republic of Zaire, there is only one
institution, the Popular Movement of the Revolution."5
Article 34 of the same law argues that "the President of
the Popular Movement of the Revolution shall be the
President of the Republic."^ Therefore, as President of
the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), the President
of the Republic is the highest authority in the country.
Although Article 52 identifies five organs of the Popular
Movement of the Revolution (the Congress, the Political
Bureau, the Legislative Council, the Executive Council
and the Judicial Council), in the context of this study,
three of those organs (the Congress, the Political Bureau,
and the Executive Council) plus a recently created organ,
the Central Committee of the Party, all of which play a
role in the making of Zaire's foreign policy, will be
examined.
The Congress. The Congress is the supreme organ of
the Popular Movement of the Revolution. Article 53 of
Law No. 78-010 states that the Congress "shall rule on all
SLaw No. 78-010 of February 10, 1978, Article 32.
®Law No. 78-010 of February 10, 1978, Article 34.
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questions related to the doctrine and to the fundamental
options of the Popular Movement of the Revolution.The
Congress of the party Is supposed to be held every five
years. The Political Bureau was given the power to designate
the members of the Congress and It Is the President of the
Popular Movement of the Revolution who convenes the ordinary
and extraordinary sessions of the Congress. As far as
foreign policy Is concerned, the Congress adopts resolutions
that the Executive Council has to Implement when dealing
with International Issues. For Instance, at the first
ordinary session which took place In 1972, the Congress
adopted among others, the following resolution:
The Popular Movement of the Revolution condemns all
powers which cooperate militarily with racist South
Africa which disregards the resolutions adopted by
the Security Council and the General Assembly of the
United Nations and by the Organization of African
Unity; proclaims that the Republic of Zaire will never
adopt the politics of dialogue with South Africa.8
Delegates to the Congress Include high ranking officials,
ambassadors, regional commissioners, members of legislative
councils, etc.
The Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the
MPR. Article 58 of Law No. 78-010 states that "the Political
Bureau Is the organ of conception. Inspiration, orientation.
^Law No. 78-010 of February 10, 19787, Article 53.
^Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution; Premier Congres
OrdInaTre du 21 au 23 mal 1972 (Kinshasa; Direction du
Bureau Politique, 1972), p. 117.
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and decision of the Popular Movement of the Revolution.“9
The Political Bureau "protects and fosters" Mobutism which
is the "ideology of the party." The Political Bureau has
undergone a series of changes in the past years. Members
of the Political Bureau were appointed by President Mobutu
at its creation. A few years later, elections were organized
to choose members of the Political Bureau. Recently,
President Mobutu has taken the decision to appoint them once
again. Also, the powers of the Political Bureau have been
transferred to a newly created organ called the Central
Committee of the Popular Movement of the Revolution.
Actually, the Political Bureau has been reduced from twenty
to fourteen members and, as for responsibility, the Political
Bureau takes care of urgent decisions when the Central
Committee is not in session. However, the total number of
the members of the Central Committee of the Popular Movement
of the Revolution has been reduced from 120 to eighty members.
The Party Central Committee was created in August 1980.
To many analysts, the Party Central Committee or Central
Committee of the Popular Movement of the Revolution was
established to reduce the influence of the Legislative
Council and Political Bureau. To President Mobutu, the
Central Committee of the MPR is "to conceive, to inspire,
to orientate, to decide, and to see to respect for discipline
^Law No. 780-010 of February 10, 1978, Article 58.
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within the party and to supervise the activities of the
MPR.“10 Headed by a permanent secretary, the Central
Committee of the MPR is subdivided into different
commissions including economy and finance, agriculture
and rural development, industry and commerce, transport
and communications, international affairs.
As far as foreign policy is concerned, the Political
Bureau and, actually, the Central Committee of the MPR
determine the general orientation of Zaire's foreign policy.
For instance, it was the Political Bureau which publicly
announced that Zaire's foreign policy was "neither leftist,
nor rightist, and nor even centrist."
The Executive Council. The Executive Council is the
executive arm of the government. It is, according to
Article 87 of Law No. 78-010, "the organ of execution of
the Popular Movement of the Revolution."^ The President
of the Republic presides over the Executive Council which
has a first commissioner and state commissioners. The
President is the head of state and government. He has
been given by the constitution full power to conduct
foreign policy (including the power to declare war and
make treaties). In conducting his foreign policy, the
President of the Republic is assisted by the department
lOpresident Mobutu quoted by Thomas Callaghy, The
State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 215.
llLaw No. 78-010 of February 10, 1978, Article 87.
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of foreign affairs which is one of the sub-organs of the
Executive Council. The department of foreign affairs and
international cooperation collect information that is
provided by Zairean embassies around the world. As a
rule, the bureaucrats of the foreign affairs department
analyze the information so collected and submit it to the
President of the Republic along with proposals which may
serve as a basis of political decisions. For many years,
the political influence of the foreign affairs department
has depended on its leadership. State commissioners such
as Bomboko, Losembe, Mandungu and Nguza Karl-I-Bond played
key roles in the decision-making process of Zaire's
foreign policy.
Besides the foreign affairs department, there exist
other channels which influence and shape foreign political
decisions. One of those organs is the state security
apparatus. Before the advent of the Mobutu regime, the
state security was controlled by a single organ called
the Surete. Four years after President Mobutu's takeover,
that is in 1969, the official designation of the security
service changed from Surete to "Centre National de
Documentation" (CND). At the same time, it was attached
directly to the office of the President of the Republic.
In the mid-seventies, the CND was reorganized into internal
and external sections. In the early eighties, the two
sections of CND were autonomous and independent from each
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other. The external affairs section has become the
Service National d' Intel 1igence (SNI) while the internal
affairs section has been designated as Centre National de
Recherche et d' Investigation (CNRI). It is believed that
many foreigners including Belgians, Israeli, and Americans
help make the Zairean state security apparatus efficient by
training Zairean security agents and by introducing sophis¬
ticated equipments for security purpose. The state security
apparatus is in charge of gathering and interpreting political,
economic, and social information which is vital to the
security of the state. To be specific, the Zairean security
service, especially the Service National d'Intel 1igence,
plays a significant role in the decision-making process of
Zaire's foreign policy. For instance, on many occasions,
Zaire has strained relations with Belgium because of some
reports from the Zairean security service according to
which too much freedom is given to the regime's political
opponents living in Belgium. By the same token, the
Zairean security apparatus plays a significant role in the
promotion or dismissal of Zairean diplomats. Proposals
emerging from the security services, regarding appointments,
promotions or dismissals of diplomats, carry more weight
than the foreign affairs departments' recommendations.
Other informal organs may consist of the National
Security Council which is composed of high ranking officials
appointed by the President. The National Security Council
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meets at the request of the President and is charged of
examining major issues which threaten the security of the
state. There are also the office of the special security
advisor of the President and the President's own "kitchen
cabinet" which influence tremendously the decisions
emerging from the office of the President.
To put it clearly, political decisions in Zaire are
the reflection of President Mobutu's will. Indeed, the
organs of the Popular Movement of the Revolution take
decisions which are proposed or supported by President
Mobutu. In other words, the organs of the MPR cannot
oppose or contradict President Mobutu. To be specific,
the organs of the MPR provide the President with necessary
information that he sometimes uses to take his decisions
through the Central Committee of the MPR, the Political
Bureau, the foreign ministry or simply through his speeches.
Practically, besides issuing written statements regard¬
ing the orientation of Zaire's foreign policy, the political
organs that have just been described play no concrete role
in the formulation of decisions. At this point, one concurs
with Christopher Clapham's contention that it is the
personalities of individual leaders which matter in the
foreign policy decision-making of African countries.
Indeed, major political decisions have never been subject
to debates in the Political Bureau or the Congress.
President Mobutu, in many cases, surprises members of the
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Political Bureau when he announces his decisions through
speeches or ordinance-laws. On certain occasions. President
Mobutu keeps secret some of the actions regarding Zaire's
involvement in international affairs. By disregarding the
resolutions or decisions of some of the political organs
of the MPR, President Mobutu's international actions
largely contribute to develop the gap or discrepancy
existing between the rhetoric and practical aspects of
Zaire's foreign policy. For instance, despite the
Congress' resolutions condemning countries which deal
with the racist regim of South Africa, the Zairean
government has had sceret connections with South Africa
(see Section IV). Furthermore, the scandal relating to
the OTRAG question or the Zairean interventions in the
Angola and Chadian wars were simply the reflection of
Mobutu's will, for most of the members of the Zairean
political organs were caught by surprise. Likewise, the
decision to break diplomatic ties with Israel was publicly
announced when President Mobutu delivered his speech at
the United Nations in October 1973. Needless to argue
that most of the high ranking officials learned about the
break up when watching live President Mobutu's speech at
the United Nations. However, it was during an interview
in the United States that President Mobutu announced that
Zaire would reestablish diplomatic ties with Israel. By
the same token, President Mobutu conducts his foreign
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policy through the promulation of ordonnonce-1aws. For
instance, ordinance-law No. 85-174 of June 28, approved
the loan agreement worth 19,100 deutshe mark between Zaire
and the German company KREDITANSTALT FUR WIEDERAUFBAU.12
Thus, through his speeches, interviews and ordinance-1aws,
President Mobutu personally announces his decisions
regarding Zaire's stands in international affairs.
Therefore, without any doubt, the political organs of the
MPR play practically a passive role as far as the
formulation of decisions is concerned. Zairean political
bureaucrats mostly intervene after the decision has already
been made by explaining to the press and world opinion the
motives of any particular decision. At this point, one may
recall the testimony of the former Zairean foreign minister
and prime minister at the U.S. Congress. He pointed out
that on many occasions he had to lie in order to justify
Mobutu's actions or hide his secret dealings. To put it
clearly, the Zairean bureaucrats, on the practical level,
play the role of providing President Mobutu with information
and carrying out his decisions. If one agrees that the
decision-making process begins with the collection of
information, the selection of alternatives, the formulation
of decisions, and the implementation of the decisions made.
12see Journal Officiel de la Republique du Zaire,
Bureau de President-Fondateur du MPR, President de la
Republique, 26eme annee, no. 3, 1® fevrier 1985, pp. 7-8
and no. 14, 15 juillet 1985, p. 5.
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then one can also buy Olajide Aluko's contention that in
any modern state the bureaucrats play a certain part in
either formulating or implementing foreign policy decisions.
That is the reason why this section has dealt with the
examination of the Zairean bureaucratic machinery.
Admittedly this analysis of the structure of the
political organs involved in the decision-making process
of Zaire's foreign policy is not extensive. Any rate, it
must be born in mind that the main concern of this chapter
is to look at the bureaucratic politics of Zaire by
emphasizing this country's foreign policy orientation as
outlined by the party's official documents. Hence the
following section focuses on the official party line in
matters of foreign policy.
MPR AND THE OFFICIAL GUIDELINE OF ZAIRE'S FOREIGN POLICY
As explained earlier, the Popular Movement of the
Revolution is by constitution, the supreme organ to which
all others must respond. All other political and admini¬
strative organs are integral parts of the Popular Movement
of the Revolution. The Zairean single party MPR came into
existence in 1967. At its creation, the party issued a
blueprint known as the Nsele Manifesto which defines the
general orientation of the government from an ideological
as well as from a programmatic standpoint. Therefore, an
analysis of this blueprint in matters of foreign policy
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will help to establish the gaps that may exist between
political rhetoric and political actions. Furthermore,
the causes of such contradictions will help in determining
whether dependency is a factor affecting Zaire's foreign
policy.
The Nsele Manifesto subdivides the international
political orientation of Zaire into three parts. The first
part deals with Africa, while the second part puts emphasis
on international organizations and the last part focuses on
the relations between Zaire and the rest of the world.
Zaire and Africa
The Nsele Manifesto proclaims that Zaire will support
any move towards an African alliance. In this context,
states the manifesto,
Africa must stand as a bloc in order to influence
international dialogues. The MPR will support with
all its powers, a politics of African solidarity,
through an effective contribution to the Organiza¬
tion of African Unity.13
The MPR ideologists recognize the key role that Zaire should
play in Africa. They see the African problems as their own,
i.e., Zairean problems. In the context of the protection of
African interests, the manifesto states that MPR will
struggle for the total liberation of African territories
which are still under colonial domination. The manifesto
goes on stating that:
13Manifesto de la N'Sele (Kinshasa: MPR, 1967), p. 14
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The events in Rhodesia have demonstrated that
there existed a colonialist complicity between
South Africa, Portugal and the Ian Smith
government. It is that coalition that one must
attack and crush in order to attain the
liberation of the continent as a whole.1^
However, the party ideologists argue that a successful
struggle against colonial domination cannot be achieved
without a solidarity among all African people concerned
about the liberation of Africa. Accordingly,
The MPR will support the policy of the President
who struggles without interruption in order to
bind tighter relations between African states
through alliance treaties, meetings of heads of
states, common political resolutions, and
concerted actions at the United Nations.15
The Nsele Manifesto insists also on the economic
problems of Africa. In order to promote African economic
development, the manifesto stands for a "policy of develop¬
ment of commercial exchanges, improvement of aerial, rail¬
road and maritime transportations."1®
At the cultural level, the MPR, says the manifesto,
will help develop cultural exchanges between African
states and promote travels of students, teachers and





Zaire and International Organizations
The manifesto states that:
International organizations, starting with the
United Nations and its specialized agencies such
as UNESCO, International Labor Organization, Food
and Agricultural Organization, etc...are in
majority composedof states that can understand
Zaire's problems and act in total solidarity with
it. That is the reason for the importance which
must be given to the representation of the country
(Zaire) into those organizations.!^
The party ideologists acknowledge the strategic position
of Zaire in the central part of Africa and its wealth
which makes the country an important member of the
international community. For that reason, the manifesto
states that: "MPR must function in a way such as to
preserve the international audience which makes Zaire an
attractive pole, not only in Africa, but also around the
world." 18
Zaire and the Rest of the World
The Nsele Manifesto asserts that the Popular Movement
of the Revolution will follow a policy of positive
neutralism. The ideologists of the Zairean political
party make it clear that:
The country (Zaire) must not be involved in the
game of alliances or pacts which divide the
world. Those world divisions which have resulted
in armed conflicts do not have any common nature




African countries. Therefore, why compromise
without a real interest the independence of
the country by accepting to take side with some
or others?!^
As one can notice, the manifesto stresses the
independent character of the Zairean state. Under the
provisions of the manifesto, Zaire will protect its
independence and follow a foreign policy which takes into
account Zaire and Africa's interests.
Writing on Zairean Authentic Nationalism, the Party's
doctrine, Manwana Mungongo asserts the following:
Zairean Authentic Nationalism is an awareness
of what is proper and authentic to us; it is
an awareness of what is common to us; it is an
affirmation of our willingness to live together;
it is a conviction that we are the first
responsible for our happiness and that we must
rely first of all on ourselves; it is a doctrine
that proclaims the primacy of national interests;
it is a struggle for economic independence; it is
a communal movement of peace, justice, and work;
it is a scientific and dynamic method; it is a
pragmatic doctrine of action and sacrifice, of
work and obligation; it is a doctrine of positive
neutralism and non-ingerence: 'neither leftist,
nor rightist'.20
As far as economic independence is concerned, the
Nsele Manifesto precises that:
Economic independence is the essential objective
towards which all efforts of the nation must be
oriented. Indeed, the conquest of that independence
is the only means to reach a real improvement of the
level of life of the populations. Also, the MPR
19ibid.
20Manwana Mungongo, Le General Mobutu Sese Seko parle
du Nationalism Zairois Authentique (Kinshasa: Editions
Okapi, 1975), p. 31.
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struggles so that our country does not continue
to be a colony of international capital.21
On the issue of economic independence. President
Mobutu, in one of his speeches, argues that, "political
independence without economic independence is an illusion."22
To President Mobutu, the ownership of the means of
production by Zairean people is a primordial obligation.
As indicated earlier, the Popular Movement of the
Revolution proclaims that Zaire's foreign policy is based
on the philosophy of positive neutralism. Manwana
Mungongo, explains the meaning of positive neutalism as
fol1ows:
Zaire benefits from Western and Eastern countries'
contributions as long as those countries do not
take actions which are harmful to Zaire's national
interests and which do not compromise national
sovereignty of the country. That is the meaning of
positive neutralism. It is a nationalism open to
all nations of good intentions. Strongly opposed
to the monopoly of blocs and foreign countries in
Zaire; it is guided not by an ideological prejudice,
but by the kind of actions taken by those countries.23
Hence, positive neutralism in foreign policy is a
notion that is emphasized by the President and his party
in all official pronouncements since 1971, at which date
the doctrine of Authenticity was introduced and adopted
as the national ideology. In the context of foreign
policy. Authenticity and its many variances, i.e., Mobutism,
2lManifesto de la N'Sele, p. 5.
22president Mobutu quoted by Mungongo, p. 48.
23Mungongo, Le General Mobutu Sese Seko, p. 69.
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Zairean Authentic Nationalism, constitute the instrument
of Zaire's propaganda.
This brief section has examined the rhetorical aspect
of Zaire's foreign policy. The next section will focus
on the practical aspect of Zaire's foreign policy. The
discrepancy between rhetoric and practice will be the
subject of this analysis at this juncture so as to
determine its root cause.
THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF ZAIRE'S FOREIGN POLICY
Domestic politico-economic situations have largely
contributed to shape Zaire's foreign policy. Indeed,
Zaire's international political stands have changed from
time to time depending on the social, political, and
economic situations prevailing in the country. A World
Bank report of 1979, divided the Zairean economy into
three periods which coincided with three general trends
in Zaire's foreign policy. According to this report.
The economic history of Zaire since independence
in 1960 can be divided into three periods:
(1) the years 1960-67, which were marked by
violent political strife and economic turmoil;
(2) the period 1968-74, when the GDP grew by
about 7 percent in real terms annually; and
(3) the crisis years of 1975-78.24
The crisis period (1975-78) which was the subject of the
1979 World Bank report has never ended. For, the Zairean
socio-economic crisis which began in 1975, has worsened in
24zaire: Current Economic Situations and Constraints
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979), p. 4.
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the 1980s to the extent that the reliance of the Zairean
state on foreign assistance seems to be the only remedy for
the Zairean government.
The three distinct periods described by the World Bank
report impacted on Zaire's foreign policy which has continued
to shift according to economic and political circumstances.
When President Mobutu first assumed power in 1965, Zaire was
still in a state of political strife and economic turmoil.
To consolidate his power, President Mobutu sought and
attracted the support of the masses by adopting Patrice
Lumumba's revolutionary rhetoric. He proclaimed Lumumba
as a national hero and promised to win the struggle for
economic independence. However, at the same time. President
Mobutu still needed the Western powers' military and economic
aid to end secessionist movements and to reconstruct the
national economy. So, the first trend of Zaire's foreign
policy was marked by a situation whereby President Mobutu
struggled to build a popular base in the country while, at
the same time, he was trying to rely carefully on the West.
When Zaire entered the period of economic prosperity
because of favorable conditions in the copper market.
President Mobutu intensified his revolutionary rhetoric
and became preoccupied with a quest for a leadership role
among his African colleagues. During that period.
President Mobutu sought to eliminate Zaire's economic
dependency by trying to build an economic base controlled
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by the Zairean bourgeoisie. The "Zairianization" of the
economy put Mobutu into open conflict with his Western
friends. The trend of Zaire's foreign policy, at the time,
was marked by more or less independent political stands.
The Zairean economic crisis which began in 1975, has
shifted the trend of Zaire's foreign policy. Indeed,
Zaire's economic, financial, military and technological
dependence which began to increase since 1975, has reached
an alarming level to the extent that Zaire's foreign policy
has become very conservative and pro-Western.
It should be noted that despite the revolutionary
rhetoric that the Zairean leadership displayed in the
early going, its class characters has made Zaire lean
permanently towards the Western bloc. One may argue that
some Zairean revolutionary stands may be caused by the
Zairean ruling classes' dissatisfaction with the foreign
bourgeoisie which blocks any move towards an establishment
of an economic base under the control of the Zairean
bouregoisie. This situation is a reflection of the
contradiction existing in the relation between the Zairean
ruling class and the foreign bourgeoisie which sustains it.
Having described the general trends of Zaire's
foreign policy, a focus on Zaire's policies towards
Africa, the Western countries, the Communist countries
and the Middle East states will provide a significant
ground from which an adequate conclusion can be drawn.
166
Also, the presence of Zaire at the United Nations and the
Organization of African Unity will be examined in order to
understand Zaire's behavior in international organizations.
ZAIRE'S POLICY TOWARD OTHER AFRICAN STATES
President Mobutu's takeover in 1965 was regarded
with suspicion by other African leaders because of the
ties he had with Western countries especially Belgium and
the United States before the murder of Lumumba. To many
African leaders. President Mobutu was involved in one way
or another in the overthrow and murder of Lumumba. To
eliminate these suspicions. President Mobutu's diplomatic
offensive began with his interest in speaking about
African values. He considered himself as a "spokesman"
for African unity and played an conciliatory role in
inter-African affairs. He presented himself as a fighter
against colonialism and racism and a defender of a policy
of friendship and cooperation in the name of African
solidarity. He proclaimed what he called "la politique
du bon voisinage" (policy of good neighborhood) in order
to dispel the suspicion of his neighbors.
The first success of the Zairean diplomacy took
place in 1967 when Kinshasa was chosen as the site for
the OAU summit. In February 1968, thanks to President
Mobutu's initiative, an economic regional group called
"the Union of Central African States) (UEAC - Union des
Etats de I'Afrique Centrale) was created. The UEAC was
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composed of Zaire, the Central African Republic and Chad.
The creation of the UEAC symbolized an informal withdrawal
of Zaire, Chad and the Central African Republic from the
UDEAC (Union Douaniere des Etats de I'Afrique Centrale or
Customs Union of Central African States) formed in 1964
with Cameroon and Gabon. In any case, the UEAC was
affected a few months after its creation following the
withdrawal of the Central African Republic because of the
temporary deterioration of its relations with Zaire.
Despite the diplomatic offensive aimed at improving
President Mobutu's image in Africa, Zaire's foreign policy
towards other African states has consistently changed
from time to time. A mutual distrust existed between
Zaire and the progressive countries such as Algeria,
Guinea, Ghana, Congo and Tanzania while other moderate
small countries such as Rwanda and Burundi were worried
about President Mobutu's imperialistic aims symbolized by
his search for leadership in Africa as explained in the
next section. Indeed, Mobutu's declarations were sometimes
provocative. On many occasions, he argued that it will
take a few hours for Zaire to invade and takeover the
Popular Republic of the Congo. Also, he used to claim
that "La voix du Zaire" which is the state-controlled
radio and televsion was the biggest drum of Africa. His
vision of Zaire as being the biggest and the strongest
country in Africa made some small and weak neighboring
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countries distrust Mobutu's interference with African
affairs. This justifies the break up of Zaire's relations
with Rwanda in January 1968, because of the refusal of
President Kayibanda to hand over white mercenaries who
entered Rwanda after fleeing from Bukavu in November 1967.
Thanks to the mediation of the Sudanese president,
relations between Zaire and Rwanda were resumed in
September 1968.
Despite the so-called "policy of good neighborhood,"
Zaire has had problems with most of its neighbors. Of the
nine countries sharing borders with Zaire (Uganda, Zambia,
Tanzania, Angola, Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan,
Rwanda and Burundi), the pro-socialist countries (Congo
at first, and later Angola) seemed to have had more tense
relations with Zaire. In the overall, all Zaire's
neighbors have had problems with the Mobutu government.
At a certain time, relations with Sudan reached a low
point because of the movement of rebels going to Sudan
from Zaire. In October 1968, Zaire and Sudan reached an
agreement controlling the movement of rebels and arms
along their common border. This agreement resulted in
the strengthening of relations between the two countries.
President Mobutu launched another diplomatic offensive
during the Biafra War by giving material and moral support
to the Federal Governnent of Nigeria. Zaire never
recognized Biafra. To President Mobutu, "the Nigerian
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crisis was not a moral question, but a matter of
principie."25
By the end of 1968, Zaire's relations with the Congo
became strained following the Mulele Affairs. Indeed,
Pierre Mulele, the guerilla leader of the Kwilu Province
from 1963-64, who lived in exile in the Congo was granted
an amnesty by President Mobutu. Foreign Minister Bomboko
succeeded in convincing the Congolese authorities who
suspected Mobutu's amnesty measures, to let Mulele return
to Kinshasa. However, a few days after his return, Mulele
was condemned to death by a military tribunal and executed
on October 9, 1968. The execution of Mulele severed
relations between Zaire and the Congo. On October 11, the
border between the two countries was closed and traffic
across the river ceased. During the same period. General
Bokassa accused Zaire of interfering with the Central
African Republic's internal affairs. In December 1968,
Bokassa withdrew his country from UEAC. If relations
with the Central African Republic improved one year later,
relations with the Congo were still tense in the early
1970s. Following the disintegration of the UEAC, Zaire
made another attempt aimed at grouping the former Belgian
territories of Rwanda and Burundi in order to create the
Common Organization for Economic Cooperation in Central
25president Mobutu Sese Seko quoted by Colin Legum and
John Drysdale, eds., Africa Contemporary Record; 1968
(London: Africa Research Limited, 1969) , p. 445.
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Africa. However, this attempt never materialized.
Zaire's relations with the Congo People's Republic
worsened in 1970 following the attempted coup in Brazzaville
on March 22, which had been led by Lieutenant Kikanga. The
departure of Foreign Minister Adoula who replaced Bomkoko
and the arrest of the latter resulted in the improvement
of relations between the two countries. Diplomatic
relations were restored following a two-hour meeting
between Mobutu and Ngouabi on the Congo River on June 16,
1970. Also, during the same year, that is in 1970,
President Mobutu visited General Gowon in Nigeria and
made possible a reconciliation between Nigeria and the
countries which had recognized Biafra, namely Gabon,
Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia.
President Mobutu's role as a spokesman for African
unity and African values was contradicted by several
African leaders following the expulsion of thousands of
foreign Africans from Zaire in September 1971. The Zairean
government claimed that foreigners were involved in diamond
smuggling. Explaining that expulsion measures before
foreign ambassadors in Kinshasa, the Vice-Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Laurent Eketebi argued that Zaire was
"neither xenophobic nor selfish."26 He contended that
"diamond smuggling had drained away 26 percent of the
26Laurent Eketebi quoted by Colin Legum, ed., Africa
Contemporary Record: 1971-1972 (London: Africana
Publisning Company, 1972), p. 526.
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revenue the country should have received from diamonds."27
In any case, the expulsion measure was followed by strong
protests from the Nigerian, Sierra Leonean and Senegalese
governments.
In spite of good relations between Mobutu and President
Obote, the Zairean government gave an unconditional support
to Idi Amin when he took over power in 1971. According
to Colin Legum, Zaire at first boycotted .OAU meetings when
the OAU summit was changed from Kampala to Addis Ababa.
Only a personal appeal to Mobutu from the Emperor of
Ethiopia prevented Zaire's absence from the summit in
June.28 Presidents Mobutu and Jomo Kenyatta played a
major role in resolving the conflict between Idi Amin
and Nyerere who granted political asylum to Obote. If
Jomo Kenyatta intervened in the interest of the economic
community of East Africa, President Mobutu was said to
intervene in the name of the "policy of good neighborhood".
Having succeeded in establishing good relations with
his neighbors by the end of 1971, President Mobutu wanted
to exert more influence in African affairs. He began
traveling around the continent and intensified his involve¬
ment in the struggle for the decolonization of Angola. He
continued to adopt a negative attitude concerning the




time commercial relations with South Africa were booming.
As demonstrated later in this section, a certain number
of mining contracts were won by South African firms.
It may be argued that the first trend of Zaire's
foreign policy towards Africa was characterized by Mobutu's
offensive diplomacy. This offensive diplomacy was symbolized
by Mobutu's role as a skilled conciliator in diplomatic
conflicts among African countries. As of 1971, the Congo
was the only neighboring state which had periodic troubled
relations with Zaire.
The second phase of Zaire's diplomacy was, in may
ways, influenced by the prosperous economic period caused
by favorable conditions in the copper market. President
Mobutu took that opportunity to launch another diplomatic
offensive with the purpose of taking a leadership role in
African affairs. He began taking revolutionary stands in
international politics in order to eradicate the suspicion
of progressive countries such as Algeria, Guinea, and Ghana.
President Mobutu traveled extensively in 1972 and 1973, and
devoted a lot of time trying to act as mediator for the OAU.
His ideology of Authenticity got some followers, namely
Togo and Chad.
On May 25, 1972, Mobutu made his first military
intervention by sending troops to Burundi in order to
protect President Michombero against internal uprisings.
That marked the first manifestations of President Mobutu's
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imperialistic ambitions in Africa.
In April 1972, Zaire withdrew from the French dominated
African-Malagasy Common Organization (Organisation Commune
Africaine et Malgache - OCAM). The Political Bureau explained
that the country was "ill at ease" within the organization.
Since OCAM was dominated by France, the withdrawal of Zaire
showed the extent to which President Mobutu was determined
to get rid of foreign domination in Africa. By that time.
President Mobutu sought to build an economy dominated by
the local bourgeoisie.
President Mobutu sought to improve his image by
traveling to Guinea in June 1972 and, as a result, Sekou
Toure and Mobutu reached some economic agreements including
an industrial accord for a Zairo-Guinea company.
By 1973, Mobutu succeeded in improving Zaire's
relations with its neighbors: the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda,
Tanzania, and Zambia. By working closely with Tanzania
and Zambia, Zaire was taking over Uganda's role in the
Mulungushi Club which was created in the mid-sixties by
Nyerere, Obote and Kaunda in order to coordinate their
position and put forward a strategy concerning the
situation in Southern Africa. Mobutu's contacts with
Nyerere and Kaunda probably contributed to the deterioration
of his relationship with Idi Amin. Mobutu mediated
between Tanzania and Burundi in their diplomatic conflict,
and between Rwanda and Burundi during the Tutsi-Hutu armed
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conf1 lets.
On October 4, 1973, President Mobutu addressed the
United Nations General Assembly and exposed clearly the
militant character of his foreign policy. Speaking of
South Africa, President Mobutu declared:
The building of the Cabora Bassa Dam, which will
serve to feed much of the Republic of South
Africa, shows unequivocally that the powers
interested will always oppose the liberation and
independence of the countries I have mentioned.
Furthermore, the Minister of the Interior and of
Information, Or. Connie Mulder, recently declared
that the Republic of South Africa was ready to
supply military support to all countries of
Southern Africa, including Mozambique and other
Portuguese territories, in order to combat what
he called terrorism - in other words, the heroic
struggle of the African nationalists... South Africa
is the only country in the world where the whites
have raised segregation to the level of an
institution. The term apartheid would not exist in
human language had the whites not been in South
Africa. The Republic of South Africa has plagued
the UN for over twenty years with the problem of
Namibia and the gravest thing is that the South
African racists are now balkanizing that great
African territory.29
Throughout 1974, Mobutu was working hard to prepare
a prominent role for his protege, Holden Roberto, in the
post-independence government of Angola. Roberto had a
quasi-kinship relationship with Mobutu for marrying a
Zairean women from the same village as Mobutu's first
wife. However, as explained later in this section, there
were other reasons why Mobutu supported Roberto. In any
case, Mobutu was accompanied by Holden Robert to the OAU
29Mobutu Sese Seko quoted by Legum in Ibid.
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Summit at Mogadishu in June 1974 and he took Roberto with
him to several other meetings. It was also reported that
Mobutu was supporting the Front for the Liberation of the
Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) in order to control the oil-rich
area of Cabinda. Mobutu justified his support for FLEC on
this historical ground: "Angola was colonized by Portugal
in the fifteenth century, but Cabinda was not annexed until
1885, enjoyed protectorate status, and only came under joint
administration with Angola in 1956."30
When Zaire got militarily involved in the Angolan war
in 1975, Zaire's economic situation was still good thanks
to the rise of the price of copper. The political situation
was dominated by tensions between Zaire and the Western
powers because of the nationalization of foreign companies.
Therefore, it may be argued that Zaire's military involve¬
ment in the Angolan war was not the consequence of any
foreign pressure. Indeed, the search for an economic base
at home which resulted in the nationalization measures,
the imperialistic ambitions of the Zairean ruling class,
the privileged relations between President Mobutu and the
President of FNLA, and the fear of an establishment of a
pro-Marxist government in Angola are some of the causes
explaining the Zairean military intervention in Angola.
Nzongola Ntalaja is certainly right when he contends that:
30Mobutu quoted by Legum, Africa Contemporary Record:
1975-76 (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976),
p. B511.
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Zaire's intervention in the Angola civil war,
far from being a simple execution of American
directives by the government of President
Mobutu Sese Seko, was primarily related to the
latter's struggle for survival, a desire that
coincided with the foreign policy objectives
of the United States. This is to say that the
Mobutu regime intervened in Angola to defend
its own class interests as well as to discharge
its obligations as junior parter of U.S.
imperialism.31
Almost a decade before the outbreak of the Angola
civil war, Zaire had strong ties with the FNLA (National
Front for the Liberation of Angola) which received also
the CIA backing. However, relations between Zaire and
the Marxist-oriented MPLA (Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola) were very tense. The backing of MPLA
by the Congo contributed to intensify hostility between the
Zairean and Congolese governments. Relations between Zaire
and UNITA (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola)
improved as a result of the conflict between UNITA and the
MPLA. Despite OAU's efforts to reconcile the three opposing
camps in order to create one movement, mistrust among the
leadership of the three political parties made impossible
an emergence of an unitary union. Without any doubt, Zaire
had always sought to maintain access to the ports of Lobito
in Angola and to use the Benguela Railway for the export of
Zairean copper. The Zairean ruling class believed that the
3lNzongola-Ntalaja, "The U.S., Zaire and Angola," in
Rene Lemarchand, ed., American Policy in Southern Africa
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978),
pp. 147-149.
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control of power by the MPLA in Angola could prevent Zaire
from using the quickest way to the Atlantic Ocean.
In early 1975, while plans had already been made
concerning the establishment of a transitory government
composed of MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA's members, the three
political movements were receiving intensive external
assistance. Zaire, the United States, China and South
Africa provided FNLA with material and logistical support
while the Soviet Union began accelerating arms deliveries
to the MPLA. In the summer of 1975, Cuban intervention
began with the arrival of military advisors. During the
crucial phases of the Angolan civil war in October, November
and December 1975, foreign military units were in full
operation in Angola. The Zairean troops that were backing
FNLA's troops were badly defeated. However, people still
questioned the reasons behind Zaire's intervention. As
indicated earlier, the fear of a Marxist-oriented government
in Angola and the imperialistic ambitions of the Zairean
ruling class were among the most important motives of the
Zairean military intervention. However, the OAU backing of
the MPLA became evident after the full invasion of Angola
by the South African military units in October 1975. It
was evident that Zaire was supporting a movement which has
connections with the racist government of South Africa. As
Thomas Turner and Crawford Young put it;
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...the South African and CIA interventions had
swing African opinion solidly behind the MPLA,
and legitimated the Soviet-Cuban role. The
vision of an Angolan triumph that would confirm
Zaire as a hegemonic regional power has thus
become the nightmare of an embattled Zaire,
again cast into diplomatic isolation, anew the
pariah state of tropical Africa. This disaster,,
great as it was, was soon eclipsed by the
relentess onslaught of the economic crisis.^2
Just after the Angola Civil War, Zaire has entered the
economic crisis period which is far from ending. Zaire
which was challenging economically the Western countries
in the early seventies has stopped launching revolutionary
slogans since 1976 in order to get financial loans which
are badly needed to run the country. Inflation, recession,
unemployment, unrest, foreign debt and many other political,
social, and economic difficulties have reached a lamentable
proportion. This deepening of the Zairean crisis has shifted
the trend of Zaire's foreign policy. In the context of this
economic crisis. President Mobutu once urged his African
colleagues to develop trade between African states. Indeed,
during the fourth assembly of the Association of African
Central Banks held in Kinshasa by the end of 1975, Mobutu
declared that Zaire would accept all African currencies in
settlement of trade balance.
In February 1976, Presidents Mobutu and Neto of Angola
reconciled thanks to President Ngouabi's personnel efforts.
32crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline
of the Zairean State (Madison: The University of iJisconsin
Press, 1985), p. 378.
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Although President Mobutu used to argue that he would
never meet with the Angolan President, some serious
problems such as border insecurity and the slowness in
the expedition of Zaire's copper forced Mobutu to accept
Washington's views according to which a diplomatic relation
with Angola would be beneficial to Zaire.
One of Zaire's negative images in African affairs
lies in its secret and ambiguous connections with the
racist government of South Africa. While the economic
problems facing landlocked countries such as Zambia are
great, and despite the fact that Zaire can find other
options concerning trade routes for its copper, the Angola
crisis of 1975 led Zaire to develop diplomatic and trading
contacts with South Africa. To begin with, Zaire fought
together with FNLA, UNITA, and South African troops in
order to prevent the Marxist-oriented MPLA to rule in
Angola. Since Zairean troops and South African units
were fighting in order to reach a common goal, there is
good reason to believe that the two forces were coordinating
their strategies at the military and even political levels.
Speaking of the connection between Zaire and South Africa,
Colin Legum argues that:
Contacts at official levels were reported in the
Johannesburg Star on 15 August 1975, but were
routinely denied by Zaire's Commissioner for
Foreign Affairs. However, Zaire's opposition at
the OAU to move to expel South Africa and Israel
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from the United Nations provided a favourable
background for negotiations.33
Colin Legum also contends that, "...the London Financial
Times mentioned unconfirmed reports of a R8m. loan from the
South African government to Zaire to cover food imports."34
In December 1975, the South African Minister for Economic
Affairs confirmed that petrol supplies from South Africa to
Zaire had begun October 1, 1975; between 1.5m. and 1.7m.
litres were routed to Zaire in the only month of October.35
To put it clearly, Zaire has had secret relations with
the South African government despite its verbal sympathy for
the South African liberation movement. The simple fact that
grocery stores in Zaire are stocked by some food imported
from South Africa can explain the extent to which South
Africa has become a major trading partner of Zaire.
President Mobutu's connection with South Africa increased
in 1976 and, at the same time, contributed to reduce his
influence in Africa. Colin Legum writes that:
Pretoria's offer a $6.7m. credit to Zaire for the
import of South Africa foodstuffs, and Zaire's
decision to ship a substantial portion of its
mineral exports through South Africa after the March
1976 closure of the Mozambique-Rhodesia border helped
feed African suspicion that the Mobutu regime was
'soft on South Africa,' and thus increase its
diplomatic isolation. It also tarnished the image
Mobutu was trying to cultivate as a militant




supporter of African liberation movements.36
On September 20, 1976, Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi
signed a convention setting up the Economic Community of
the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL). However, other
African states never joined the CEPGL whose membership
was open to any country in the region. Needless to say
that the CEPGL has never been operational.
In 1977, immediately after the Shaba War, Zaire
became the cause of the increasing polarization between
progressive and moderate African states. Progressive
states never tolerated foreign intervention in the Shaba
War and rejected Mobutu's claim that Cubans were involved
in the Shaba invasion. Moderate states, on the other hand,
supported Mobutu and made it known that Zaire had the right
to request foreign troops in order to rescue the state. The
fragmentation of African states' stands became deep after
the second Shaba War in 1978. During the Franco-African
summit of 1978, President Mobutu criticized Zambia's
President Kenneth Kaunda by arguing that, he had been either
an accomplice of the FNLC (National Front for the Libera¬
tion of the Congo), or else was incapable of controlling
his own territory.37 He thanked moderate African states that
came to Zaire's rescue, especially Morocco and Senegal.
36colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record; 1976-77
(New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1977), p. B536.
37Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: 1978-79, p. B579.
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During his visit to Morocco, Mobutu accused Algeria of having
backed the rebels who invaded Zaire during the Shaba War.
He threatened to train and arm Angola's political opponents.
However, Angola's decision to remove Zairean exiles from the
border area and the efforts of the Angola government to
encourage the repatriation of those who wished to leave
Angola contributed to eradicate the tense relations between
Zaire and Angola.
In the early 1980s, Zaire's foreign policy was domi¬
nated by considerations relating to the regime survival.
Practically, Zaire has abandoned its revolutionary rhetoric
and has adopted conservative stands in world politics. The
two last events which dominated Zaire's relations with
other African states were the Western Sahara issue and the
Chadian conflicts in which Zaire intervened militarily.
Indeed, in Februrary 1982, the Organization of African Unity
was paralyzed by the tension caused by the admission of the
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) during the 38th
Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers. The then
OAU Secretary-General, Edem Kodjo who wrote the letter
confirming the admission of SDAR acted within the limits of
powers conferred upon him by Article 28 of the OAU Charter.
As a matter of fact, the SDAR's foreign minister made a
written formal request for admission which Edem Kodjo
circulated to all OAU members in June 1981. Twenty-six
members (a simple majority of a total membership of fifty-
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one) responded favorably. Since Article 10 of the charter
says that all resolutions shall be determined by a two-
thirds majority of the members of the organization, the
twenty-six members favoring the SOAR's admission pressured
Kodjo to admit SOAR under Article 10. The admission of SOAR
let the conservative countries Morocco, Zaire, Senegal,
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Sudan, Tunisia, Togo, Egypt, Guinea,
Liberia, Gabon, Somalia, Rwanda, Swaziland, Malawi, Burundi,
and the Central African Republic to boycott the OAU
summit; the so-called radicals, composed of Angola,
Mozambique, Algeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Libya, Congo,
Cape Verde, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mauritius, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Sao Tome, Madagascar, Seychelles and Benin
supported Kodjo's action while Nigeria, Cameroon, Botswana,
Upper Volta, Uganda, Lesotho, Sierra Leone and Mauritania
found themselves in the category of moderates for trying to
reconcile the two opposing camps.38
The tense climate resulting from the admission of
SOAR attracted the superpowers to influence the stands of
their allies. Zaire's stand was conditioned partly by
its close relations with Morocco which sent troops to
help Zaire recapture its territories during the two Shaba
wars, and partly by Western pressure, for Zaire still
remembered the role that the West played in the Shaba wars
38colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record; 1982-83
(London: Africana Publishing Company, 1984), p. A42.
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and the flow of financial, economic, and technological
assistance coming from the Western countries. One can
argue that the Western Sahara question was not examined
by the Zairean government on the basis of merit and logic.
On the contrary, the Zairean government took that opportunity
to consolidate its ties and its allegiance to the Western
bloc which prevents the emergence of a pro-socialist
government in the Western Sahara.
The Chadian civil war was another issue dividing the
OAU members in 1982-83. Zaire's controversial involvement
in the Chadian civil war has been seen by many analysts as
another concrete example of its role as agent of the
Western bloc. To begin with, Zaire has practically no
common border with Chad and the immediate concern of Zaire,
at the time, should have been Angola which was the victim
of a series of invasions by South African troops. Instead
of assisting its neighbor Angola, Zaire took the lead in
sending troops to protect the former rebel Hissene Habre.
Indeed, on the basis of the OAU peace plan, Goukouni Weddeye
was appointed head of the provisional government of Chad.
The OAU Peace Force composed of Zaire, Nigeria and Senegal
moved into Chad to maintain peace after the evacuation of
the Libyan troops. However, when the rebel forces of
Hissene Habre launched their attacks in order to overthrow
Goukouni Weddeye, the OAU peace force did nothing to protect
the head of the provisional government appointed by the OAU.
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Under those circumstances, Goukouni's army lost the fight
and N'Djamena, the capital of Chad, was captured. Goukouni
lost because he had trusted the OAU peace forces before
requesting the withdrawal of the Libyan troops which has
previously kept Habre's forces in check. The fall of
N'Djamena, on June 9, 1983, to Habre's army led the OAU
chairman. President Moi of Kenya to order the OAU peace
force to withdraw from Chad. While Nigeria and Senegal
pulled out, Zaire did not really comply with President Moi's
orders.
After his overthrow, Goukouni Weddeye reorganized his
troops from Libya, and with Libyan military assistance,
launched an offensive military attack aimed at recapturing
Chad. On July 31, 1983, France decided to send equipment
and instructors in order to assist Hissene Habre while the
United States sent other military equipment through Egypt
and Sudan. The Chadian war became, ipso facto, inter¬
nationalized. While African states were polarized as to
whether the Hissene Habre government was legal or not.
President Mobutu increased Zaire's forces from 2,000 to
3,000 in order to assist Habre. President Mobutu was
congratulated by President Reagan on his visit to the
United States because of his "courageous intervention" in
Chad. Supplementary economic aid was given to Zaire by the
IMF at the request of the Reagan administration. Without
any doubt, Zaire's military intervention in Chad aimed at
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securing its ties with Western countries, especially the
United States. Indeed, since any military intervention
requires financial and material resources, Zaire which
had been facing enormous financial and military difficulties
would not accept to get involved. If Zaire had a military
capability to secure peace in other African countries, its
neighbor Angola would appreciate its military assistance
during the South African invasion. Such a military
involvement against the South African troops would certainly
improve the image of Zaire in the world. However, by
intervening in Chad, the Zairean government played the
role of a confident agent of the Western bloc which, in
return, guarantees the survival of the Zairean state.
ZAIRE'S POLICY TOWARD THE WESTERN COUNTRIES
President Mobutu has been skillful enough to avoid
being completely manipulated by the Western bloc. His
success lies in the fact that Western countries rarely
speak in an unified voice. Burning political or economic
issues sometimes divide Western countries and President
Mobutu has largely profited from this situation. For
instance, the relations between Zaire and Belgium may
worsen while France and the United States show some signs
of readiness to fill the vacuum that Belgian experts might
create by leaving the country. However, during the
"Zairianization" period, Mobutu's radical rhetoric was
viewed as a challenge to the whole Western bloc to the
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extent that relations between Zaire and the Western countries
reached a very low point. The increase of Zaire's dependence
on Western countries since the early eighties has led Zaire
to be subjected to a lot of Western pressure resulting in
the acceleration of Zaire's political dependence.
When President Mobutu took over power in 1965, Belgium,
the former metropolitan, was the only Western country to
have a series of problems with Zaire for historical reasons.
President Mobutu was working hard to improve Zaire's relations
with Belgium which controlled Zaire's economic sector.
However, tense relations between the two countries began in
1967 when the Zairean government promulgated the Bakajika
law resulting in the nationalization of the "Union Miniere
du Haut-Katanga". In July 1968, Mobutu met with King
Baudouin in Brussels and a month later, the Foreign Ministers
Bomboko and Henri Spaak met to discuss a series of treaties
aimed at "ending Belgium paternalism" in Zaire.39 Relations
between Zaire and Belgium were improving in mid-1969
especially in June 1969 when King Baudouin and Queen Fabiola
visited Zaire. In his speech welcoming them. President
Mobutu declared:
We rejoice that the condition of our mutual
relations has completely changed, and that
suspicion, mistrust and hostility have given
way to mutual understanding and cooperation
...Our two peoples now realize that their
vocation is to understand each other and that
39Colin Legum and John Drysdale, Africa Contemporary
Record: 1968-69 (London: Africa Research Ltd., 1969), p. 444.
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what has been achieved in eighty years of
common labour is the bond between the two
countries.^O
Also, the appointment of Cyrille Adoula as foreign minister
in August 1969 was welcomed by Belgium because of the pro-
Americ'an stand of the former foreign minister Justin-Marie
Bomboko. However, later in 1969, three events contributed
to deteriorate relations between the two countries. At
first, in September 1969, the Zairean government rejected
Union Miniere's proposal relating to the resumption of its
mining operations in Zaire; secondly, the trial of a Belgian
bank "SOCOBANQUE” accused of currency smuggling and, thirdly,
the dismissal of the Zairean bank governor Albert N'Dele
who was advocating closer links with Belgium. These three
events contributed to developing tense relations between
Zaire and Belgiurn
While relations with Belgium were worsening, Zaire's
ties with the U.S. were getting stronger. President Mobutu
visited the U.S. in August 1969, and at a press conference
he denied the fact that "Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga" had
been nationalized. In any case. President Nixon urged
American businessmen to invest in Zaire. He declared that
Zaire was a good place to make investments, not only for its
natural riches but also because of the vigor of its people
and the progressive character of its government.
^Olegum, Africa Contemporary Record: 1970-71, p. B295.
41lbid., p. B296.
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The political and economic support that Zaire received
from the U.S. after Mobutu's official visit made the latter
get tough in his dealings with Belgium. Indeed, Zaire's
relations with Belgium reached a low point after severe
sentences were imposed on Belgian bankers in Zaire. For,
the managing director of SOCOBANQUE, De Cuyper, was sentenced
to eight years with a fine of 175,000 zaires and was imposed
to repatriate 584,000 belgian francs. Many other Belgians
were sentenced to many years imprisonment. Further, in
June 1970, President Mobutu declared that Zaire was not
responsible for the debt contracted by the colonial regime;
therefore, said Mobutu, Zaire would stop making its monthly
payments to Belgium. In the meantime. President Mobutu,
opened the door to French technical assistance. A Franco-
Zairean chamber of commerce was established and a series of
cultural and technical agreements were signed by the two
countries.
Zaire's policy towards the Western countries started
assuming a sharper militancy in 1971. Indeed, the rise of
the ideology of authenticity in Zaire was pushing Mobutu to
play a sort of leadership role in Africa. Also, the favorable
economic conditions largely contributed to shape Zaire's
militant foreign policy. To President Mobutu, as an
independent counry, Zaire must deal on an equal footing with
the Western countries. For instance, Zaire's relations with
Great Britain almost deteriorated because of the poor
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reception given to Zaire's foreign minister in London.
Indeed, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, the Zairean foreign minister,
was upset for not being welcomed at the London airport by
Sir Alec Douglas-Home in person. Instead, a foreign office
official was sent to the airport to welcome him. Nguza
Karl-I-Bond got angry and left immediately for Kinshasa
to report to President Mobutu. This latter gave a warning
to Great Britain through its embassy in Zaire.
President Mobutu's militant foreign policy came to
surface when he addressed the General Assembly of the
United Nations on October 4, 1973. Speaking of Portugal
and NATO, President Mobutu declared:
In fact, Portugal is an economically, socially
and culturally underdeveloped nation. It has no
democracy. It has not military force. Its sole
record is that of having the highest level of
illiteracy in Europe. Its force and its arrogance
are supplied to it through its membership of NATO,
because Portugal, with its colonies, is strate¬
gically necessary for that military organization.
The volume of investments and capital coming from
the West to Portuguese colonies increases daily.^2
Referring to the connection between Great Britain and
Rhodesia, President Mobutu argued that:
Much has been said about economic sanctions to
put down the secession in Rhodesia, but in point
of fact. Great Britain carefully protects its
friend in NATO, Portugal, and the latter in turn
protects its friends, the British settlers of
Rhodes!a... Great Britain which considers itself
the most traditionally democratic country in the
world, the defender of fundamental freedoms and
the legitimate rights of man, accepts, tolerates
^^Mobutu quoted by Legum, Africa Contemporary Record:
1973-74, p. B616.
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and implicitly upholds its 200,000 rebellious
subjects who, contrary to the elementary rules
of democracy, keep four million blacks in
si a very.43
President Mobutu's militant speech followed by his
"Zairianization" measures resulted in the deterioration of
Zaire's relations with the United States. In an interview
to the Belgian newspaper, Le Soir, President Mobutu declared
that Zaire would no longer accept to be "exploited and
squeezed like a lemon." Throughout 1974, Mobutu stressed
the struggle for economic independence. He insisted on
control of the Zairean economy by the Zairean people. By
mid-1974, the replacement of Donald Easoum, Under-Secretary
of State for African Affairs by Nathaniel Davies, former
U.S. Ambassador to Chile by the time Allende was overthrown,
which followed the appointment of Dean Hinton as Ambassador
of the U.S. in Zaire in replacement of Vance in late 1973,
angered Mobutu because of his close relation with the former
Ambassador Vance. As a matter of fact, Mobutu never had
good working relations with Dean Hinton in 1974. Addressing
an Afro-American audience on January 21, 1975, President
Mobutu argued that, "In my opinion, the U.S. policy on
Africa is simply a passive one. It is a policy of status
quo and fait accompli."44
43ibid., p. B617.
44Mobutu quoted by Legum, Africa Contemporary Record:
1974-75, p. B610.
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He went on arguing that the United States "had done
nothing for the liberation of Africa from colonialism
and apartheid...in certain cases, the United States had
even worked against African interest."45 Relations with
the United states reached a low point in June 1975, when
Mobutu accused the U.S. of being involved in the coup
attempt. Indeed, eleven Zairean general officers and some
civilians were arrested for plotting to overthrow Mobutu.
Despite the fact that President Mobutu showed no concrete
evidence to back his accusations against the U.S., Dean
Hinton, the U.S. ambassador was withdrawn from Zaire at
the request of President Mobutu. The Zairo-US. crisis
disappeared rapidly as the two countries were drawn
together by the Angolan war. Zaire's involvement in the
Angolan war marked the beginning of a new trend of Zaire's
policy toward the West.
Relations with Belgium improved little by little as
Belgium's "Societe Generale" set up a joint venture with
Zairean mining companies. Also, the advent of the two
Shaba wars contributed to strengthening ties between
Zaire and the West. For, the U.S., Belgium, France and
West Germany provided Zaire with direct or indirect logistic
and military assistance. West Germany strengthened its ties
through OTRAG which obtained the right to use a territory
45Mobutu quoted by Turner and Young, The Rise and
Decline of the Zairean State, p. 372.
193
of nearly 150,000 sq. km. for testing the launching of
rockets. However, on the other hand, there has never
been a uniform Western foreign policy towards Zaire.
Legum argues that during the Shaba war for instance,
while assisting in the rescue operation of Mobutu, Belgium
and the U.S. clearly had serious misgivings; other Western
nations - such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and
Denmark - were more explicitly critical of the Mobutu
regime's corruption and disregard for human rights.
France alone stood ready to give unqualified support.
By intervening unconditionally in the Shaba wars,
France was aiming at increasing its influence in Zaire.
During the Franco-African summit which followed the first
Shaba war. President Mobutu threatened to break diplomatic
relations with Belgium and turn over to the French all
positions that Belgian experts held in Zaire. His threat
was made on the grounds of lack of enthusiam by Belgium
during the first Shaba war. President Mobutu's threat led
Belgium to intervene strongly in the second Shaba war.
To assure the U.S. of its allegiance, Zaire was the
first African country to accept President Carter's call for
sabotage of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow following
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Zaire's relations
with the United States became closer under the Reagan
Administration, for the emphasis of President Carter
46Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: 1978-79, p. B578.
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on human rights Issues prevent closer ties between the
Mobutu and Carter administrations. The unconditional
support of the Reagan administration to any leader who
resists Soviet penetrations has made possible a closer
rapprochment between Zaire and the Untied States.
While relations between Zaire and the U.S. were
improving, Zaire's relations with France were affected
during the presidential campaign in France. Indeed,
President Giscard d'Estaing was sharply criticized for
his personal and family ties with the Mobutu and Bokassa
regimes. As a matter of fact, Giscard d'Estaing was
previously involved in the scandal of "Bokassa diamonds"
and Francois Mitterand kept linking Giscard with Mobutu
and Bokassa during his presidential campaign. However,
the advent of the French Socialist Party to power has not
resulted in a radical shift of French foreign policy toward
Zaire. France has a lot of economic interests in Zaire and
President Mitterand has probably understood that any
distance from Zaire may reduce France's influence and
prepare Zaire to be subjected to other Western countries'
inf1uence.
Since the early eighties, Zaire's financial dependence
on the Western bloc has kept on increasing. In May 1980,
the Paris Club members composed of France, Belgium, the
U.S., Great Britain and West Germany met to reschedule
Zaire's external debt. According to Legum, the Reagan
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administration's visible sympathy toward the Mobutu regime
was apparently responsible for the mid-1981 decision by the
IMF to extend a startingly generous credit facility to
Zaire.^^7 jhe increasingly close relations between Mobutu and
the Reagan administration was probably one of the factors
which made Nguza's testimony in the U.S. Congress produce
no concrete weight despite the support given to the former
Zaire's prime minister by Howard Wolpe, the Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Africa. In any case, the Reagan
administration's request for aid to Zaire was rejected by
the Congress because of the rise of corruption in Zaire.
Instead of a total of $45.5m. consisting of $12m. in
military aid and $33.5m. in non-military aid, the Congress
reduced the total amount of U.S. aid to a mere $4m. in
May 1982. President Mobutu got upset by the Congress
decision and announced that Zaire would refuse further
U.S. aid. At that point, he declared that Zaire would
restore diplomatic ties with Israel. It was obvious that
Zaire could not refuse U.S. aid while the economic crisis
was worsening in the country. The resumption of diplomatic
ties with Israel could be a means to have the Jewish lobby
pressure the U.S. Congress. However, the immediate result
was the flow of Israeli technical and military assistance
in Zaire while Arab countries retaliated by cutting off
aid to Zaire. President Mobutu visited the U.S. right
^^Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: 1981-82, p. B388.
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after sending troops to Chad. He had a series of meetings
respectively with President Reagan; Vice President George
Bush; Secretary of State, Alexander Haig; Defense Secretary,
Casper Weinberger, and officials from the World Bank and the
IMF. As a result of his visit, substantial aid was given to
Zaire.
Relations between France and Zaire, under the Mitterand
administration, improved as Mitterand decided to maintain
the French military mission in Zaire so as to continue to
train the Zairean armed forces. Therefore, as many observers
argue, the rhetoric of Mitterand during the presidential
campaign has shifted to realism, for it is clear that
Mitterand does not intend to sever Franco-Zairean relations.
However, the presence of Zairean political exiles in Belgium
has been another cause of the periodical tense relations
between Zaire and Belgium. The meeting between Yoka
Mangano, Zaire's foreign minister and Leo Tindemans, the
Belgian foreign minister, on September 22, 1982 helped
reduce the tension between the two countries. The
negotiations between the two foreign ministers ended up
with a grant of $18m. aid program and a $20m. credit line
for Zaire.
In order to assure the survival of the Zairean state,
the Mobutu regime had strengthened its ties with France
and the U.S. While France's protection has been viewed as
48Legum, Africa Contemporary Record; 1982-83, p. B413.
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an alternative to Belgian paternalism, the U.S. is
considered as the strongest ally committed to securing the
survival of the Mobutu regime. In return, Zaire has been
playing for some years, the role of an agent protecting
Western interests. For instance, Zaire did not hesitate
to rescue the Habre regime in Chad when the U.S. expressed
some concern about the offensive of the Libyan backed forces
of the Chadian national government of transition. Further,
Zaire increased its military troops in Chad in 1983 in
order to please the U.S. and France. In addition, Zaire
sided with the U.S. in condemning the U.S.S.R. over the
KAL-007 incident and refused to condemn the U.S. invasion
of Grenada while the majority of the U.N. members did.
To put it clearly, it is irrational to determine a
general foreign policy of Zaire towards the Western bloc.
Zaire's president has taken advantage of the Western
division to formulate his foreign policy. One can notice
that any severe relation with Belgium, for example, is
accompanied by a close rapprochment with the U.S. and
France. The fact that some Western countries are ready
to fill the gap that other Western countries can create,
enables the president of Zaire to show some signs of
independence vis-a-vis the Western bloc. Actually, Zaire
badly needs the Western countries to boost its economy
through various forms of aid and, at the same time, the
search for markets has contributed to make the Western
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countries maintain stable relations with Zaire. One can
argue that Zaire and the West need each other. However,
the fact that the survival of the Zairean state depends
actually on Western intelligence, military aid, economic,
financial, and technological assistance provided mainly by
the U.S. which is certainly the leader of the Western bloc.
President Mobutu has every reason to keep closer ties with
the United States.
For years, Zaire's foreign policy has been pro-Western
despite the rhetoric slogans of the 1960s and early 1970s.
Also, the "Zairianization" measures which surface the
capitalistic character of the ruling class could not
distance Zaire from the West, for the functioning of those
"Zairianized" companies depend on Western technology,
finance and experts. Instead of giving economic independence
to Zaire, the Zairianization measures increased, on the
contrary, Zaire's dependency on the West. At last, the
worsening of Zaire's economic crisis has led Zaire to the
hands of the Western bloc which meets regularly through
the Paris Club to discuss Zaire's debt problem. It is in
this context that one can understand Zaire's pro-American
stand.
ZAIRE'S POLICY TOWARD THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Despite the rhetoric of neutralism, non-alignment
and authenticity that the Zairean government used to
display, the reality has shown that the president of
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Zaire and the communist leaders never trust each other.
As a matter of fact, socialist countries never forgot the
role that President Mobutu played in the fall of Patrice
Emery Lumumba. According to Crawford Young and Thomas
Turner.
Moscow, in its official commentaries on the Mobutu
takeover, described him as an instrument of Belgian
and American monopolies, born to power by a "colo¬
nial-racist armed rabble". The Soviets were wary
about his intimate American ties and CIA links.
Even though Lumumba was proclaimed a national hero by
Mobutu, relations between Zaire and the Communist bloc
have been surrounded by suspicion and mistrust. Indeed,
the anti-communiSt stand of President Mobutu was already
obvious before his takeover. In the conflict opposing
Kasa-Vubu to Lumumba in 196U, it was clear that President
Mobutu was siding with the moderates who supported Kasa-
Vubu. When he temporarily neutralized the government in
1960, he publicly accused the Soviet Union of subversion
and expelled the Soviet diplomats from Zaire. That marked
the first break of Zairo-Soviet relations. Another break
with the Soviet Union occurred in 1963 during the Adoula
government era. Indeed, the Zairean government accused
the Soviet Union of assisting the rebels in the eastern
part of Zaire.
Although Zaire's foreign policy since 1965 followed
*
^^Turner and Young, The Rise and Decline of the
Zairean State, p. 370.
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three significant trends, radical changes in Zaire's
relations with the communist countries in general have
never occured. A couple of years after his takeover.
President Mobutu announced that Zaire would establish an
embassy in Taiwan. This decision severed, one more time,
Zaire's relations with the communist bloc which sympathized
with China in its conflict with Taiwan.
In April 1968, for the first time since Mobutu's
takeover, Zaire reestablished its diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union. Zaire's foreign minister,
Justin-Marie Bomboko traveled to Moscow on July 26, 1968.
In his meeting with Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister,
he was told that Russia intended to have good relations
with Zaire despite ideological differences. However, a
month later, that is in August 1968, Zaire reacted strongly
to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Although the
reaction was legitimate, the fact of questioning the
usefulness of socialism showed the extent to which Zaire's
government was anti-socialist despite its rhetoric of
neutralism. Indeed, the state-run radio on August 21
made the following comment:
Now that guns are doing the talking in Prague,
as in Budapest earlier, Muscovite communism
has once again degraded itself in the eyes of
the world and will not in the short term be
able to rehabilitate itself, even if from the
UN rostrum its tenors sing of Soviet condem¬
nation of imperialism, coloniaism and neo¬
colonialism. Imperiaism and colonialism are
what we have just seen in all their horror
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reigning in Eastern Europe and imposed by
Moscow...We have just seen that scienfitic
socialism cannot and will never come to terms
with the fundamental freedom. The Congolese
people have chosen their own philosophy, which
is nationalism...the events in Prague will no
doubt lead the Congolese government to recall
all Congolese students now studying in those
countries whose armies have invaded Czecho-
solvakia, for we have no wish to see these
leaders of tomorrow returning home one day
imbued with imperialist ideas and liable to
advocate invasion of countries neighboring on
the Congo, who do not share its views, culture
or system of government.50
The above statement showed clearly that Zaire had no
sympathy with socialism. In August 1968, Adoula replaced
Bomboko as foreign minister. He issued a foreign policy
statement by declaring that besides the principles of
positive neutralism and non-alignment laid down in the
constitution, the policy of General Mobutu was focused on
cooperation with all countries whatever their political or
economic regime. When the rise of authenticity took place.
President Mobutu began speaking of Zaire's neutralism in
international politics. He visited Romania and Yugoslavia
and signed economic treaties with the two countries.
However, relations with the Soviet Union worsened again
in May 1970, when four Soviet Union diplomats were declared
persona non grata; they were accused of subversive activities.
A year later, that is, in 1971, about twenty Soviet-bloc
officials were expelled for being accused of complicity
SOlegum and Drysdale, Africa Contemporary Record:
1968-69, p. 611.
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in student riots on the university campus of Kinshasa.
The visit of President Mobutu to Taiwan in April
1971, resulted in the development of tense relations
between Zaire and the Eastern countries that sympathized
with China. By the time of his visit to Taiwan, President
Mobutu was committed to voting against the entry of China
to the United Nations. However, an ambiguous shift in
Zaire's foreign policy toward the communist countries
occured in 1972 when President Mobutu recognized the
People's Republic of China. Indeed, the development of
the Sino-Soviet conflict and Nixon's visit to China meant
to President Mobutu that a rapprochment with China would
not hurt his close ties with the Western bloc. The
official normalization of relations between China and
Zaire took place on November 19, 1972, while the agreement
came into effect on November 24. China granted Zaire a
loan of $100m. with no interest for twenty years. The
recognition of China resulted in the closing of the Taiwan
embassy in Zaire. Mobutu declared in November 1972, that
he agreed with the idea of two Germanys, two Koreas and
two Vietnams. In his militant speech at the United
Nations in 1973, President Mobutu praised China by arguing
that:
Since the month of January this year, Zaire has
been the scene of a unique experiment in the
field of cooperation; that is, the assistance
given by China to my country. The Chinese
technical assistants in our country receive no
203
air tickets from us and they transfer no
salaries to their home country. The Chinese
experts adopt the same way of life as their
Zairean counterparts. In the field of
financial assistance, China has given us
considerable credits on a very long term loan
and without interest. This, in my view, is a
very good example to follow if you want to
help an under-equipped country.^1
Zaire's president launched a diplomatic offensive
towards the East in 1974 by visiting Cuba in April 1974,
and North Korea in December 1974. Mobutu agreed to
establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. He also visited
China, once again, and accepted to go to the Soviet Union.
However, the trip to the Soviet Union never materialized.
North Korea agreed to send 107 military instructors to
train the Kamanyola division while China became involved
in different projects especially in agricultural and
health sectors.
The improvement of relations with the Eastern bloc
was very short, for the involvement of Zaire in the
Angolan war had serious consequences. First of all, the
Korean instructors left Zaire on December 7, 1975, while
President Mobutu's verbal attacks to Russia resurfaced.
He declared on January 19, 1976, during an interview with
Agence Zaire Presse (AZAP) that the last OAU summit had
been a failure, for the African continent had become
divided into two camps, because of the game played by the
Soviet Union. In any case, because of the Sino-Soviet
SlLegum, Africa Contemporary Record: 1974-75, p. B618.
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difference, Zaire found itself in the same camp as China
during the Angolan war. Actually, although relations
with the Eastern bloc are surrounded by suspicion and
mistrust, Zaire's relations with China are still good.
Just after the Zairean disaster in Angola, a Zairean
delegation headed by the State Commissioner for Political
Affairs arrived in Peking. The Chinese foreign minister,
Chiao Kuan-Hua congratulated Zaire for its stand against
"social imperialism and Soviet ambitions".^2
Zaire's relations with the Eastern bloc have reached
a low point, especially since the first Shaba war in 1977.
Indeed, President Mobutu appealed to the Western countries
for help and accused Angola, Cuba, the U.S.S.R., and East
Germany of aggression. Although there was no concrete
evidence of Cuban participation in the war, Cuban diplomats
were expelled from Zaire.
In the early 1980s, the increase in Zaire's reliance
on the Western assistance has resulted in the development
of distrust between Zaire and the Eastern bloc. In any
case, China which has enormous differences with the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, a non-aligned communist country, are
the two communist countries which have good and stable
diplomatic relations with Zaire. Countries such as Poland,
East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Mongolia
which have similar views with the Soviet Union are unlikely
52Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: 1976-77, p. B539.
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to have excellent diplomatic relations with Zaire.
ZAIRE’S POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES
The Israelo-Arab conflict is certainly the most
criticial issue that one takes into account when dealing
with the Middle East situation. Zaire's policy toward
the Middle East has shifted in many occasions, depending
on circumstances. Indeed, after its independence, Zaire
received a lot of military assistance from Israel. When
President Mobutu took over power, Israel was in charge of
training the para-commando troops based in Kinshasa and
Lubumbashi. The increasing military and agricultural
assistance from Israel led to the ratification of a treaty
of friendship between Zaire and Israel in November 1970.
By the time President Mobutu began to formulate a militant
foreign policy toward the West, following the rise of his
ideology of authenticity in the early seventies, Zaire's
ties with Israel were still unshaken. As a matter of
fact, in September 1971, President Mobutu signed a new
military assistance agreement with Israel. However, by
that time, rumors concerning the connection between Israel
and South Africa were circulating among African leaders
and President Mobutu who was struggling to take the
leadership role in Africa was becoming sensitive to Arab's
complaints, especially the occupation of Arab territories
by Israel.
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In August 1971, President Mobutu hosted a meeting of
the OAU's Middle East Peace Commission in Kinshasa.
Presidents Senghor of Senegal, Gowon of Nigeria and Ahidjo
of Cameroon attended the meeting. President Mobutu was
certainly influenced by his colleagues during the Middle
East Peace Commission meeting concerning his views on the
Middle East. He decided to score a diplomatic success by
reconciling Israel and Egypt. Thus, he visited Tel Aviv
and Cairo in November 1971, but no successful results
occured. Zaire's policy toward the Middle East took a
radical shift on October 4, 1973, when President Mobutu
decided to break diplomatic relations with Israel. In
his speech before the General Assembly, he declared that:
Zaire must choose between a friendly country,
Israel, and a brother country, Egypt. Now,
between a friend and a brother, the choice is
clear. And our decisions are taken in complete
independence and outside all pressures.53
As one can remember, the break up of diplomatic
relations with Isreal coincided with the tense relations
between Zaire and the West. And, at the domestic level,
Zaire embarked on the policy of "radicalization and
Zairianization," that is, nationalization of foreign
enterprises. At the same time, the economic situation
between 1970 and 1975 was prosperous thanks to the rise of
copper prices in the international market. President
Mobutu, by that time, felt that he could rule without
53Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: 1973-74, p. B616.
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relying on Western assistance.
The immediate consequence of the break up of diplomatic
relations between Zaire and Israel was, as one can imagine,
the rapprochment between Zaire and the Arab world. Indeed,
contacts between Zaire and the Arab countries became stronger
than ever. In the beginning of 1974, President Mobutu
embarked on a trip which took him to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Egypt, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. He immediatley
established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
and the UAE. In March 1974, President Mobutu announced
that a Lebanese embassy would be opened in Kinshasa. As
a result, Arab financial assistance began to flow into
Zaire.
Thoughout 1975, two events pushed Mobutu to modify
his policy toward the Middle East. First, the Arab oil
price was increasing and President Mobutu was upset
because of the lack of Arab's concern about Third World's
economic problems; second, the involvement of Zaire in
the Angolan war ended up with the consolidation of
relations between Zaire and the United States. As a
matter of fact, U.S. influence became obvious as Zaire
was entering the period of economic crisis.
As far as oil prices were concerned. President Mobutu
began speaking against the unfairness of the Arab oil-
producing countries. The Libyan Prime Minister, Major
Jalloud, who visited Zaire from March 13 - 18, 1975, tried
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to sympathize with Mobutu's concern and signed a series
of agreements on economic, technical, scientific and
cultural cooperation. At the end of his visit. Major
Jalloud praised President Mobutu's ideology of authenticity
and declared that Gaddafy's third theory and Mobutu's
authenticity constituted "the basis for crystallizing the
ideas of the third world in a single theory, with the aim
of creating a unified social, economic and intellectual
system."54 President Mobutu was exhausted to hear Major
Jalloud stating that oil revenues should be used to assist
Third World countries. A total amount of $100.7m. was
given to Zaire by Libya as a loan in order to expand
Zaire's copper industry. However, during the Angolan
war, the unfortunate collision between Zaire, South Africa,
and the U.S. led some analysts to believe that Israel was
also providing logistic support in order to crush the MPLA
forces. Also, Zaire's firm stand against moves to expel
Israel and South Africa from the United Nations during
the OAU summit in Kampala in July 1975 and later on at the
United Nations General Assembly, indicated a possibility
of Zaire's secret connection with Israel. Therefore,
many observers were not too surprised when the Israeli
television announced on December 21, 1975, that the
foreign minister Yigal Allon had met with the Zairean
foreign minister in Zurich at the request of the Zairean
54Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: 1975-76, p. B513.
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government. The two foreign ministers discussed among
other things the resumption of diplomatic relations between
the two countries. As expected, the Arab countries reacted
quickly and on December 23, the Department of Foreign
Affairs in Kinshasa issued a statement denying the Israeli
allegations and reassuring Arab ambassadors in Zaire that
the Mobutu regime would continue to support the Palestinian
cause and that relations with Israel would not be reesta¬
blished as long as Israel occupies Arab land.
From the period of the Angola war to the period of
the Shaba wars, Zaire's economic and military reliance on
the West was growing fast. At the same time the official
recognition of the MPLA by most of the Arab as well as
non-Arab countries resulted in one of the biggest failures
of Zaire's foreign policy. During that critical period,
informal contacts between Zaire and Israel were growing
despite the lack of official ties.
It was during the Franco-African summit held in
November 1981, in Paris that rumors relating to the
probable resumption of diplomatic relations between Zaire
and Israel began to circulate. On his return to Kinshasa
after the summit. President Mobutu welcomed the Israeli
Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon. And on May 14, 1982, two
days after Mobutu had announced that Zaire would refuse
any further U.S. aid, the Zairean government made official
the resumption of diplomatic relations between Zaire and
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Israel. After announcing his decision. President Mobutu
dispatched the director of his office to Jerusalem in
order to meet with Menachem Begin. As expected, the Arab
reaction was quick. For, Qatar and Saudi Arabia retaliated
by breaking diplomatic relations with Zaire and later on,
Syria, Libya, Bangladesh, the United Arab Emirates, and
Kuwait followed Saudi Arabia's lead. Also, the Arab Bank
for African Economic Development (BADEA) which had provided
Zaire with $36.8m. from 1975 to 1981, decided to stop its
dealing with Zaire. In addition, OPEC's International
Development Fund decided to stop its assistance to Zaire.
The bilateral Arab aid to Zaire which amounted to $434.4m.
from 1973 to 1980 was also suspended. Egypt never reacted,
but Morocco which participated in the rescue operation during
the Shaba war promised to have Mobutu change his mind. How-
wever, Morocco never succeeded in its efforts to convince
Mobutu to reverse his decision. Zaire's justification lies
in the fact that Israel has returned to Egypt the last
portion of African territory (SINAI) occupied since 1967.
One can argue that class interest has strongly
contributed in making Mobutu resume diplomatic relations
with Israel. Indeed, the financial assistance of the
Arab world to Zaire was not enough to secure the survival
of the Zairean state whose political record is dominated
by anti-socialiSt stands while many Arab countries have
adopted a pro-socialist model of development. Israel had
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been seen as an ally which could provide logistic support
for the survival of the Zairean state. Also, it was obvious
obvious that the Jews lobby in the U.S. could influence the
Congress in order to increase economic assistance to Zaire.
Therefore, as long as the survival of the Zairean state is
concerned. President Mobutu has every reason to believe
that relations with Israel are far more productive than
with the Arab world composed of many radical countries
whose ideology is totally opposed to the philosophy of
the Zairean ruling class.
In January 1983, following the visit of a Israeli
delegation headed by Ariel Sharon, Israel announced that
the Israel would train two key units of the Zairean armed
forces: the presidential guard and the Kamanyola division.
In addition, it was said that Israel would also be in charge
of developing the Zairean navy. It is clear that the strong
military assistance from Israel is far more important than
the Arab economic assistance as far as the security of the
Zairean state is concerned. Many Africans argue that
Zaire, Israel and South Africa may constitute an axis
aiming at destabilizing the progressive countries in
Southern Africa such as Angola, Mozambique and possibly
Zimbabwe. Progressive African states have strongly
criticized Zaire's military ties with Israel. Actually,
the revolutionary pressure that is spreading throughout
the African continent has made conservative and moderate
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African presidents realize that their survival needs to
be secured at any cost. As a result, Israel has launched
a diplomatic offensive resulting in resumption of diplomatic
relations with some moderate and conservative African
countries. At this juncture, it appears that Liberia and
the Ivory Coast have followed Zaire in resuming diplomatic
ties with Israel.
ZAIRE'S PRESENCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Zaire has become an effective member of the United
Nations since September 20, 1960. As as developing
country, Zaire shares a lot of problems and goals with
other Third World nations. Developing nations operate in
a loose, but effective political caucus at the United
Nations. As a matter of fact, the Group of 77, which
numbers actually 118 countries including China has been
an effective body challenging the developed nations. The
North-South Dialogue symbolizes the struggle of developing
countries for radical changes within the international
system. As a political caucus, developing nations struggle
for reapportionment of political power within the United
Nations in order for the General Assembly to have some
power to deal with important political and economic
issues. Thus, for many years, the General Assembly has
been a forum through which developing countries level
protests, grievances, or accusations against imperalistic
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policies of developed nations. By voicing the right for
self-determination at the General Assembly, the developing
countries efficiently helped accelerate the process of
decolonization in the sixties and seventies.
As a member of the Group of 77, Zaire has voted
several times with the U.S.S.R. and other developed
socialist countries of the Third World nations. To put
it clearly, political alignment at the United Nations is
not very obvious as far as the voting pattern is concerned.
For instance, the fact that Zaire has voted many times with
the Soviet Union does not indicate that Zaire sympathizes
with her. It rather shows the Soviet Union's sympathy
toward the Third World nations. Indeed, the Soviet Union
has supported most of the resolutions regarding the self-
determination of the Third World nations, while the
Western nations, especially the United States and the
United Kingdom, have either abstained or opposed those
resolutions.
It would be unnecessary to examine all Zaire's votes
at the United Nations since 1965, because of the large
number of resolutions that pass every year. The appendixes
of this dissertation provide a list of some of the
resolutions that circumstantially led Zaire and the Soviet-
bloc countries in the same camp.
The resolutions listed in Appendix I and many other
that are not mentioned in this study reflect some of the
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cases in which Zaire allied itself with the cause supported
by the political caucus of the developing nations. Zaire's
votes in those cases may be seen as popular because they
were supported by the majority of the members of the United
Nations, and in addition, they were based on merit; there¬
fore, they are unquestionable.
However, despite its membership in the Group of 77,
Zaire has disappointed many times the political caucus of
the Third World nations by voting unpopularly with the Western
bloc without regard to merit. By abstaining or voting against
against some resolutions, Zaire has failed, in many cases, to
support the cause of oppressed people (see Appendix II).
In looking at the resolutions passed frm the 29th to
the 39th sessions of the General Assembly, (see Appendix
II), one notices that Zaire's unpopular votes kept on
increasing from 1975 to 1985. Zaire's negative votes or
abstentions to resolutions above mentioned are surprising
but if one examines them carefully, one will come to the
conclusion that they were shaped by the political climate
existing by that time.
For some reasons, Zaire never supported all resolutions
condemning violations of human rights. Also, despite
Zaire's rhetorical sympathy toward the Palestinian people,
Zaire abstained or voted negatively to resolutions condemn¬
ing Israel's behavior in the Arab occupied territories.
Further, despite the concern of the developing countries
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for self-determination and independence of all countries
still under colonial domination, Zaire abstained from many
resolutions calling for the self-determination of people
under colonial rule. While, the Soviet bloc supported
the developing countries in their struggle for self-
determination, the United States was siding with the
United Kingdom or France by abstaining or voting negatively
to resolutions calling for independence of colonial
territories. Surprisingly, Zaire was not supporting all
those resolutions.
Disarmament is another area dividing the United
States and the Soviet Union. As far as nuclear weapons
are concerned, the Soviet Union has indicated, a couple
of years ago, that it would stop temporarily testing
nuclear weapons. For that reason, the Soviet bloc has
supported resolutions calling for a nuclear weapons freeze
while the U.S. has always voted negatively. Being a non¬
nuclear state, Zaire could support such nuclear freeze
resolutions, but she abstained from most of those
resolutions.
To put it clearly, most of Zaire's abstention or
negative votes are unjustifiable and symbolize nothing
but a clear political alignment. Although Zaire had
voted many times with the Soviet bloc, especially on
colonial questions, all those votes can be explained and
justified. However, one cannot explain Zaire's abstentions
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and negative votes without referring to the concepts of
political dependence, political alignment or class
ideology.
ZAIRE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
The creation of the Organization of African Unity,
on May 26, 1963, was a precious event for all African
people. As The Uganda Angus commented, on May 27, 1963:
...clearly, the outlook now is for closer and
closer cooperation between African states and
for a pooling of their efforts in all spheres,
but particularly in the ending of colonialism
and the freeing of those parts of Africa where
the African people are still denied self-
determination .55
However, since 1963, the OAU has encountered a series
of difficulties in the process of creating a network
which could facilitate close cooperation among African
states in order to end domination and exploitation in
Africa. As a matter of fact, ideological groups which
existed before the creation of the OAU still operate
underground.
Before the signing of the OAU Charter, Zaire identified
itself with the Monrovia Group which adopted conservative
views in burning African issues while the Casablanca
Group took radical stands. Although, Zaire has contributed
several times to solving some inter-African problems, there
55The Uganda Angus quoted by Zdenek Cervenka, The
Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU (London:
Friedmann Publishers, Ltd., 1977), p. TH
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is no doubt to argue that, she has played some role
leading to the paralysis of the OAU, especially in the
early eighties.
Zaire's stands in burning issues dividing OAU members
are mostly pro-Western while some moderate states such as
Nigeria and Cameroon have voted many times with the
radical African states. However, in many instances, Zaire
has failed to get its stands endorsed.
Before the creation of the OAU, the Casablanca Group,
composed of Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Egypt and Algeria
insisted on the fact that political unity should be the
first step toward the integration of African economies,
whereas, the moderate and conservative states of the
Monrovia and Brazzaville groups argued that economic
cooperation should be the prerequisite for the political
unity of Africa. However, as Cervenka argues, "Despite
the divisions, there was a sustained desire to unite all
the independent African states, and each of the three
groups made frequent attempts to end the division."56
Despite their efforts to end divisions, African states
within the OAU are sharply divided at the ideological
level. For instance, in 1965, hardline states introduced
a bill calling for the break up of African states'
relations with the United Kingdom because of its support
of the racist regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. Guinea,
56ibid., p. 1.
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Ghana, Mali, Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Congo, Tanzania,
and Sudan were the radical states which supported the
bill while Zaire and other conservative states refused to
endorse that proposal. However, Zaire did participate in
some of the commissions in charge of ending inter-African
conflicts. Indeed, in 1966, an OAU commission composed
of Kenya, Sierra Leone and Zaire was in charge of
reconciling Guinea and Ghana over the case of Ghanians
held in Ghana. Also, in 1967, Zaire was a member of the
commission in charge of inquiring and consulting Nigeria
on the Biafra question.
While radical African states were advocating strong
stands against South Africa, the Zairean foreign minister
argued in October 1969, that negotiations should not be
excluded in liberation wars. In 1971, Zaire was a member
of the OAU Middle East Peace Commission. However, she
failed to reconcile Israel with Egypt.
Zaire's strong right-wing extremism has become
obvious since 1975 when the Angolan war began. In the
early eighties, Zaire contributed to paralyzing the OAU
by boycotting OAU summits because of the Chad and Western
Sahara issues. To begin with, Zaire's conservatism failed
to prevent the entry of Angola to the OAU. For, at the
OAU meeting which began on Februrary 23, 1976, Angola
was formally seated for the first time as an OAU member.
When the OAU celebrated its fifteenth anniversary on
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May 25, 1978, a lot of disputes were dividing African
states. Indeed, in Western Sahara, POLISARIO forces were
fighting Morocco and Mauritania's armies while in the
Horn of Africa, Somalia was losing the battle with Ethiopia
over the Ogaden province. In addition, there was the Shaba
War of 1978 in Zaire and the Rhodesian army aggressions in
Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia. All those issues dividied
African states, and the progressive states seemed more
active than the moderate countries. The Zairean Foreign
Minister, Umba di Lutete, referred to the moderate states
as the "silent majority" because of their inability to
resist the pressure of radical states.57
Speaking of the active role of the radical states,
Zdenek Cervenka makes the following comments:
However, on most occasions in the past, it (the
silent majority) has been unable to resist the
pressure of a small, but very active and well
organized group of 'radicals' whose core has
consisted of Algeria, Tanzania, Libya, Guinea,
Somalia (until 1977), Congo, Benin, and more
latterly the ex-Portuguese and Sao Tome and
Principe. For example, in 1972, this combi¬
nation produced the remarkable unanimous vote
against Israel at the Rabat QUA summit, despite
the fact that almost two-thirds of all the
African states had diplomatic and economic
relations with Israel at that time. In 1975, a
small group of OAU members - later to become
known as the Front-line states - assumed
responsibility for the liberation of Zimbabwe
and Namibia... Perhaps the most remarkable feat
of the radical minority was its diplomatic
victory at the OAU's Extraordinary Session on
SZzdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "The Organization of
African Unity in 1978: The Challenge of Foreign Intervention,"
in Legum, Africa Contemporary Record: 1978-79, p. A26.
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Angola which met in Addis Ababa in January
1976. The radicals, which at the time
consisted of Algeria, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mozambique, Sao
Tome and Principe, Somalia and Tanzania,
succeeded in winning the support of two of the
most important moderates - Nigeria and Sudan -
to recognize the MPLA government proclaimed on
11 November 1975.58
In most issues, Zaire has strongly opposed the
radical states. As far as ideological classification is
concerned, Cervenka includes Zaire in the category of
moderates and conservatives. As of 1978, Cervenka
identified the following ideological groups:
Category One: The Marxist Radicals ^Ten Members)TTi Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau
Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe
B. Magadascar, Benin and Congo.
C. Equatorial Guinea. This country is not in any
sense Marxist, but depends almost exclusively for
its support on the communist world.
Category Two: The Radical or Militant Nationalists
(Twelve Members) Serious aspirations to being non-
aligned.
A. Algeria, Cameroon, Guinea, Ghana, Libya, Mali,
Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia.
B. Uganda, under Amin, was a maverick member of this
group.
Category Three: Nationalist with Non-Aligned
Aspirations (Seven Members) Votes are liable to
change depending on particular issues.
Burundi, Central African Empire, Djibouti, Lesotho,
Liberia, Niger, Upper Volta.
Category Four: 'Moderates' and 'Conservatives'
(Twenty Members) Affirm belief in non-alignement,
but tend to adopt anti-Soviet/Cuban positions
(though not necessarily anti-Chinese).
A. Ivory Coast, Gabon, Malawi, Morocco, Egypt,
Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Mauritania, Togo, Comoros,
Zaire. Aggressively anti-Soviet to the point of
welcoming open Western military and other support.
B. Liberia, Kenya, Mauritius, Gambia, Tunisia,
Botswana, Swaziland. Less doctrinaire in their
58ibid., pp. A26-A27.
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anti-Soviet stand and more circumspect in their
relations with the West and China.
C. Somalia, Marxist, but sharing the views of
those in Category A on foreign policy.59
The above classification provides a useful background
in understanding the voting pattern of African states in
general and Zaire in particular.
The Chad and the Western Sahara issues were the two
burning issues dividing once again African states in the
early eighties. In both cases, Zaire has taken a
conservative stand to the point that she did not hesitate
to boycott the OAU summits while the moderate Nigeria has
tried to reconcile the two camps in order to save the OAU.
Speaking of Zaire's military intervention in Chad, Cervenka
and Colin Legum argue that "Mobutu's eagerness to send in
his troops, when he himself had to rely on others to help
his regime in time of trouble gave rise to much speculation
as to his true motives."50 in any case, the inaction of
the OAU peacekeeping forces which replaced the Libyan
forces helped the pro-Western Hissene Habre to overthrow
the transitionary government of Weddeye, that was set up
by the OAU. The radical states' effort to seat Weddeye
at the OAU summit was unsuccessful as the conservative
states were determined to protect the former rebel
59ibid., p. A28.
50zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "The Organization
of African Unity in 1981: A Crucial Testing Time for Peace¬




Concerning the Western Saharan question, despite
many U.N. resolutions reaffirming the right of the people
of the Western Sahara for self-determination, and despite
the legal procedures followed by the Secretary-General
Eden Kodjo before admitting the Saharan Arab Democratic
Republic to the OAU, Zaire and other hardline conserative
states refused to participate in OAU summits where SOAR
was seated. Nineteen conservative states supported
Morocco in its dispute with SOAR while twenty-six states
backed POLISARIO at the OAU liberation for the admission
of SOAR.
Pro-Morocco: Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia,
Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Somalia,
Sudan, Tunisia, Upper Volta, and Zaire.
Pro-SDAR; Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana,
Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Libya,
Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sao Tome,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Undecided: Egypt, Nigeria, Malawi, Mauritania.61
The division over the admission of SDAR made impossible
the holding of the 1982 OAU summit in Tripoli. For thirty-
two states were present while nineteen never showed up.
That led President Nyerere to argue that "a small minority
of nineteen states were holding a majority of thirty-two
states as hostages and depriving them of their duty to act
Sllbid., p. A90.
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and address themselves to the burning problems of Africa."62
However, the radical states did hold informal meetings in
Tripoli while Nigeria and Kenya played a neutral role.
The OAU 19th Summit was held in Addis Ababa between
June 6 - 12, 1983. The summit got underway after Senegal,
Algeria and Ethiopia agreed on a formula according to
which
SDAR's friends would urge it to withdraw, while
Morocco's friends would urge King Hassan to
implement the Nairobi summit resolution calling
for direct negotiations between Morocco and
POLISARIO and to guarantee an impartial
referendum.63
Thus, the OAU 19th Summit was held with two empty seats:
SDAR's and Libya's. So, the conservatives succeeded
temporarily in preventing SOAR from being seated at the
summit.
One may argue that Zaire's stands at the OAU have
depended on the issue involved. Indeed, in most of the
cases, Zaire takes stands which safeguard the interest of
its Western friends. Because of the class interest of the
Zairean ruling elite, Zaire is unlikely to take anti¬
neocolonial stands in African internal affairs. As a
matter of fact, stands based on special interests do not
62zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "The OAU in 1982:
A Severe Setback for African Unity," in Legum, Africa
Contemporary Record: 1982-83, p. A48.
63colin Legum, "The OAU After Twenty Years: The Record
of Failures and Successes, " in Legum, Africa Contemporary
Record: 1983-84, p. A72.
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contribute to unify Africa. Therefore, it is evident
that dependency will continue to impact on inter-African
issues as long as superpowers are determined to maintain
neo-colonial domination in Africa.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The main concern of this study was to determine the
extent to which dependency shapes the foreign policy of
Zaire. In order to establish as clear as possible the
link between dependency and foreign policy, it was
necessary, in the first place, to analyze the nature of
the Zairean state and its external linkages. Thus, the
introductory chapter of this dissertation dealt with the
international nexus of the Zairean state. Indeed, having
a neo-colonial character, the Zairean state is more likely
to serve the interests of externally-based dominant
classes that sustain it. Furthermore, foreign forces
have been able to subject Zaire in the state of dependency
for several reasons such as the lack of a local economic
base for the Zairean bourgeoisie, Zaire's military unpre¬
paredness and the internal class conflicts. But, above
all, the class alliance between the Zairean ruling elite
and international monopoly capital has largely contributed
to align politically Zaire to the Western bloc. In any
case, because of the lack of a local economic base, the
Zairean bourgeoisie has nothing to lose by letting external
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forces control the Zairean economic structure. As
demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Zairean
bourgeoisie gets a lot of material advantages in the
process of foreign economic operations in Zaire. Also,
Zaire's military unpreparedness combined with the internal
class conflicts make the Zairen state rely on external
assistance in order to crush revolutionary pressure coming
from the masses that are dissatisfied with the socio¬
economic situation in the country. The material gap
between the ruling class and the masses is so big that
the state is unable to build a popular base in the country.
The ruling classes' taste for embourgeoisiement has
contributed to making the state seek continuously external
financial assistance in order to maintain its lifestyle.
Needless to contend that, at the moment, Zaire is obviously
dependent to the extent that the country extensively relies
on Western countries as far as finance, investments,
technology, trade and military assistance are concerned.
In the context of this study, the concept of dependency is
seen as a special perspective within a Marxian analysis.
By focusing on class analysis, it was possible to identify
the ideological character of the Zairean ruling class whose
political stands are more likely to be closer to the Western
stands as a result of the class alliance. Therefore, the
ideological character of the Zairean state may be a key
reference helping to comprehend Zaire's political behavior
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at the international level.
Despite the controversy surrounding the concept of
non-alignment, most of the scholars agree that freedom of
decision in international affairs and the exclusive right
to make choices on the basis of issues' merits constitute
the core of the non-alignment ideology. Therefore, the
question was to examine whether Zaire has the freedom to
make international decisions and judge issues on the basis
of merit despite its dependency. To answer this question,
it was necessary to deeply analyze Zaire's dependency in
order to determine its level or degree before establishing
its impact on Zaire's foreign policy. That was the concern
of the second chapter of this dissertation.
As demonstrated through the analysis of its economic
structure, Zaire's dependency is obvious at the economic,
technological, trade, financial and even military levels.
At this juncture, it should be pointed out that the
convergence of interests between the Zairean ruling class
operating within the framework of dependency and inter¬
national monopoly capital largely contributes to maintaining
"dominant-dependent" relations between Zaire and the
Western countries. Also, Zaire's dependency has continued
to increase as a result of the intensification of class
conflicts. For, the Zairean ruling class has no choice
but to strengthen its ties with the Western world which
provides the Zairean state with all necessary assistance
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in order to keep revolutionary opposing forces in check.
After evaluating the degree of Zaire's dependency,
it was possible to analyze, in the third chapter, its
impact on the formulation of Zaire's foreign policy. As
demonstrated, the three periods which divide the economic
history of Zaire coincide with three significant trends in
Zaire's foreign policy. Indeed, it is obvious that Zaire's
foreign policy has been influenced by domestic socio¬
economic situations. As Zaire entered the economic crisis
period since 1975, the ruling class has been unable to run
the country without massive financial, economic and military
assistance from the Western bloc. The logic consequence of
this reliance on the West lies in the fact that the Zairean
government has become unable to put into practice its
principles laid down in the party manifesto. As a result,
although Zaire's rhetoric, slogans and principles are
militant and revolutionary, on the practical level, Zaire's
actions and stands are mostly pro-Western and conservative.
The conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis
is that Zaire's foreign policy is largely influenced by
external forces which guarantee the survival of the Zairean
state. To put it clearly, a policy of non-alignment cannot
be conducted within a state of neo-colonialism. In order
for Zaire to implement an independent foreign policy, a
series of radical changes need to be made. Structural
change and political liberalization are two of the principal
229
issues that must be addressed. Indeed, in order for
Zaire to get rid of its dependence, radical structural
and institutional changes must be made. As demonstrated
earlier, the economic structure of Zaire is extrovert,
that is, it has been set up to meet the needs of the
Western world. Despite the advent of independence in
June 1960, the Zairean economic structure has never
undergone a radical change. However, one must admit that
because of the fact that Zaire is located at the periphery
of the world capitalist system, radical changes are not
easy to implement. For, powerful external forces struggle
to maintain the status quo. Therefore, the process must
begin with a change in the attitudes and conceptions of
the ruling class. The Zairean ruling class must pursue
the interests which are more or less similar to the masses
instead of foreigners. The coalition between the masses
and the ruling elite will result in the identification of
economic forces which exploit Zaire's wealth. At the
same token, an economic structural change must lead Zaire
and its people to control all means of production. But
above all, Zaire must stop relying on mineral production,
for international monopoly capital is capable of sabotaging
the Zairean economy because of the fact that production and
marketing of Zaire's mineral products are presently
controlled by Western economic forces. An alternative to
the actual process of mineral production must be found.
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In the meantime, Zaire must boost its agricultural
production in order to feed its population. Farmers and
peasants must be assisted and encouraged by the government
in order to increase food production. One must create
institutions which serve the needs of the whole population.
For, the actual institutions serve the interest of the
ruling class as they do not address and solve the problems
facing the masses in urban as well as rural areas. One
has to find another institutional arrangement which can
give the masses the opportunity to address their problems.
Indeed, it is obvious that the actual political
institutions set up by the Mobutu regime are too bourgeois
to tackle the basic problems facing the Zairean masses.
Being appointed by President Mobutu, members of those
different political institutions - with the exception of
the Legislative Council - are mostly concerned about
their material conditions to the extent that they clearly
represent the President rather than the masses. Repre¬
sentatives of the party at the local levels do not hesitate
to harm citizens who demonstrate some sign of unwillingness
to be loyal to the party official land institutions.
Therefore, masses attend party rallies because of the
coercive practices used by party officials backed by the
army. Further, most of the members of the Legislative
Council enjoy the advantages given to them by the regime
and seem to ignore the problems facing the people who
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elected them.
Therefore, whatever the political system that Zairean
people want to adopt, it is important to stress that the
new institutional arrangement must have the support of the
masses that would control it through basic popular
commissions. To put it clearly, at the local levels,
people should organize themselves in order to choose their
representatives at the district, regional, and national
levels. Thus, problems facing people at the locals levels
are channelled to the national institutions through the
district and regional representatives. As a result,
instead of having a representative of the party or govern¬
ment at the local levels, there would be representatives
of the masses at the national level. So, structural and
institutional changes will play a major role in the
process of eliminating Zaire's dependency in order to
implement a militant foreign policy. Radical economic
changes coupled with political participation of the
masses certainly result in the reduction of social tension
in Zaire. Actually, there are a lot of opposition forces
and political tendencies in Zaire. Most of the opposition
leaders are in exile and struggle in one way or another
to overthrow the Zairean leadership. This situation has
contributed to getting Zaire closer to the Western world
which assists the Zairean government in order to prevent
a revolutionary takeover. The development of political
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tendencies has attracted foreign intervention in Zaire's
domestic problems. One has to encourage the different
political tendencies to express their views in order to
come to establish a political system which can be approved
by the Zairean people. Once the Zairean ruling class
acknowledges the primacy of national interest over private
interest, Zaire would be able to implement an independent
foreign policy and take the leadership role in Africa
because of its size and its strategic place in Africa.
In short, a political liberalization must take place in
Zaire. To put it clearly, changes in the economic
structure and political institutions must be done and
individual freedom restored. This process will lead the
Zairean state to rely on the popular support of the masses
instead of external assistance. By the same token, the
foreign policy of Zaire will be a reflection of the
masses' interests instead of foreigners. It is only in
this context that one can speak of non-aligned foreign
policy, that is, a foreign policy based on freedom of
actions and judgment on merits.
APPENDIX I
VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS SUPPORTED
BY ZAIRE AND SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES, 1966-1974
The following resolutions were supported by the
majority of the developing nations including Zaire and by
the Soviet-bloc countries while some Western countries
voted against them:
Resolution No. 2138 (10/22/66) reaffirming the
obligation to transfer power to the people of
Zimbabwe: U.S., Great Britain, France and
Belgium abstained.
Resolution No. 2145 (10/27/66) reaffirming the
right of the people of South West Africa to
independence: United Kingdom and France
abstained.
Resolution No. 2184 (12/12/66) discouraging the
establishment of closer economic and financial
relations with South Africa: U.S., United
Kingdom, France and Belgium abstained.
Resolution No. 2226 (12/20/66) requesting the
grant of independence to the Nauruan people:
U.K. voted against while France and Belgium
abstained.
Resolution No. 2227 (12/20/66) requesting the
grant of independence of New Guinea: U.S. and
U.K. voted against while France and Belgium
abstained.
Resolution No. 2228 (12/20/66) appealing to
ensure the right of self-determination to the
people of Djibouti: U.S., U.K, and Belgium
abstained.
Resolution No. 2229 (12/20/66) calling for the
decolonization of Spanish Sahara: U.S., U.K.,
France and Belgium abstained.
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Resolution No. 2230 (12/20/66) calling for the
transfer of power to the people of Equatorial
Guinea: U.S., U.K., and France abstained.
Resolution No. 2238 (12/20/66) appealing to the
U.K. to withdraw its troops from Oman: U.K. and
Belgim voted against while France abstained.
Resolution No. 2248 (5/19/67) calling for the
creation of a council to administer South West
Africa: U.S., U.K., France, and Belgium abstained.
Resolution No.2262 (11/3/67) condemning the South
African armed forces in Southern Rhodesia: U.S.,
U.K., France, and Belgium abstained.
Resolution No. 2270 (11/17/67) condemning the
colonial policy of Portugal: U.S., and U.K.
voted against while France and Belgium abstained.
Resolution No. 2671 (12/8/70) condemning the system
of apartheid: U.K., France and Belgium abstained.
Resolution No. 3158 (12/14/73) calling for U.K. to
take steps towards the independence of Seychelles:
U.S., U.K., and France voted against while Belgium
abstained.
Resolution No. 3160 (12/14/73) calling for a
negotiation between U.K. and Argentina for a
peaceful settlement of the Falkland Islands:
U.S., U.K., France and Belgium abstained.
Resolution No. 3175 (12/17/73) reaffirming the
illegal exploitation of human and natural resources
by Israel in the occupied Arab territories: U.S.
voted against while U.K., France and Belgium
abstained.
Resolution No. 3236 (11/11/74) appealing to all
states to support the Palestinian people in the
struggle to restore their rights: U.S. voted
against while U.K., France and Belgium abstained.
Source: Index to Proceeding of the General Assembly.
New York: United Nations Publications, 1975-1985.
APPENDIX II
VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS NOT SUPPORTED
BY ZAIRE AND SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES, 1975-1985
All of the following resolutions were not supported by
Zaire; most of them were not supported by some or all
Western countries while only a couple of them were not
supported by the Soviet-bloc (from 1975-1985).
Twenty Ninth Session 1975, Seventh Special
Session 1975 and Thirteenth Session 1975
Resolution No. 3379 (11/10/75) calling for the
elimination of all forms of racial discrimination
and equating racism with Zionism and apartheid:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 3390-A (11/18/75) calling for the
reunification of the two Koreas (South and North):
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 3390-B (11/18/75) calling for the
North and the South of Korea to observe the
principles of the North-South joint statement and
urging foreign troops stationed in South Korea
under the flag of the U.N. to withdraw: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 3448 (12/9/75) condemning violations
of human rights in Chile: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 3450 (12/9/75) reaffirming the human
need of families in Cyprus to be informed about
missing relatives: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 3458-A (12/10/75) reaffirming the
inalienable right of the people of Spanish Sahara




Resolution No. 3485 (12/12/75) deploring the
military intervention of the armed forces of
Indonesia in Portuguese Timor: Zaire abstained.
Thirty-First Session 1976, First Part
21 Sept. - 22 Dec. 1976
Resolution No. 31/49 (12/1/76) requesting the
governments of Argentina and the U.K., and the
Northern Ireland to expedite the negotiations
concerning the dispute about sovereignty over
the Falkland Islands: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 31/53 (12/1/76) deploring the
refusal of the government of Indonesia to
comply with the provisions of the General
Assembly Resolution No. 3485: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 31/58 (12/1/76) calling for the
U.S., as administering power, to take steps
toward self-determination and independence of
Guam: Zaire abstained.
Thirty-First Session 1977, Second Part
Thirty-Second Session 1977
Resolution No. 32/15 (11/9/77) calling upon all
states to respect the sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity and non-alignment of the
Republic of Cyprus: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 32/27 (11/28/77) calling upon the
U.K., and Northern Ireland, as administering
power to take all steps to facilitate the process
of independence of Brumei: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 32/34 (11/28/77) rejecting the
claim that East Timor has been integrated into
Indonesia: Zaire voted NO.
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Resolution No. 32/35 (11/28/77) condemning the
support which South Africa and the racist
minority regime of Rhodesia received from
foreign economic and financial interests:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 32/118 (12/16/77) deploring
violations of human rights in Chile: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 32/142 02/16/77) supporting
women exposed to colonialism, racism, and
apartheid in their struggle against the racist
regime in Southern Africa: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 32/198 (12/21/77) recalling the
provisions of the 3198 resolution of the
standards of accommodation for official travel





Resolution No. 33/31-A (12/13/78) reaffirming the
right of the people of the Western Sahara for
self-determination: Zaire voted NO.
Resolution No. 33/39 (12/13/78) deploring the
refusal of Indonesia to comply with the General
Assembly resolution: Zaire voted NO.
Resolution No. 33/40 (12/13/78) condemning foreign
economic support to racist regimes in South Africa
and Rhodesia: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 33/76 (12/15/78) demanding the
Nicaragua authorities to stop military and other




Resolution No. 33/97 (12/16/78) calling for
members states to submit comments on the draft
code of offenses against the peace and security
of mankind: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 33/99 (12/16/78) affirming that
all forms of racism, racial discrimination and
apartheid are abhorent: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 33/100 (12/16/78) proclaiming
that the elimination of all forms of racism and
of prejudices is a matter of high priority:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 33/172 (12/20/78) urging the
establishment of an investigatory body concerning
missing persons in Cyprus: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 33/174 12/20/78) deciding to
establish a voluntary fund called the UN Trust
Fund for Chile: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 33/175 (12/20/78) condemning the
continued violation of human rights in Chile:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 33/176 (12/20/78) welcoming the
fact that the Ad Hoc working group was finally
able to travel to Chile and carry out an
investigation of the human rights situation:
Zaire abstained.
Thirty-Fourth Session 1979
Resolution No. 34/37 (11/21/79) deploring the
aggravation of the situation resulting from the
continued occupation of the Western Sahara by
Morocco and the extension of that occupation to
the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania:
Zaire had two votes, NO and abstention.
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Resolution No. 34/47 (11/23/79) calling for the
Secretary-General to ensure that adequate
financial and other resources are allocated to
the sector of the Secretariat concerned with
human rights: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 34/48 (11/23/79) calling for the
creation of a post of United Nations High
Commissioner for human rights: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 34/65-B (11/29/79) declaring that
the Camp David accords and other agreements have
no validity in so far as they purport to determine
the future of the Palestinian people and of the
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since
1967: Zaire voted NO.
Resolution No. 34/87-C (11/12/79) calling for the
inclusion in the provisional agenda of the thirty-
fifth session an item entitled "Non-Stationing of
nuclear weapons on the territories of states where
there are no such weapons at present": Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 34/88 (11/12/79) calling for an
international cooperation for disarmament:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 34/91 (11/12/79) calling upon the
government of France to initiate negotiations
with the governemnt of Madagascar for the re¬
integration of the Islands of Glorieuses, Juan de
Nova, Europa and Bassas da India, which were
arbitarily separated from Madagascar: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 34/172 (11/17/79) calling for
effective measures to improve the situation
and ensure the human rights and dignity of all
migrant workers: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 34/179 (11/20/79) expressing
concern over the deterioration of human rights




16 Sept. 1980 -11 May 1981
Resolution No. 35/8 (10/30/80) calling upon states
to take strong measures relative to the preservation
of nature for the present and future generation:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 35/27 (11/11/80) declaring the
right for self-determination and independence
of the people of East Timor: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 35/123 (12/11/80) inviting the
government of France to initiate talks concern¬
ing the Malagasy Islands of Glorieuses, Juan de
Nova, Europa and Bassas da India: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 35/152-B (12/12/80) approving the
decision of the committe on disarmament to resume
intensive consideration of the item on the
cessation of the nuclear-arms race: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 35/152-G (12/12/80) calling for
international cooperation on disarmament: Zaire
had two votes, YES and abstention, while the
U.S. voted NO.
Resolution No. 35/154 (12/12/80) calling upon all
nuclear-weapon states to make solemn declaration
concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 35/156-C (12/12/80) calling for a
general and complete disarmament: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 35/169-A (12/15/80) demanding the
complete and unconditional withdrawal by Israel
from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories
occupied since 1967: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 35/169-B (12/15/80) declaring that
no state has the right to undertake any actions
that could affect the future of the Palestinian
people without the participation of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization: Zaire abstained.
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Resolution No. 35/185 (12/15/80) urging the Bolivian
authorities to ensure respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 35/188 (12/15/80) expressing concern
over the lack of improvement in human rights
situation in Chile: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 35/190 (12/15/80) calling for an
establishment of a voluntary fund of the U.N. for
victims of gross and flagrant violations of human
rights: Zaire abstained.
Thirty-Sixth Session, 1981-82
15 Sept. 1981 - 20 Sept. 1982
Resolution No. 36/27 (11/13/81) condemning Israeli
armed aggression against the Iraqi nuclear
installations: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 36/46 (11/24/81) calling for the
right of the people of Western Sahara for self-
determination: Zaire voted NO.
Resolution No. 36/50 (11/24/81) calling for the
right of the people of East Timor for self-
determination: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 36/92-C 02/9/81) calling for a
world disarmament campaign: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 36/92-D (12/9/81) calling for an
international cooperation for disarmament: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 36/92-J (12/9/81) urging a world¬
wide action for collecting signatures in support
of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the
arms race and for disarmament: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 36/92-K (12/9/81) calling for
prohibition of nuclear neutron weapon: Zaire
abstained.
APPENDIX II (continued)
Resolution No. 36/94 (12/9/81) approving the
conclusion of an international convention on
the strengthening of the security of non¬
nuclear weapon sttes against the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 36/96-B (12/9/81) urging
negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 36/97-E (12/9/81) calling for non¬
stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories
of states where there are no such weapons at
present: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 36/10 (12/9/81) calling for measures
to prevent nuclear catastrophe: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 36/120-E (12/10/81) stressing the
status of the Holy City of Jerusalem: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 36/151 (12/16/81) supporting the
UN voluntary fund for victims of torture: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 36/155 (12/16/81) deploring the
violation of human rights in El Salvador: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 36/157 (12/16/81) calling for
protection of human rights in Chile: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 36/171 (12/16/81) calling for the
respect of human rights in the case of Mr. Ziad
Abu Eain: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 36/226-A (12/17/81) deploring





21 Sept. 1982 - 19 Sept. 19^?"
Resolution No. 37/9 (11/4/82) calling for a
peaceful settlement of the Falkland Islands
issue: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 37/28 (11/23/82) calling for the
right of the people of Western Sahara for self-
determination and independence: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 37/70 (11/23/82) calling for the
right of the people of East Timor for self-
determination: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 37/65 (12/3/82) concerning the
question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte:
Zaire had two votes, abstention and YES, while
the U.S. abstained.
Resolution No. 37/78-C (12/9/82) calling for
nuclear weapons freeze: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 37/78-E (12/9/82) calling for
prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 37/78-J (12/9/82) calling for
non-use of nuclear weapons: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 37/80 (12/9/82) supporting the
strengthening of the security of non-nuclear
weapons states against the use of nuclear
weapons: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 37/88-F (12/13/82) calling for
freedom of all educational institutions in the
occupied Palestinian territories: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 37/99-A (12/13/82) calling for
non-stationing of nuclear weapons on territories




Resolution No. 37/120-H (12/16/92) on revenues
derived from Palestine refugge properties:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 37/123-A (12/16/82) deploring
Israel's activities in the Middle East: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 37/123-F (12/20/82) calling for
the implementation of UN resolutions: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 37/183 (12/17/82) condemning the
violation of human rights in Chile: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 37/184 (12/17/82) condemning the
voilation of human rights in Guatemala: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 37/815 (12/17/82) condemning the
violation of human rights in El Salvador: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 37/199 (12/18/82) calling for strong
measures to improve the effective enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms: Zaire abstained.
Thirty-Eighth Session, 1983-84
20 Sept. 1983 - 17. Sept. 1984
Resolution No. 38/7 (11/2/83) condemning U.S.
military intervention in Grenada: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/12 (11/16/83) calling for a
peaceful settlement of the Falkland Islands
issue: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/13 (11/21/83) reaffirming the
sovereignty of the Islamic Federal Republic of




Resolution No. 39/69 (12/15/83) condemning
Israel's refused to adhere to the treaty on
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/73-B (12/15/83) calling for
nuclear arms freeze: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/73-E (12/15/83) calling for
nuclear arms freeze: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/75 (12/15/83) calling for
nuclear arms freeze: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/76 (12/15/83) calling for
nuclear arms freeze: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/79-A (12/15/83) calling for
the release of Ziyad Abu Ein from Israeli prison:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/79-D (12/15/83) calling for
an investigation on Israeli practices and policies
in the occupied territories: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/79-G (12/15/83) calling for
freedom of all educational institutions in the
occupied Palestinian territories: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/83-H (12/15/83) on revenues
derived from Palestine refugee properties: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 38/100 (12/16/83) deploring the
violation of human rights in Guatemala: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 38/101 (12/16/83) deploring the
violation of human rights in El Salvador: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 38/102 (12/16/83) deploring the




Resolution No. 38/183-C (12/20/83) calling for
a prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/183-D (12/20/83) calling for
nuclear weapon freeze: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/188-F (12/20/83) calling for
an international cooperation for disarmament:
Zaire abstained.
Thirty-Ninth Session 1984-85
Resolution No. 39/9 (9/28/84) encouraging
cooperation between the United Nations and
the League of Arab States: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 38/14 (11/16/84) condemning
the Israeli armed aggression against the
Iraqi nuclear installation: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/40 (12/5/84) declaring the
right of the people of Western Saharan for
self-determination and independence: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 39/57 (12/12/84) calling for
international arrangements to secure the
non-nuclear weapons states against the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 39/60 (12/12/84) calling for
prohibition of nuclear weapon tests: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 39/65-B (12/12/84) calling for
prohibition of chemical and bacteriological
weapons: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/95-A (1.2/14/84) condemning




Resolution No. 38.95-B (12/14/84) asking Israel
to comply with the Geneva convention relative
to the protection of civilian persons in time
of war: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/95-D (12/14/84) condemning
Israel's refusal to allow special committee
access to the occupied territories: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 39/95-F (12/14/84) condemning the
imposition of Israeli laws in the Golan Heights:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/95-G (12/14/84) condemning
Israeli practices against Palestinian students:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/99-F (12/14/84) calling for
the resumption of ration distribution to
Palestine refugees: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/99-H (12/14/84) on revenues
derived from Palestine refugee properties:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/99-1 (12/14/94) calling for
the protection of Palestine refugees: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 39/101 (12/14/84) denouncing
Israel's decision to build a canal linking the
Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 39/119 (12/14/84) deploring the
violation of human rights in El Salvador: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 39/120 (12/14/84) deploring the
violation of human rights in Guatemala: Zaire
abstained.
Resolution No. 39/121 (12/14/94) deploring the
violation of human rights in Chile: Zaire
abstained.
APPENDIX II (continued)
Resolution No. 39/137 (12/14/84) calling for the
elaboration of a second optimal protocol to the
international covenant on civil and political
rights, aiming at the abolition of the death
penalty: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/147 (12/17/84) denouncing
Israeli nuclear armament: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/148-C (12/17/84) calling for
nuclear weapons freeze: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/148-D (12/17/84) calling for
non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of
nuclear war: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/148-E (12/17/84) calling for
prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon:
Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/151-D (12/17/84) calling for
nuclear weapon freeze: Zaire abstained.
Resolution No. 39/151-1 (12/17/84) calling for
limitation and reduction of naval armaments:
Zaire abstained.
Source: Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly.
























Source: New Africa Yearbook 1980. Dunstable:






Palm product 1,155 1,134
Coffee 82 92




Other cereals 58 58
Cassava 11,844 12,230
Yams/Sweet potatoes 474 485
Other roots 106 109
Logs 152 162
Sugar cane 813 834
Banana 1,697 1,742
Pi neapples 363 370
Rubber 29 32
Source: New Africa Yearbook 1980. Dunstable:
Waterlows, 1980, p. 3^6.
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EVOLUTION OF MEDIUM AND LONG TERM
EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT




June 30, 1979 3,654,836 662,317
December 31, 1980(1) 4,282,933 17,187








June 30, 1979 200,342 3,855,178
December 31, 1980 (1 ) 2,766 4,285,699
December 31, 1981(2) 60,240 4,142,614
Source: Africa Research Bulletin : Economic,
Financial and Technical Series 19:7




(in millions of dol1ars)
1979 1980 1981
Copper 679 912 726
Cobalt 571 378 156
Other products (1) 49 78 86
Gross total 1,299 1,368 968
Marketing expenses -211 -240 -174
Net total 1,088 1,128 794
(1) Includes zinc, silver, gold and cadimium
Source: Africa Research Bulletin: Economic,
Financial and Technical Series 19:7
(July 15 - August 14, 1^82), p. 6520.
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PRINCIPAL EXPORTS OTHER THAN THOSE OF GECAMINES
(in min ions of do!1ars)
1979 1980 1981
Crude oil
Volume (thousands of 7,535 6,534 7,668
barrels)
Unit price (dollars 20.27 34.45 35.67
per barrel)
Value 153 225 273
Coffee (value) 145 163 112
Diamonds (value) 99 96 74
Copper (value) 57 67 59
Source: Africa Research Bulletin : Economic,
Financial and Technical Series 19:7
(July 15 - August 14, 1982), p. 6520 •
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